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ABSTRACT 
     This project sets out to understand the Chinese press within a regional context during the 
post-Mao reform era. As an extension of the Party press, post-Mao popular newspapers grew 
from within the Party-state bureaucracies in response to the economic and social reform since the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. Foregrounded by the history of Southern Weekend [Nanfang 
Zhoumo], a news weekly based in Guangzhou yet with national influence especially since the 
late 1990s, the study aims to examine how popular newspapers have explored the forms and 
politics of their journalism under new historical conditions. For each period of development, the 
project worked to locate the key transformations of the Guangzhou press, and then characterized 
the journalistic paradigm of Southern Weekend in reference to the sources of change. It presents a 
journalism history of what I call the “Party-popular” expanding from cultural to social and 
political realms in the post-Mao Chinese society.  
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driven by the need to reduce overlap of responsibilities between the two regulators and stream-
line bureaucracy especially when, with the arrival of the Internet era, both tried to exert control 
over the various Internet-based new media. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps no other newspaper in the post-Mao era attracted as much attention regarding press 
and politics in mainland China as Southern Weekend [nanfang zhoumo]. This provincial 
newspaper is often studied as a groundbreaking commercial newspaper, independent voice, and 
organ of professional journalism. Despite apparent limitations, the prevailing image in its 
popular and scholarly narrative is of courageous journalists seizing on an opening to produce the 
kind of investigative reportage admired in the West. In the conventional story, this opening 
closed, and the party-state reasserted control.  
The story I am about to tell is more nuanced. I situate Southern Weekend in the historical 
context of local competition, regional experimentation, and transborder cultural flows. Its story is 
not one of simple confrontation with the Party-state but of mediating between a Party-state 
bureaucracy on the one hand and a booming chaotic media marketplace on the other. I will tell a 
story not of heroic individual journalists (important as they have been) but of complex newsroom 
developments regarding practices, structures, and divisions of labor. This would be, as John 
Nerone kindly summarized for me, “less a story of a discrete journalistic sphere than of a 
geography of news practices embedded in a national popular culture.”  
This project is, in short, a social and cultural history of Southern Weekend. As such, it makes 
a contribution to journalism history that is often written from the inside out. The conventional 
approach normally highlights inventions initiated by great figures within the newsroom, and 
contains with it an evolutionary logic in journalism towards political independence (e.g. Park, 
1923). In American journalism history, dissatisfaction with the progressive paradigm appeared in 
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the 1970s, and called for writing social and cultural histories of the press (Nerone, 1987: 383). 
Within these new styles, the evolutionary logic moves beyond the individualism of journalists 
and editors. The sources of journalistic development were explored not as the working out of a 
particular set of professional practices but embedded within specific socio-historical conditions. 
The answers to what drove journalism towards the hegemonic form of “objectivity,” for instance, 
vary greatly depending on one’s emphasis of the “social.” While many historians agreed upon the 
central role of mass market in driving the press toward its current commercial orientation (e.g. 
Baldasty 1992; Chalaby 1998), others emphasized different defining factors, including the 
emergence of mass politics or cultural consensus of the American society, in shaping the face of 
news production (Schudson 1978; Schiller 1981). Informed by American journalism histories 
that have moved beyond a progressive logic, my project on Southern Weekend is a paralleled 
investment on Chinese journalism history that has long been captured by a mirror image—the 
seemingly invariable political control and absence of freedom. 
A social and cultural approach to post-Mao press also adds a non-western episode to the 
global history of journalism within the neoliberal moment. The influential Four Theories of the 
Press (Siebert, Peterson, Schramm, 1956), though have been updated from the original context of 
Cold War (Nerone, 1995; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Christians et al., 2009), continued to cast a 
long shadow in thinking about media and communications in non-Western countries. The 
primary occupation with “free versus unfree" press assigned to different countries has already 
triggered multiple calls to broaden the conceptual framework (Ostini & Fung, 2002; Yin, 2008; 
Meng, 2010; Sparks, 2012). In the case of contemporary China, Colin Sparks argued earlier that 
the plural nature of Party-state, society, and media relations no longer supports a unitary press 
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model (Sparks, 2012). Focusing on a leading press market in post-Mao China for three decades, 
therefore, my project joins the recent efforts (e.g. Xin, 2012; Zhang, 2014) in producing media 
histories to enrich empirical evidence for further theorization. While, according to Clifford 
Christians and others (2009), the role of the western press varies from monitorial, facilitative, 
radical, to collaborative ones, the post-Mao Chinese press has yet come to comparable 
conceptualization as its previous “mouthpiece” role. The post-Communist press, in short, calls 
for nuanced analysis that grounded better by social specifics than unchanged theoretical entry 
points. 
By telling this journalism history from the outside in, I also hope that the project on Southern 
Weekend can illuminate the ways in which news media entangled with the play of power in 
China where formal political discourses cannot represent a quickly stratifying post-Mao Chinese 
society. Gramsci once wrote that “in countries where there is a single, totalitarian, governing 
party…other parties in fact always do exist and other tendencies which cannot be legally 
coerced…political questions are disguised as cultural ones” (1988: 149). Concerning the 
popularity of the post-Mao press, it is logical to assume its importance in addressing emerging 
social interests and conflicts that reconfigure its relations with the Party-state and readership. 
Journalism culture, in other words, bears with it greater political relevance than the narrow lens 
of political control and resistance in countries like China. 
Defining the “Popular”   
I use the term “popular newspaper” for the project to refer to newspapers established and 
openly circulated during the post-Mao period. They include not only subsidiaries of Party 
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newspapers but also newspapers founded by various governmental units, professional and semi-
social organizations, and—especially in the 1980s—unauthorized individuals. “Popular” here, 
first of all, refers to the market orientation of the post-Mao newspapers. Popular journalism in 
this project then broadly encompasses different kinds of post-Mao newspapers in their changing 
forms. Party newspapers and dailies, on the other hand, refer to newspaper titles established 
before the economic reform. Mostly affiliated with Party committees on municipal and 
provincial levels, Party newspapers continued to carry on the obligation to propagate Party-state 
policies and guide public opinion but also, like popular newspapers, initiated market reform. 
Using “popular newspaper” has several benefits. It suspends the convenient connotations one 
gets from “tabloid” [xiao bao] as opposed to “serious newspapers.” Within the dramatic 
evolvement of Chinese newspapers in the post-Mao period, the division of journalism between 
Party dailies and the newly-established papers was not always self-evident. Going popular in the 
rising consumer market, after all, has been a hegemonic turn of the Chinese press regardless of 
their bureaucratic origins. Using the term “popular” in this study helps us to open the room to 
understand different types of newspapers and their relationships without categorical assumptions.  
To be sure, the term “tabloid” [xiao bao] continues to be used in referring to the post-Mao 
popular newspapers (e.g. Huang, 2001; Hendrischke, 2005) for at least two reasons. One is 
defined by the politics of their institutional relations. Similar to its western counterpart, the term 
xiao bao has the derogatory meaning of reporting the sensational, the trivial, and even the 
fabricated. Market orientation, after all, was the central metaphor of capitalism and dismissed in 
Mao’s regime. To call the post-Mao popular newspapers “tabloids,” generally speaking, 
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represents the lasting dominance of the Party press and ideology in policing the post-Mao 
expansion of the press. 
The other possible reason is more tangible. Tabloids, xiao bao or literary “small 
newspapers,” were used to describe the size of these newspapers as opposed to Party dailies 
which normally were printed on broadsheet-size papers (folded in half instead of quarters). In the 
1980s, in particular, while the right to print was extended from Party committees to other 
governmental units, many of the newly-established papers were launched with limited resources. 
Those new comers, therefore, were normally in tabloid size. As I will discuss in chapter 1, these 
tabloids were also circulating in large quantity and often carrying dubious content especially in 
comparison with the Party dailies. The starting point of post-Mao newspapers, one may say, was 
the moment when the two branches looked most distant from each other. But as these 
newspapers evolved, the distinctions of “tabloid” waned. For Southern Weekend, its “de-
tabloidization” happened in both senses of the word as it changed its journalistic paradigm as 
well as the size of the newspaper. In this project, I adopted the term “tabloid” only up to the end 
of the 1980s and early 1990s, or chapter 1, to acknowledge the messy but quickly evolving post-
Mao press.  
Some others also used “official vs. unofficial” (e.g. Link, 1985; Zhao, 2002) or “Party 
(organ) vs. non-Party (organ)” (e.g. Lee 2003: 158; Tong, 2011) to categorize these two types of 
newspapers. These terms highlight the institutional origins of the two. Even though both types of 
newspapers are state-owned until today, the differences between their affiliations with Party 
committees versus other administrative departments still hold significant explanatory power in 
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understanding their post-Mao fates. So I also use “Party newspapers” and “non-Party 
newspapers” whenever their political affiliations are emphasized. 
In addition to these direct benefits in newspaper history, I also prefer the concept of 
“popular” which potentially links journalism to the field of cultural studies, two sub-disciplines 
coexisting uneasily together. As Barbie Zelizer put it, “journalism remains constrained by its 
somewhat reified but nonetheless instrumental respect for facts, truth, and reality” (Zelizer, 
2004). Its commitment to modernism, in other words, seems conceptually unreflective from the 
perspective of critical cultural studies. A proposal on “cultural studies of journalism,” I assume, 
would risk blasphemy in the journalism department while ineffably uninteresting to cultural and 
media scholars whose interpretative schemes have a much bigger space in the fictional world of 
literature, film, and television. Such tension between journalism and cultural studies in 
disciplinary epistemology also manifested in the division of research agenda between “news” 
and “entertainment.” While journalism scholars are preoccupied with “news” and the role of the 
press in political communication, their definition of “politics” may be seen as stubbornly narrow 
by the other camp.  
But journalism, indeed, is and has been entangled with cultural formation and had its place in 
cultural studies. The British school of cultural studies, for one, had journalism as a key focus for 
its work in the 1970s with an emphasis on class relations. In studying the relationship between 
the press and popular culture, Raymond Williams (1970, 1978) grounded his definition of the 
“popular” in the historical development of the British press in the nineteenth century. He 
identified how the radical political press was isolated and steadily incorporated along with the 
rise of the “respectable press” led by The Times and the emergence of Sunday papers. The 
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meaning of “popular” was defined by Williams in three different categories: (1) the old radical 
sense of “for the people” as represented in the political press of the 1890s; (2) an intermediate 
sense of “a skillful and vigorous combination of generalized political attitudes with the 
established popular reading materials”; and (3) the purely market sense as a steady movement 
away from independent political radicalism and a more open reliance on habitual tastes and 
markets (1978: 49).  
Similarly, Stuart Hall, another key figure of British cultural studies, had used the case of 
British press history to emphasize the relation between culture and questions of hegemony. The 
rise of a new kind of popular press in mid-nineteenth century Britain, for Hall, not only was an 
active marginalization of the indigenous radical press but also of the process of changing class 
relations (2006). Hall extended Williams’ ideas on cultural formation among the “dominant, 
residual, and emergent” (1977) to other forms such as incorporation, distortion, resistance, and 
negotiation; and he further destabilized the market definition of  the “popular” as oscillating 
between pure autonomy and total encapsulation rather than “whole and coherent.”  
In addition, empirical work done by the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at 
the University of Birmingham such as Paper Voices: The Popular Press and Social Change, 
1935-1965 (Smith, 1975) and Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order (Hall, 
1978) also investigated the interactions between the British press and broader sociopolitical 
changes, and studied journalism within the politics of public culture. In the introduction to Paper 
Voices, which was drawn from a longer research report published by the University of 
Birmingham in 1970, Stuart Hall identified the goal of the project as “to examine how the 
popular press interprets social change to its readers; and to explore and develop methods of close 
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analysis as a contribution to the general field of cultural studies.” Newspaper journalism, 
according to Hall, was linked to the popular political consciousness assumed by the press in its 
readership (p.13). By comparing two British newspapers, the book found that the left-wing 
newspaper Mirror failed to challenge in post-war Britain the metaphor of “an unprecedentedly 
affluent society” portrayed by the Tories and supporting newspapers like the Telegraph. 
Journalism in both projects, in brief, was understood “as a structure of meanings rather than as a 
channel for the transmission and reception of news” (Smith, 1975: 17). 
The early theoretical framework of British cultural studies in journalism was also shared by  
American counterparts and followers. In his critique to the field of journalism history, James 
Carey clearly defined journalism in terms of his cultural approach to communication as “one 
form of human imagination, shared by writers and readers, in which reality has entered 
consciousness in an aesthetically satisfying way” (1974). As a form of industrialized expression, 
journalism here is defined closer to what Raymond Williams called “structures of 
feeling” (1977). In a later attempt, James Carey traced the eclipse of public life in American 
history on the ground of press transformations and argued that “the real problem of journalism is 
that the term which grounds it—the public—has been dissolved, dissolved in part by journalism” 
(1987). His criticism here was directed against “a journalism of the expert and the conduit, a 
journalism of information, facts, objectivity, and publicity,” as promoted by Walter Lippmann, 
that inherited and institutionalized in American history (p.14). These examples show that 
journalism and its politics locate beyond the narrow measures of political or economic autonomy. 
Popular journalism, especially, has its potential in revealing the key characteristics and elements 
of public life.  
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In Chinese studies, post-Mao research on popular culture has yet been located within the 
press and journalism until recent years (e.g. Cai, 2005). The definition of the “popular” therefore 
has stayed as a subject of much debate if not confusion. Baranovitch (2003) identified two 
common ways of understanding “popular” in contemporary Chinese history: one is associated 
with the Cultural Revolution during which the “popular” was produced and disseminated by the 
Party-state; the other, as presented in Unofficial China: Popular Culture and Thought in the 
People’s Republic (Madsen, Pickowicz, and Link, 1989), identifies the popular with the 
unofficial. In studying post-Mao popular music, Baranovitch found that, comparing to the 1980s, 
the permeating state power in the cultural scene intensified in the 1990s. He further argued that 
the relationship between popular culture and state power varied beyond the dichotomy of 
cooperation and resistance. Forms of symbiosis, assimilation, and collaboration have been 
evident. The politics of popular music has more to do with its changing relations with state 
power than the abstract measure of “freedom”. 
Bringing these discussions on the “popular” in cultural studies to post-Mao journalism, an 
explicit goal here for the project is to think about the relations between “the political” and “the 
popular” in Chinese journalism history. This, in fact, has been an integral part of a cultural 
situation where the quest for modernity in China initiated. To have a better historical context, a 
brief outline should be offered here. 
Chinese Newspapers: an Overview 
Outside the imperial system, journalism histories in the nineteenth century China were 
written predominantly along the lines between foreign [wai bao] and domestic [min bao] 
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undertakings. It was the time when the printing press ineluctably interacted with the maelstrom 
of conflicting political forces among the tottering Qing regime, colonial gunboat power, and the 
rise of reformists and revolutionary parties. With the strong agenda for renewing political power, 
propagating religious and modern knowledge, or modernizing the political system, the genre of 
“tabloid” seemed hardly relevant. Instead, three types of publication—the protestant press, the 
domestic press, and the commercial press—played a central role in the so-called Chinese fin de 
siècle. 
Early missionaries from Britain began publishing periodicals as early as 1815 in Southeast 
Asia and expedited their inroads to mainland trading ports after the Opium War (1839-1842). As 
part of the extension of western journalism yet departing from its mainstream commercial model, 
the liberal wing of the protestant press had remarkably secularized toward Chinese social life by 
the late nineteenth century (Volz and Lee 2007; Tao, 2007). From promoting western science and 
technologies, advocating educational reform and participating in broad social issues through 
political criticism, the protestant press indeed served as the major source for the rise of the 
indigenous political press at the end of the nineteenth century in China (Zhang, 2007).  
The years after China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese war (1895) witnessed a surge of political 
papers and periodicals which soon surpassed the pre-1895 press in numbers, circulation, and 
political liveliness (Nathan, 1985), entering what Lin Yutang called the “Golden Age” of Chinese 
journalism (Lin, 1937: 114-130). Unlike the liberal protestant press which emphasized mass 
education as the role of journalism, however, these domestic papers and periodicals were deeply 
embroiled in national politics dominated by two groups of politician-journalists: the 
conservative-reformists led by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, and the revolutionaries led by 
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Sun Yat-sen. Acclaimed by news historians as the founding norm of Chinese journalism, the 
political press prioritized editorials and debates over “news” to compete for followers. Ge 
Gongzhen, who wrote in the 1920s, applauded “the political papers for one thing relied on 
donations without profit-orientation; and for the other offered unequivocal opinions to guide 
readers. This is the right track of newspapers [baozhi zhi zhenggui] yet hard to be found these 
days” (Ge, 1925: 179). Zeng Xubai (1966), similarly, endorsed the political press as socially 
responsive because “at the time readers cared about what the newspapers thought [yi] instead of 
what happened [shi]” (Zeng: 193).  
A third model of journalism also growing in Chinese treaty ports of the nineteenth century 
was the commercial press founded by foreign merchants. As Volz and Lee (2007) noticed, the 
secularization of protestant press in the late nineteenth century was a partial reaction to 
competing with those “ungodly” papers for influence. In the case of the immensely popular 
Shenbao (1872-1949) founded by the British merchant Ernest Major and others in Shanghai, 
cultural and political conservatism was apparent in its close lineage with classical literacy and 
urban consumer culture (Mittler, 2004; Tsai and Connect 2009). Despite its financial 
independence, Shenbao did not try to assert political leadership until Shanghai was bombed by 
the Japanese in the early 1930s (Wang, S., 1994). The widely read supplement of Shenbao, the 
Dianshizhai Pictorial, was so well embedded in the urban life of Shanghai—advocating projects 
from running water system to city hygiene—that it did not say a word about the 1895 petitions 
for political reform or the turning point in Chinese political history toward the 1911 Revolution 
(Ye, 2003).  
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What Lin Yutang celebrated as the “Golden Age” of Chinese journalism between 1895 and 
1911, however, did not include a fourth and less cared-about member—the modern tabloid press
—growing along with the commercial press in Hong Kong, Shanghai and other treaty port cities. 
Founded toward the end of the nineteenth century by low and middle-ranking literati who relied 
on the marketplace for fame and profit, the tabloid press cast a sarcastic lens on a descending 
imperial court, representing the voices of outsiders and underdogs who lost their entry to the 
nation’s political life after the imperial exam system was abolished in 1905 (Wang, J., 2012). 
Nourished by popular fiction, tabloids also embraced local leisure such as opium dens, gambling 
houses, and brothels, things the political press despised. After the Qing court turned to a reform 
agenda in its last years, the tabloid papers and magazines also relied heavily on social criticism 
to stay popular (Wang, 2007: 92-95).  
After the Xinhai Revolution (1911) which ended the imperial rule of the Qing Dynasty, 
newspapers of the early Republic of China (ROC, 1912-1949 in the mainland) largely inherited 
the tradition of political press of the late Qing, relying mostly on political commentary instead of 
news and so “the hopes and fears of a paper depends on a few pens” (Zeng 1966: 263). The 
Nationalist (KMT) government established Party newspapers and news networks on both central 
and regional levels while factional papers within the Party or subsidized by regional warlords, 
the army, and other political juntos also prevailed and competed for power (Gao, 2005). While 
partisanship seemed to enhance the number of papers quickly, big commercial dailies such as 
Shenbao and Xinwenbao and a tabloid press continued to flourish. In 1920s and 1930s, more 
than a thousand tabloids—mostly published every three days—were circulating all kinds of 
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“inside stories,” anecdotes, and celebrity news in Shanghai and other urban centers, establishing 
urban leisure as a genre in the print market (Meng, 2005: 20-21). 
The momentous role played by the political press in the late Qing state of affairs continued 
the tradition of “literati politics” [wenren lunzheng] (Lee, 2008), and cast a long shadow in 
making and evaluating the Republican popular newspapers. The U.S. trained Deweyan scholar 
Hu Shi (a.k.a. Hu Shih, 1891-1962) complained in 1928 that “all Shanghai newspapers are dead, 
suffocated by the government; only a few tabloids occasionally spoke with some honesty” (Hu, 
2001: 110-113). Lin Yutang, having witnessed the passing “Golden Age,” lamented in 1930s the 
timid Party dailies and sensational tabloids as both insignificant and straying away from social 
life. For Lin, the flaccid Republican journalism was another example of the inverse relations 
between the government and the press in the power seesaw (Lin, 1937). 
As such, the political press continued to carry forward the domination of national politics in 
Chinese newspapers and contained newspaper within the educated elites and political struggles. 
Japanese aggression in the 1930s further heightened the need for a press—for both the KMT and 
the CCP—as a powerful instrument of public enlightenment, national consciousness, and mass 
mobilization. The political urgency felt by Chinese elite intellectuals even twisted the imported 
American model of journalism education, the hands-on pragmatist curriculum from Missouri, 
and gave more weight to courses on propaganda techniques and government public relations 
rather than business related ones (Volz and Lee, 2009).  
Before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC, 1949-), in brief, late Qing 
and Republican newspapers split along the lines of the political and the popular. The two were 
not only independent of each other but also mutually exclusive: the political journals took pride 
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in their patriotic motives and devoted themselves mostly to essays of political dispute and 
advocacy; the commercial papers flourished in semi-colonial cities and became immersed in the 
burgeoning urban life and culture.  
This divergence between the popular and the political in Chinese newspaper culture, 
however, was largely unified in Mao’s China (1949-1976). After the socialist transformation 
when newspapers were quickly incorporated into the state-planned economy (Zhang, 2009; 
Huang, 2012), the press became an integral part of the Party-state bureaucracy for policy 
propagation and political mobilization. Regional dailies followed closely People's Daily, the 
newspaper affiliated with the Central Party Committee, in layout, page design, and typography 
while local news was discouraged and kept to the minimum unless an item might serve as a 
model case for national emulation. The “mouthpiece” theory of the press by Lenin found its 
fullest articulation in the Chinese Communist Party’s press theory and has survived in multiple 
dimensions of Chinese media and ideological structure until today (Zhao, 2011). In Mao's top-
down and centralized communication system where the press was essentially CCP’s political 
speech in public, the meaning of “popular” in journalism was in its radical sense that the Party, 
proclaiming itself to be the vanguard of the proletariat, represents the interests of the people 
(Zhao, 1998: 19-22).  
In addition, there were also special interest newspapers and an entertainment-and-lifestyle 
oriented tabloid sector within the Party press structure. Special interests newspapers targeted 
social groups such as workers, farmers, women, and the youth. Workers’ Daily, for instance, was 
published by the Party’s mass organization All-China Workers’ Federation. In the late1950s and 
early 1960s, the Party also created 13 evening newspapers, most notably Yangcheng Evening 
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News in Guangzhou and Beijing Evening News in Beijing, as a form of popular culture for the 
urban population (Ibid: 129-131). Popular, in this second sense, was a skillful combination of 
widely-circulated cultural genres for party cadres, intellectuals, and a larger (mostly urban) 
readership as off-hour reading without deviating from the unitary national political agenda or the 
Party principle. The Yangcheng Evening News in Guangzhou, for instance, was known for 
“blending communism in chatting” and was popular among intellectuals and urban readers since 
its inception in 1957. Mostly shut down during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) for their 
distance from national politics, evening and special interest newspapers were revived in the post-
Mao period and signaled the restoration of literary and cultural content in newspapers. 
Historically, in sum, the division between political and popular press in China has not been 
resolved. In the rough account I sketched above, popular newspapers existed but only on the 
margin. If the early tabloids in semi-colonial port cities negotiated between classical literacy and 
urban consumer culture in late Qing China and embraced urban leisure in Republican China, the 
evening newspapers under Mao mediated between Party-state politics and the urban and 
intellectual life. The question for this project, simply speaking, is what has characterized popular 
newspapers in the post-Mao era as both Party-state owned and commercial. With a focus on 
Southern Weekend, a popular subsidiary of a provincial Party daily, this project will review the 
evolvement of the popular press within one of the most vibrant printing centers in post-Mao 
China to offer some answers. 
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Locating the Guangzhou Press 
As the capital city in the southern province of Guangdong, Guangzhou has a relatively long 
history of trading activities with the west as a treaty port. In the modern period of China fraught 
with war and political turbulence, large numbers of Cantonese emigrated overseas after the 
Opium War (1840-1842), after which Hong Kong, the outer port area approximately 100 miles 
further south of Guangzhou, was ceded to British rule till 1997. As part of the Western Bloc 
during the Cold War, British Hong Kong had been cut off from Mao’s China for three decades 
since 1949 even though waves of Guangdong refugees continued to cross the border to Hong 
Kong and overseas. The number of Cantonese expatriates, including those settled in British 
Hong Kong, reached nearly 10 million by 1949 and 20 million in the 1980s, accounting for about 
two thirds of the overseas Chinese population (Guangdong Province Gazette, 1996: 2-3; 374-5).  
The history of the maritime economy and the prevalence of overseas connections—especially 
with British Hong Kong—continued to play a role in the fate of the province during the Maoist 
and post-Mao periods. In the 1950s and 1960s, national investment was concentrated in interior 
instead of coastal provinces. Guangdong, as one of the most exposed areas, not only received 
little new investment but had some of its existing facilities moved inland (Vogel, 1989: 36). 
Under Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform, in contrast, overseas connections were redressed as 
not only legitimate but beneficial in inviting foreign capital and technologies. The shift, from 
Mao’s self-reliant nationalism to Deng Xiaoping’s strategic open policies, indicated another 
radical turn of Guangdong in relation to the domestic and the outside.  
While overseas connections especially with and via Hong Kong played a vital role in 
bringing back desirable capital, technologies, and managerial personnels necessary for the open 
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reform, domestic migration has brought in millions of laborers to the region, making it the 
second most populous megacity in China today (OECD, 2015: 36-7). The residential population 
of Guangzhou grew from 4.93 million in 1979 to 8.06 million in 2010 (Statistical Bureau of 
Guangzhou: 2012); the migrant population, on the other hand, increased from 420,000 in 1989 to 
3.91 million in 2006 (Yao et al., 2009). By 2010, people who lived in Guangzhou [chang zhu ren 
kou] regardless of their hukou or residential registration status had reached 12.7 million 
(Statistical Bureau of Guangzhou, 2011). A recent study shows that, between 1990 and 2005, 
more than 7.5 million inter-provincial migrants went to Guangdong, making it the number one 
destination within post-Mao China’s human migration (Chan, 2013: 9). Standing at the forefront 
of economic reform, therefore, the printing press in Guangzhou has been part and parcel of the 
cultural formation in the precipitating post-Mao socioeconomic transformations. 
Similar to other major cities in China, the newspapers in Guangzhou before the Cultural 
Revolution had three major components: (1) the provincial and municipal Party dailies (Southern 
Daily and Guangzhou Daily), (2) one evening newspaper (Yancheng Evening News), and (3) a 
few special interests newspapers sponsored by corresponding governmental departments or 
institutions such as Guangdong Police Gazette [Guangdong gongan bao], Guangdong 
Broadcasting [Guangdong guangbo], and Guangzhou Hygiene [Guangzhou weisheng]. 
Following the Soviet press model, again, the provincial Party newspaper Southern Daily adhered 
closely to the central newspaper People’s Daily and devoted limited space, usually no more than 
one out of four pages, to local news. The evening newspaper, on the other hand, was more 
reader-oriented by softening propaganda into human interest stories and columns. Yangcheng 
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Evening News in Guangzhou was known for its double subsidiary pages “Flower Land” [hua di] 
and “Evening Gala” [wan hui] drawing on local culture to promote reader participation.  
The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) brought in chaos to the press to various degrees, 
ranging from multiple interruptions to full suspension of publication. While Southern Daily, the 
provincial Party organ, closed its popular columns to relay more top-down (and long) speeches, 
the more intellectual and lively Yangcheng Evening News was shut down in 1966 or the 
beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Other casualties in the same year included the Guangdong 
Police Gazette and Guangdong Broadcasting, both of which resumed publication approaching 
the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1975. 
For the local press system, the end of the chaotic decade was signaled by both the 
resurrection of evening newspapers in the early 1980s and the emergence of newly-established 
papers and journals. The internal adjustment of Party dailies, though significant in their own 
right, was much less remarkable for local readers who witnessed the vigorous boom in 
newsstands and publications in the city. Unlike other smaller governmental and cultural 
institutions, the path of reform for the major Party organs remained constrained. For them, the 
spirit of reform was translated into restorative practices such as a renewed emphasis on local 
news and reviving popular columns and the use of bylines. In the case of Guangzhou Daily, for 
instance, the deadline was postponed to 10 pm and made flexible to accommodate the flow of 
daily news. Yangcheng Evening News added a group of columns on local life and later a daily 
news cartoon to one of the cover stories.  
On the other hand, market orientation became desirable not only for governmental 
departments but also many other institutions which were less constrained by ideological 
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responsibilities. To be sure, to what extent market incentives could agree with the ongoing 
restorative practices in the newsroom was still unclear then, not to mention the exploratory role 
Guangdong now had on its shoulder for the national economic reform. But all momentum 
pointed to an experimental spirit. Before establishing Southern Weekend in 1984, the provincial 
Party paper Southern Daily had four pages and still, as one of the three major Party newspapers 
in Guangdong, entirely depended on state subsidies, subscription, and postal distribution. In the 
following three decades of development that this study covers, the southern city of Guangzhou 
had its number of newspapers grew from fewer than 10 in the late 1970s to 100 by 2010 
circulating in local, regional, and national markets. These new members, what I have called 
popular newspapers, are the context within which Southern Weekend was established and 
evolved.  
Organization of the Study 
In general, the project will be structured according to the periodization and characterization 
of Southern Weekend's journalism between 1984 and 2010. Particularly, there were three major 
expansions of the weekly newspaper that can serve as a timeline of its history. For each section, I 
generally follow the “outside in” pattern of first mapping the major social and institutional 
changes from which the press evolved, and then moving on to its dominant form of journalism to 
further understand the connections. 
Part I, including chapter 1 and 2, covers the transitional period of the post-Mao era from the 
inauguration of Southern Weekend in 1984 to the year of 1991, or before its first expansion from 
four pages—a standard design of party papers—to eight in 1992. In contrast to the previous 
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practices under Mao, the booming popular press took on a significant “cultural turn” in 
journalism anchoring on a rising local identity. Chapter 1 begins with framing what constituted 
the turn or what kind of “culture” was mobilized by mapping the major types of newspapers in 
Guangzhou: Party dailies, non-Party popular papers, and the “Party-popular” as seen in the case 
of Southern Weekend.  
A significant component of the cultural turn in journalism during the 1980s was the rising 
influence from Hong Kong and Taiwan as alternative sources. With the absence of national 
politics in the early Southern Weekend, a new geography started to emerge from its pages across 
the national border to incorporate cultural content from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and other foreign 
countries. Chapter 2 analyzes this cultural formation and examines its structure, themes, and 
politics to understand the role Southern Weekend had played during the period.  
Part II, including chapters 3 and 4, discusses the years from 1992 to 1999 when Southern 
Weekend stabilized its national circulation. The newspaper grew aggressively during this period 
and started to wade deeper into domestic social life. A new form of popular journalism, 
investigative reporting, had been established in the weekly newspaper by the end of the twentieth 
century while another form of popular journalism, the metro papers, quickly developed along 
urban clusters. Chapter 3 identifies the key institutional changes of the press in the early 1990s, 
including the labor force, and how they contributed to increasing conflicts when the weekly 
newspaper began to cover social news. Chapter 4 characterizes this new form of journalism, 
investigative reporting, in reference to institutional conditions as well as historical linkages. 
Part III or chapter 5 deals with the continuous “up-scale” movement of Southern Weekend in 
its corporate stage in the 2000s when it shifted gear to political reporting. By the end of the first 
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decade of the twenty-first century, Southern Weekend was still a leading news weekly but no 
longer a “fighter” as it was in the late 1990s. The chapter first describes how the press changed in 
relation to political, economic, and also organizational factors, and then situate the most recent 
paradigm of political reporting within such contexts. 
A note on methods 
The project relies primarily on first-hand reading of the newspapers under study, including 
Southern Weekend since its inception in 1984 to 2010, and other major contemporary newspapers 
in Guangzhou. Meanwhile, I have relied on major trade and academic journals in China through 
documentary and archival research to understand the historical context. Previous research on 
media reform, journalism history, and the press was also consulted. 
Chronological in first order, the study shifts its lens of research accordingly to capture the 
key changes of the newspaper in response to what I have called the “outside-in” approach. The 
first stage of journalism development in the 1980s, for example, was characteristic of the cultural 
and secular turn from radical politics to social-economic life. For Guangdong, in particular, this 
turn was marked by its reconnection with Hong Kong. In part I, therefore, I first map out the 
reviving printing market in Guangzhou through archival research and, in chapter 2, do a cultural 
analysis of how Southern Weekend reported on the “problem” of Hong Kong, the politics in 
practice, to examine the detailed connections between the newspaper and cultural changes.   
Around the mid-1990s, Southern Weekend experienced a crisis of legitimacy while turning to 
reporting social life again within changing social conditions. In chapter 3, I focus on two cases to 
exemplify the unprecedented crisis and challenge the newspaper faced at the time; chapter 4 then 
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discusses how both emergent and unchanged conditions were translated into newsroom 
production of a new form of journalism. The evaluation of investigative journalism, again, 
highlighted the socio-historical sources of change instead of prominent individuals. 
The final section or chapter 5 deals with the current stage of press reform when both the 
Party-state and corporate press exerted ascending power in the newspaper market and news 
production. I will outline their roles and link the political and economic situation to another new 
form of journalism, political reporting, by Southern Weekend to understand the politics of such a 
turn. Again, I mean to show the interaction between the press and changing social relations in 
which it located to characterize what “Party-popular” in the making means across time. 
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PART  I 
The 1980s of mainland China was a time of secularization in almost all aspects of social life. 
Many intellectuals recalled this period with nostalgia on the centrality of cultural expressions and 
ideological debates. New books were translated from abroad, avidly sought-after, read, and 
discussed like the resumed evening newspapers and tabloids. Guangdong province, especially, 
was standing at the historical and spatial forefront of China’s open and economic reform—where 
the market was first introduced. 
This section covers the transitional period from the early 1980s to 1992, when Southern 
Weekend initiated its first page expansion. The coming two chapters (1 & 2) will trace the 
broader change of the printing press in Guangzhou within both domestic and translocal contexts 
to understand how it took on distinct approaches to the post-Mao population in production and 
distribution. In particular, how did “culture” come to the center of journalism?  
Relying primarily on archival research, chapter 1 begins with mapping the major types of 
newspapers in Guangzhou: Party dailies, non-Party popular papers, and the Party subsidiaries as 
represented by Southern Weekend. Chapter 2 takes a closer look at the trans-border cultural flow 
from Hong Kong, a major contributor of the cultural turn in journalism during the 1980s, as seen 
in the case of Southern Weekend. 
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CHAPTER 1  MAPPING THE REVIVING CULTURAL LANDSCAPE: 
TABLOID JOURNALISM OF GUANGZHOU IN THE 1980S 
A synthetic culture is easy. An old culture is remote. 
(Williams, R., 1967: 35) 
Back to Life 
Lin Li, a veteran journalist of the central newspaper People’s Daily, wrote an essay for an 
internal journal in the spring of 1981 titled “The Curious Case of Southern Newspapers” (Lin, 
1997) criticizing the tabloids flooding the city of Guangzhou. Lin had worked for People’s Daily 
since 1947 and two major Party newspapers in Guangzhou—Southern Daily and Guangzhou 
Daily—before returning to his post in Beijing in the early 1970s. In his critical report signed by 
the pseudonym “guest of the Ram City” [yangcheng ke], or “Canton guest,” Lin contrasted the 
decline of Party dailies with the rise of tabloids in Guangzhou newsstands and lamented the 
prevalence of such “vulgar and nonsensical” journalism.  
Southern Daily, the newspaper of the provincial Party Committee, shrank in circulation from the highest 
980,000 to 600,000; the municipal Party paper Guangzhou Daily went down from 300,000 to 180,000; 
the rural edition of Southern Daily dropped from nearly 400,000 before the Cultural Revolution to merely 
60,000…the only Party paper that increased in circulation was the Yangcheng Evening News which 
resumed publication in early 1980 and reached almost one million in distribution. 
(Lin, 3 Mar.1981) 
What disturbed Lin more, it seems, was not only the disparity between two types of 
newspapers in circulation but also the role that the Party played in the new market conditions. 
Among the eight papers he randomly collected from a street vendor, Southern Wind [nan feng], 
Golden Times [huangjin shidai], Flower Land [baihua yuan], Guangzhou Hygiene [Guangzhou 
weisheng] and Screen and Stage [wutai yu yinmu] were supervised by provincial or municipal 
cultural organizations. Lin was most outraged by these sponsors that included, in the case of 
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Golden Times, the provincial Party committee of Guangdong! After surveying a few news stories 
and styles, Lin ended his diatribe by taking issue with the local government who “seemed so 
careless about the content of publications that completely gave up their leadership on the 
ideological front.” 
The voice of Lin was suggestive of the state of Guangzhou newspapers at the turn of 1980 or 
the so-called post-Mao reform age. It at least represented the anxiety of established power 
against an emergent order in urban newspaper production. In his encounter with the Guangzhou 
newsstands, Lin found on the front page of Golden Times a serial fiction reprinted from Cheng 
Ming Monthly, a banned political journal published in Hong Kong. Indeed, a large amount of 
content in these publications was adapted or simply recycled from foreign materials—Russian 
novels, British movies, Japanese stories—with saucy visual elements added to attract readers. 
Lin expressed a deep moral concern about the potential threat of capitalist culture that might 
make the opening south not only a special economic zone (SEZ) but also a cultural one. These 
“chop-suey,” “pages and pages of…nonsense,” and “dazzling content” in Lin’s eyes were by no 
means compatible with the socialist project of economic reform no matter how vaguely it was 
defined at the post-Mao moment.  
The anxiety of Lin could largely attest to the lively reading public that Perry Link witnessed 
in Guangzhou and elsewhere in 1979 and 1980. Link estimated the popular readership, mostly 
young people and workers in the city, at around one million (1985). Except for daily news, Link 
observed, literature, especially those translated foreign fictions, was the most sought-after 
reading material in local public libraries, bookstores, post-offices and newsstands. Avid readers 
were found gathering at postal offices for the resumed Yangcheng Evening News whose daily 
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circulation jumped from around 200,000 to 510,000 in less than three months (Link, 1985: 226; 
Song, 2009: 25; Lu, 2009; Huang & Chen, 1985). Literary Works, the provincial literary journal 
of Guangdong, was circulating at 460,000 in early 1980 while the municipal affiliated literary 
journal Guangzhou Literature and Art at 300,000; both topped the circulation in China of literary 
periodicals at their levels (Link, 1985: 240). 
It was within this expansion of print production that a sea change of press culture in the post-
Mao era is to be understood. The provincial capital Guangzhou and the larger Guangdong 
province—the size of a major European nation—have been widely recognized as leading 
economic change in post-Mao social transformations as the “South Gate.”  Probably earlier than 
elsewhere, the challenge to Party media was evidenced by the first “tabloid wave” of Guangzhou 
city in 1979 and 1980 which caught the attention of the visiting journalist and further 
investigation. 
Indeed, when Yangcheng Evening News resumed publication in the early 1980 with 
previously well-received cultural columns and became the only rising star among Party papers, 
more than a dozen new weeklies and journals hit the market in the same year and next in 
Guangzhou (Appendix A). Unofficial prints with mixed institutional identities tested the Party 
line even more vigorously, quickly forging a “special economic zone” in post-Mao newspaper 
production.  
But Lin and Party hardliners alike were not only concerned about the soaring numbers of 
non-Party publications. They were more apprehensive of what was defining a Party publication 
when many of the morally suspicious papers now involved Party sponsors. Was this scene an 
irony of reform policies? What kinds of popularizing strategies have been adopted by Party and 
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non-Party papers respectively? What did they share within the same local media ecology in 
transition? What characterized their relationships in competing for readers? To begin answering 
these questions, we have to first look at three types of newspapers: the Party dailies, the 
boisterous non-Party tabloids, and the Party tabloids at the post-Mao moment. 
1.1 Establishment of Guangzhou Newspapers 
After the Chinese Communist Party took power of mainland China in 1949, news institutions 
went through series of Mao’s socialist transformation. Newspapers established during the 
Nationalist government (1912-1949) or before, including the KMT Party press, commercial 
newspapers and tabloids, were mostly shut down, confiscated or transformed (Liu, 1971: 131).  
The Party press of CCP, again, is composed of two major groups according to their affiliations: 
newspapers linked with Party committees on different administrative levels—so-called Party 
organs—and those sponsored by mass organizations and professional societies such as the 
Communist Youth League and writer’s associations—so called non-Party papers.  
The Party press system before the reform era, including Party organs and non-Party 
newspapers, was fully integrated into Party and governmental bureaucracy of different levels. 
The qualification for a government unit to sponsor a newspaper was determined by its 
bureaucratic ranking. For each administrative rank—central, provincial, municipal, and county 
level, the newspaper must be supervised by a governmental unit ranked no lower than the area of 
its circulation. In other words, the jurisdiction of the sponsor overlapped with (if not larger than) 
the assigned territory of the newspaper. For national newspapers, the sponsoring unit must be a 
central ministry [bu] or be of an equivalent rank; for provincial newspapers, it must be a 
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provincial bureau [ting/ju] or of equivalent—if not higher—rank, and so forth (Chan, 2002). 
County Party Committees rarely published papers of their own but, more often, the provincial 
newspaper published a rural edition aiming to serve the counties and communes. Newspapers 
sponsored by mass organizations targeted special groups such as workers, women, and the youth 
or a specific area of content such as education, health, and technology. But structurally they were 
less penetrative compared to the Party organs. Some major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou, Xi’an, and Shenyang also had an evening newspaper, totaling 13 across the country 
before the Cultural Revolution, usually representing a softened Party voice and stronger local 
and intellectual orientations. So much are the open publications—newspapers and periodicals. 
There are also internal publications printed by and circulated mostly within schools, colleges, 
factories, and other public institutions. Their circulation could range from a few hundred to more 
than ten thousand—in the case of large state-owned manufacturing plants, for instance. The army 
also had its own military press organized in accordance with its internal structure (Cheung, 2011: 
128-149). At times, these internal publications could “transgress” into public circulation as we 
will see below. But generally they could not compare with open publications in cultural influence 
especially when top-down regulation came quickly into place.  
It should be noted that both open and internal publications concentrated heavily in urban 
areas and especially provincial capitals where provincial and municipal departments abounded. 
Rural areas have been largely dominated by oral communication despite repeated efforts such as 
newspaper reading groups and the establishment of rural editions in sending newspapers 
downwards. A report in 1963 revealed that of the eleven model counties [xian] where eighty or 
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ninety percent of their production brigades subscribed to the rural edition of Southern Daily, 
seven were near Guangzhou due to easier transportation (Liu, 1971:143).  
Like most provincial capitals in mainland China during the 1950s, Guangzhou had two Party 
dailies, the provincial Southern Daily (est.1949) and the municipal Guangzhou Daily (est.1952). 
Probably in recognition of intellectual and popular culture in disseminating Party news, the 
provincial government of Guangdong launched Yangcheng Evening News during the Anti-
Rightist Movement in 1957 as a subsidiary of Southern Daily (Zhao, 1998: 129-131). Except for 
the interruptions in the Cultural Revolution, the three newspapers constituted the backbone of the 
Party press system for the following decades in the region and grew into three powerful media 
conglomerates—the “new mainstream” of the press today (chapter 5). 
Outside the Party trio, only a number of special weeklies were founded before the end of the 
Cultural Revolution. In the early 1950s, most of these new publications were established in line 
with the political agenda in national security, public health, and—in the case of Guangdong—
issues of overseas connections. Guangdong Police Gazette [Guangdong gong’an bao] and 
Guangzhou Hygiene [Guangzhou weisheng] both came out in 1951; Guangdong Radio 
[Guangdong guangbo bao] and Guangdong Expatriates [Guangdong qiaobao] were launched in 
1955 and 1956, respectively. All of them were weeklies or bi-weeklies directly linked to and 
produced by a governmental department, office, or media institution.  
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed mostly shutdowns rather than establishments in cultural 
production. During the Cultural Revolution, institutions were at best chaotic, if not completely 
paralyzed, when many people with specialized knowledge were cleansed or driven to rural areas. 
It was indeed a decade of “de-intellecutalization” of the press (Liu, 1971:149). In Guangzhou, all 
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papers suffered similar closure or years of suspension except for the provincial organ Southern 
Daily, which was interrupted only briefly for two weeks in 1967 (Yang: 2009: 7-9). The others, 
including Yangcheng Evening News, Guangdong Police, Guangdong Radio, and Guangzhou 
Expatriates, were all forced to fold in 1966 and did not resume until the end of the ten-year 
perdition.  Even the municipal Guangzhou Daily went out of print in 1967 and returned after a 
hiatus of five years when all columns of general interest, regarded as “bourgeois practices of 
journalism,” were gone.  
Restorative initiatives were taken in the last few years of the Cultural Revolution. A technical 
weekly, Guangdong Science and Technology [Guangdong keji bao], was published in 1973 by 
the Guangdong Association of Science and Technology. This was probably a response to the 
urgent need for knowledge and learning by the end of the decade-long suspension of education. 
A few other establishments in the 1970s seemed to be addressing similar needs for the younger 
generation. The municipal Guangzhou Daily had printed a weekly paper called Guangzhou Youth 
News [Guangzhou qingshaonian bao] since 1972. The provincial Party committee of the 
Communist Youth League opened a 48-page monthly journal Guangdong Youth [Guangdong 
qingnian] in 1973, re-named Golden Times in 1981, featuring youth related topics from 
introducing role models like the revolutionary Sun Yat-sen to practical discussions on romantic 
relationships, job market, and self-study guides (Golden Times, 4. 1981). In 1979, two years after 
the national exam for colleague resumed, a special paper Guangdong Enrollment [Guangdong 
zhaosheng bao] began to publish information for the back-to-school generation. 
For a city of over 2.8 million in 1982 (Yang, 2009: 371), including many whose education 
was interrupted during the Cultural Revolution, a pressing need to know and to catch-up was 
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strikingly high after the three-decade dominance of national politics within the Cold War order. 
For Guangdong, an immediate repercussion was to re-connect with the outside through personal 
networks. Leonard Chu in 1980 recorded that: 
People in Hong Kong and elsewhere have been flooded with letters from their relatives asking for 
specific brands of TV sets, cassette radios or watches. Some of the brands are even unknown to the letter 
receivers. At Shumchun (i.e. Shenzhen or the first Special Economic Zone in Guangdong and China, my 
note), the Chinese town bordering Hong Kong, people carrying TV sets on bamboo poles have become a 
common sight for the past year. 
(Chu, 1989: 141) 
Meanwhile, the Party organ Southern Daily still remained a close follower of People’s Daily, 
a lasting practice known as “small papers copied big papers, big papers copied the central paper” 
[xiaobao chao dabao, dabao chao zhongyang] during the Cultural Revolution (Lu, 1994). In a 
limited response to the reviving cultural landscape, Southern Daily claimed to achieve “four 60 
percents” in its production, including “60 percent on local content among which 60 percent on 
news” (Yang, 2009: 20).  Compared to People’s Daily, nonetheless, Southern Daily in 1980 
contained even less local news produced by its newsroom. Ip and Wong found that the ratio of 
content relayed from the central Xinhua News Agency versus produced by its own staff, by 
comparison, was 70:12 for Southern Daily and 54:44 for People’s Daily (as cited from Bishop, 
1989: 156-157). Southern Daily remained the least radical in news reform in the following years, 
a “rear-guard,” within the local media ecology. 
It is true that Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic reform agenda of “feeling the stones while crossing 
the river” did not equip the media with specific guidelines to spell out the grand introduction of 
the market even though it was legitimized in principle. But as the national lab for reform, 
Guangdong province was given more independence to respond to its own needs and moved 
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boldly in introducing market practices in almost all areas of social life. The border between 
Guangdong province and British Hong Kong re-opened, with ongoing transportation projects and 
simplifying procedures for crossing. This radically ended Mao’s closed-door policies since 1949. 
One of the popular puns during the 1980s “East, south, west, north or central, for money you go 
to Guangdong” [dong-nan-xi-bei-zhong, facai dao Guangdong] indicated the spirit of 
enterprising individuals in the changing social map. In only a few years, Guangzhou drew in 
880,000 migrants from across the country, accounting for more than one third of local residents 
in 1986 (Yang, 2009: 377). How the printing press responded to the emergent social changes is 
one key entrance to understand the cultural changes of the reform era.  
Decentralization & new comers 
One crucial shift in newspaper production in the post-Mao era involved the units and 
organizations that were able to print, a result of institutional decentralization in general. 
Administrative departments and public institutions in science and technology, education, culture, 
sports, public hygiene, law enforcement, and economy were not only legitimate but now aspiring 
publishers. Additionally, even though private media ownership was—and still is—virtually out 
of the question, these quasi-social groups including Party-affiliated mass organizations (labor 
unions, women’s federation, and the Communist Youth League), the nine satellite “democratic 
parties,” and various professional associations and academic societies started to establish their 
media voices (Wu, 2000). The capability to print was uneven, generally easier for cultural 
institutions or departments with direct access to intellectual resources than others. Among them, 
Guangzhou Cultural Association, Guangzhou TV station, Guangzhou Institute of Literature and 
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Art Research, Guangdong Playwright Association, Guangdong Legal Press and Guangzhou 
Lingnan Art Publishing House, just to name a few, all started their own paper or periodicals in 
the early 1980s (Appendix B).  
One can argue that decentralization of media power and subsequent abundance of media 
outlets especially below the provincial level may contribute to the trend of localization in print 
culture, but they do not necessarily mean ideological pluralism. Keeping in mind the full 
integration and control of Party organs within bureaucratic hierarchies, decentralized newspaper 
production in the early 1980s might be feeding the informational need of economic reform while 
rebuilding the power of the propaganda system, potentially a double movement of “containment 
and resistance” (Hall, 2006: 443). Did the skepticism of Lin Li on the southern newspapers point 
to a regional formation or, more significantly, an ideological divergence between Party and non-
Party sectors? 
The post-Mao tabloids were blessed by a set of optimum conditions. As noted, the structural 
decentralization of the Chinese media from national capital to regional localities, and from 
central Party system to functional departments and branches in the government significantly 
transformed the overall structure of media outlets. In addition, the newly found freedom also 
offered access to urban newsstands and the emergent local advertisers. The institutional link 
between the affiliated unit [zhuban danwei] and its paper—usually described as guo kao, hitch-
up or lean on—was at best loose if not nominal (Wu, 2000: 55). Though editorial capacity was in 
general limited, many of these publications exploited additional sources to feed their 
publications. The influx of popular materials from Hong Kong, especially, was crucial in 
supplying content for print. 
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Along with the scattering of production, publishers and distributors went even further beyond 
top-down planning. When the distribution of Party organs still depended predominantly on the 
postal network, private newsstand owners and printers in the 1980s started to grow in the urban 
market. Retail print sellers soon developed into a two-tier distribution network. The first-tier 
dealers, usually referred to as the “newsstand heads” [baokan tou] or wholesalers, would buy in a 
variety of newspapers and periodicals from multiple publishers and then sell them in smaller 
quota to the second-tier or individual newsstand owners. In the 1980s, newspaper wholesalers 
gradually connected with their counterparts in other provinces and formed interprovincial 
distribution networks across the country. In Guangzhou, for instance, there were three newspaper 
wholesalers which the early Southern Weekend quickly grasped for its national distribution (Zuo, 
2008: 202). 
In most cases, semi-social organizations and their publications depended heavily on the 
private distribution networks. Weekend Pictorial [zhoumo huabao], a popular weekly produced 
by Guangdong Lingnan Art Publishing House in Guangzhou, boasted a circulation in more than 
80 cities across the nation (Hu, 1984: 43-44). In 1984, nearly 60 tabloids sold on Guangzhou 
newsstands were circulating between three and four million daily (Xin, 1986: 27-29). Shenyang, 
the capital of Liaoning province in northeast China or as far as 3,000 miles away from 
Guangzhou, found multiple tabloids produced from Guangdong province in 1984 (Campaigns in 
Guangdong, 1984: 5). In other cases, one popular tabloid was recycled by multiple printers in 
different areas, often without formal contracts. A Guangzhou tabloid banned in 1985, Xiang Qiao 
(Scented Bridge), was produced in the adjacent Guangxi province, re-printed and distributed by a 
wholesaler in Zhaoqing of western Guangdong as well as the printer of a local publisher in 
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Guangzhou (Xin, 1986). Thus, the proliferation of tabloids was far from a regional phenomenon 
as Lin Li reported. In fact, the cover story on Golden Times that sparked his outrage in 1981 was 
reprinted from Heilongjiang Youth or a provincial journal from Northeastern China. It pointed to 
a broad network of production and distribution beyond regional boundaries or official 
assignment and even, in Lin’s case, his imagination. 
1.2 The Non-Party “Popular” 
From Party organs to semi-official and complete underground papers, a remarkable market 
craze hit both in and outside the Party press system. At a glance, the post-Mao papers in the 
1980s—including the newborn and resumed ones—probably just looked as outdated to any 
contemporary eye. Usually half size of the dailies, most of the papers were still printed in a four-
page format as most Party papers were. They could only print black and red colors, and 
continued to carry calligraphy by Party officials as mastheads. They looked largely but not 
voluntarily similar to each other on a newsstand while competing for post-Mao readers. For most 
of them, exclusives were rare while filler material such as literary articles, short stories, and 
anecdotes were quite often recycled without clear acknowledgment. Freelance writing across 
news institutions and provinces was common. This further made the newspaper look similar at 
the time.  
Compared to Party dailies, tabloids published by semi-social groups in the 1980s were run on 
a much smaller scale. Nationally, the average size of the workforce in 1983 was merely 9 people 
in tabloids versus 129 in provincial and municipal Party organs, which normally owned their 
own publishing plant, distribution units, and dining halls (China Journalism Yearbook [CJY],
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1984: 55). Southern Daily in 1982 employed a total 891 hands, including 272 newsroom staff, 8 
political cadres [zhenggong ganbu], 101 administrative personnel (the three groups above were 
“cadres” [gan bu]) and 510 workers in production and logistic departments (CJY, 1982: 269). 
The number remained stable throughout the 1980s (Guangdong Provincial News Gazette: 179). 
The municipal Guangzhou Daily had a workforce of 382 in 1982, including 179 newsroom staff 
and 113 in publishing. The number grew to 707 in 1989 with 220 working in the newsroom 
(CJY, 1990: 382). In contrast, Football [zu qiu], the best-selling tabloid published by Guangzhou 
Daily, had 12 newsroom staff and a total of 18 at work. The popular Weekend Pictorial [zhoumo 
huabao] published by Guangdong Lingnan Art Publishing House was founded by only 3 staff in 
1980 and grew to 9 in 1984 (Huang, 1997; Hu, 1984).   
Judging from the size of newsroom, the gap of circulation between Party organs and tabloids 
seemed only more ironic. In a defense against Lin’s accusation on Guangzhou tabloids, Huang 
Wenyu, the former director of Southern Daily, quoted that “[Weekend Pictorial] is a laudable 
enterprise which reached one million in circulation by only three staff!” (Huang, 1997). And this 
seems to be the reality for most new tabloids. Even the provincial subsidiary Southern Weekend 
had a modest 8 news editors upon inauguration in 1984. And the number remained less than 20 
until 1992 (Yan, 1986: 29-30). 
At a time when the circulation of Southern Daily dropped to 600,000 with its 891-staff 
workforce, the market success of tabloids was indeed striking. No doubt, actual readership did 
not directly link to the official number of circulation (even if accurate) since Party organs were 
mostly subscribed and read in work units—offices, reading rooms, and public spaces—by 
multiple readers. Conversely, the newly-minted tabloids exploited heavily the rising cash 
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economy in urban streets for individual consumption. However, the comparison of newsroom 
workforce was meaningful in explaining the practices and forms of journalism, a starting point 
both Party and non-Party tabloids stood at and eyed ahead. For non-Party tabloids, the limits of 
newsroom productivity decisively opened the paper not only to other publications but also to 
writers from across various professions and social standings. Reprints and open submission 
became so common that some tabloids opened up not only “letters from readers” or “Q & A” 
columns but the entire paper to freelance and amateur writers. Yuehai Literary & Art Tribune 
[yuehai wenyi bao] advertised in 1985 calling for contribution to all major columns, including 
(1) news on the literary field in China and abroad; (2) interviews and editorial reportage on 
domestic and foreign writers; (3) literature by well-known writers home and abroad; (4) prose, 
essays, commentaries on culture; and (5) painting, photography and comic strips (Yuehai 
Literary & Art Tribune, 4, 1985: 4). 
Regular demand of numerous tabloids encouraged many to be part-time writers. And a 
proliferation of night schools and remedial classes in Guangzhou since 1979 further encouraged 
off-hour learning, vocational training, and self-education. As informal sources for newspapers, 
however, freelance contributors tended to submit across provincial territories to whichever 
publication seemed fit. Hu Haizhou, a self-educated peasant from the southwest (inland) 
province of Yunnan, had been publishing articles in multiple tabloids, including Southern 
Weekend, of different provinces and eventually became qualified to join the local writers’ 
association (Hu, 2006).  
The ready repertoire of non-news content, especially popular literature, film, and TV stories, 
at once nourished the tabloid boom and relocated journalism toward cultural journalism. In an 
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interview with Modern Mankind [xiandai ren bao], a tabloid founded by the Foreign Trade 
Association in 1985, Huang Wenyu emphasized that the diversification of subsidiaries was one 
major approach to the post-Mao press reform since “news [xinwen] remained the most difficult 
ground of change” (Modern Mankind, 4 Dec 1985: 1). Popular cultural forms and activities, 
instead, became a convenient repository to break from the “fake, grand, and shallow” [jia da 
kong] journalism of the Party dailies. A glance at the title of tabloids established in the early 
1980s would also give us an idea of such a collective “cultural turn” in tabloid journalism: 
Weekend Pictorial [zhoumo huabao], Stage and Screen [wutai yu yinmu], Guangdong Police 
Pictorial [Guangdong fazhi huabao], Guangdong TV Weekly [Guangdong dianshi zhoubao], 
Intro to Film & TV [yingshi jieshao], Youth Art [shaonian wenyi bao], Story Weekly [gushi 
zhoubao], Cultural Reference [wenhua cankao bao], Chinese Poetry [Huaxia shi bao], China 
Modern Pictorial [zhongguo xiandai huabao], Coastal Culture [yanhai dawenhua bao], etc. A 
study by the Municipal Propaganda Department in 1984 reported that local tabloids printed 
“44% on martial arts fictions, 32% on detective stories; 9% on romance, 10% on supernatural 
stories, and 5% contained explicit sexual content” (Xin, 1986). “Fist and Pillow” [quantou jia 
zhentou], it concluded, became the major themes of the flooding tabloids. 
Culture, that is, became an immediate stamp of mass appeal for the tabloids even though 
some exploited it more than others. An attempt to negotiate between “knowledge and 
fun” [zhishixing, quweixing] as well as “high and low culture” [yasu gongshang] characterized 
such a turn of tabloid production. Modern Mankind (est. 1985) boasted “no dogmatism, no 
official tone, including high and low, refreshing eyes and minds” on a full-page ad (1 Sept 1986: 
6). Golden Times, the paper associated with the provincial Party committee of the Communist 
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Youth League, printed fiction, book reviews, humor, epigrams, and anecdotes from various 
sources. Cultural References [wenhua cankao bao] (est.1987), a tabloid co-sponsored by the 
Cultural Journalist Society of Guangzhou, the China Music Company, and a private electronic 
company, claimed to cover cultural news in and outside of China while featuring one page out of 
four for literature and another one on miscellaneous forms of “culture.” 
Keeping in mind the small size of production for most tabloids, the heavy reliance on reprints 
from other publications and cultural forms was unsurprising. Due to the flexibility of timeliness, 
the general turn to cultural materials perpetuated the trend of reprint. The newspaper drew 
regularly on writers outside its own newsroom, soliciting writing pieces from journalists in 
central media institutions as well as unemployed freelance writers. That also meant in most cases 
bylines were rarely used, acknowledgements casual, and pseudonyms were common as it has 
been for literary writers.  
When licensed and commercially oriented printers took full advantage of their legal status 
and published subsidiaries, special editions, or simply extra copies for profit, there was a big and 
elusive collection of semi-official and underground publications. Semi-official tabloids here 
refers to internal publications that were temporarily tolerated in their adventure in public sales. 
Red Bean [hong dou], for instance, published by college students in the Chinese department of 
Sun Yat-Sen (Zhongshan) University in Guangzhou were printed at 3,500 copies per issue and 
sold at 0.35 Yuan a copy in downtown areas by students (Link, 1985: 244; Su, 2003: 168). Along 
with completely underground and more radical journals such as People’s Road [renmin zhi lu] 
and Life [shenghuo] by young workers in the city calling for political reform, these student and 
unofficial magazines belonged to the bottom-up democratic movement started in the late 1970s 
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in multiple cities that was quickly quelled. They became, unsurprisingly, the least mentioned 
group of post-Mao newspapers (Liu, 1985). It was difficult to trace their circulation as a separate 
category now. Yet it is fair to suggest that most registered and underground prints found their 
final outlets on private newsstands, contributing to the tabloid wave in 1984 and 1985 when up 
to 80 tabloids were available in the city of Guangzhou (Bishop, 1985: 149)—a number 2 to 4 
times larger than official records (CJY, 1986; Guangzhou News Gazette: 948-960). 
1.3 Early Adventure of Party Tabloids 
Many have recognized the divergence of Party journalism in post-Mao newspapers, one 
reminiscent of Party journalism in the previous decades while its pilot project experimented with 
the market vigorously (e.g. Lee, 1994, 2000; Zhao, 1998). Commercialization of the newspaper 
or the integration of the newspaper into an emerging system of market relations here has three 
senses: first, newspapers now disseminated market news such as prices current therefore 
promoting the development of the market; by introducing advertisers as an income source, it also 
directly serves the sales of products and services in the market; and lastly, the newspaper 
promoted itself as a commodity for sale (Barnhurst & Nerone, 2001: 71). Before the end of the 
Cultural Revolution, none of these functions existed while newspaper was primarily serving a 
highly nationalized political life within a command economy or Mao’s socialist project of 
modernity. As mentioned before, newspapers before the 1980s were predominantly consumed 
through public subscription and delivered by the post-office, so-called youfa heyi or the 
integration of distribution with postal services. 
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Except for a couple of special tabloids, the response of Party dailies in Guangzhou to the 
market was generally cautious (Song, 2009: 21-22; CJY, 1988: 435). Major Party establishments 
did not break the ice until the mid-1980s or the height of the non-Party tabloid wave. Instead, 
three provincial campaigns were launched by the Guangdong Propaganda Department to license 
both open and internal publications in 1980, 1982, and 1984 (Development and management, 
1986). Further restriction was imposed in late 1985 by the Central Propaganda Department, 
halting new licenses except for economic publications (Ibid). Even though these regulatory 
measures were ineffective in curbing tabloid publication as a whole, it did make unlicensed 
publications more vulnerable to punitive campaigns. In April 1985 alone, 350,000 copies of 11 
tabloids were directly confiscated; regulatory mandates were issued later the same year (Circular 
79, 1985) and multiple distribution portals for tabloids, such as railway stations, piers, downtown 
terminals, and major hotels were targeted for regular surveillance and irregular raids commanded 
by the office of Social and Cultural Management under the Municipal Cultural Bureau (Xin, 
1986).  
Regardless, the emerging market still offered increasing space that accommodated the top-
down mandate to curb tabloids while advancing reform policies on marketization in general. 
Special weeklies on market information, in particular, formed a strong current in newspaper 
making since the mid-1980s for both Party organs and non-Party organizations. Nineteen papers 
and periodicals on the topics of market and economy were established in Guangdong from late 
1984 to 1986 alone in response to the top-down regulation (Development and management, 
1986). For Party organs, many incipient experiments involved partnership with trading or 
commercial organizations. Quite often, their networks of co-sponsorship went across the 
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boundaries between governmental and private agencies. Information Times [xinxi shibao], 
published twice a week since January 1984, listed Guangzhou Daily as the publisher along with 
five other private and governmental organizations as co-sponsors, including an investment 
company, two local branches of national banks, an institute of economic research, and a 
governmental department (CJY, 1987: 462; 1990: 384). Similarly, the provincial Southern Daily 
teamed up with the Foreign Economic and Trade Commission of Guangdong [Guangdong 
duiwai jingji weiyuanhui] and published Overseas Market [haiwai shichang] in February 1984. 
Canton-Hong Kong Information  [yuegang xinxi bao], published by Yangcheng Evening News 
since January 1985, allied eight organizations including the Economic and Trade Commission of 
Guangdong and a state-owned trade company registered in Hong Kong (Lin, 2004; Wu, 2010: 
1177-1178).  
Inter-departmental partnership in newspaper publishing was actively pursued to compete for 
advertising money especially from state-owned enterprises that were affiliated with the sponsors 
of newspapers. In practice, the lists of sponsorship could reach up to 20 different partners that 
suggested potential “rent seeking” behaviors as well as competition among government units for 
extra revenue. It also raised the question of financial arrangements and cooperation. Take the 
Canton-Hong Kong Information  [yuegang xinxi bao] for example. Its sponsor, the Provincial 
Economic and Trade Commission of Guangdong, proposed to establish an economic newspaper 
in order to compete with the municipal-sponsored Information Times which, at the time, was in 
preparation. The Provincial Economic and Trade Commission proposed to fundraise 50,000 yuan 
from each of the eight co-sponsors but nobody else, except itself, did so. The only other 
contribution came from the state-owned company in Hong Kong, which gave a fax machine and 
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a van to the new establishment (Liu, 2000: 59). Therefore, it seemed unlikely that most co-
sponsors served more than nominally in real production or editorial responsibilities. “They did 
not have any real commitments,” a journalist commented, “the only incentive is the potential 
market of information. They did not want affiliated enterprises to give their advertising money to 
other governmental sponsored papers” (Ibid).  
In comparison, most of these non-Party tabloids seemed to be affiliated with a smaller 
sponsoring network.  And they also tended to rely more heavily on private business for financial 
contributions. Hong Kong and Macau Economic Clippings, for one example, was sponsored by 
the Research Institute of Hong Kong-Macau Economy and the Guangdong Research Center for 
Social and Economic Development. On its inaugural issue, the paper credited a local washing 
machine manufacturer for a half-page celebratory ritual, apparently an ad yet interestingly 
presented in the lingering style of the socialist age (27 Oct 1984: 4). In other cases, newspapers 
built up even closer ties to budding private enterprises of the local market. Micro-economic 
News, again a paper affiliated with a research institution of economy, invited to its third 
anniversary a list of rural entrepreneurs including farm operators, factory managers, county 
leaders as well as experts in related fields (15 Jan 1985: 1). On the same page of the anniversary 
announcement was an ad for a local hotel where the celebration was held. 
Understandably, non-party tabloids of the mid-1980s emphasized “information” [xin xi] and 
“economy” [jing ji] as the buzz words in new establishments. To name a few: Guangdong Price 
[Guangdong jiage bao], Canton-Hong Kong Entrepreneurs [yuegang qiyejia bao], Price 
Information [jiage xinxi bao], Hong Kong and Macau Economic Clippings [gang’ao jingji 
jianbao], Ram City Information Times [yangcheng xinxi bao], Southern Market Information 
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[nanfang shichang xinxi], Micro-economic News [xiao jingji daobao], and Asian-Pacific 
Economic Herald [yatai jingji shibao] (Appendix B). Even the Provincial Propaganda 
Department of Guangdong founded an economic tabloid China Golden Herald [zhongguo jin 
bao] (1989-1990). During the post-Tiananmen rectification of the print market, an attempt was 
made by the Provincial Propaganda Department to consolidate the major economic and market 
papers—Information Times, Canton-Hong Kong Information, and China Golden Herald—into 
the South China United Times [huanan lianhe shibao]. But the project aborted, in the end, as re-
organization of leadership and staff across multiple bureaucratic ranks became extremely 
cumbersome (Liu, 2000: 59-60). These non-Party tabloids, in brief, were enabled by 
governmental units within market conditions yet also disabled by their double identities. This 
moment should be kept in mind for an interesting comparison with that of a decade later in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, when top-down consolidation was imposed under a different market 
condition—and succeeded (chapter 5). 
The turn to “culture” and “economy,” finally, should not be seen simply as separate 
paradigms in tabloid production. Top-down regulation of the tabloid market clearly upheld 
economic development at the center of its policies. The legitimization of the market in post-Mao 
China starting from the south pointed to a process of “politicization of the economy” which, 
paradoxically, was in line with the de-politicization of national life that the cultural turn could 
potentially serve. While the emergent social life was increasingly discussed and understood in 
market glossaries, the definition and politics of culture also shifted. In one telling moment, the 
inaugural editorial of Consumer News [xiaofeizhe bao] supervised by the municipal consumer 
committee quoted a central government official that “serving the consumers is serving the 
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people” (3 Feb 1986: 2), a complete reverse of Mao’s epigram. If the market orientation was not 
the dividing line between Party and non-Party publications, what was? This was among the 
questions that Southern Weekend faced.  
1.4 The Birth of Southern Weekend 
Southern Weekend grew out of the department of literature and art [wenyi bu] in Southern 
Daily. Its finance, advertising, and distribution were integrated in the corresponding departments 
of Southern Daily until 1993 (Hong, 2005: 28-31). Similar in size to other non-Party tabloids, the 
early weekend subsidiary was run like a sub-newsroom of Southern Daily during the tabloid 
wave of the 1980s. 
At a glance, what Southern Weekend shared in its initial years with other popular publications 
in Guangzhou was its total abandonment of any national-political agenda. Despite its “noble 
bloodline” as a subsidiary of a provincial Party newspaper, the early face of Southern Weekend 
resembled those of the tabloids more than its parent paper Southern Daily. Its four pages were set 
as follows: 
TABLE 1.1 Major Columns of Southern Weekend in the 1980s 
Page Major Columns
1 Weekend Interview [zhoumo zhuanfang], Weekend Teahouse [zhoumo chazuo], Cultural Info [wenhua zhenwen, wenhua jianxun]
2 Knowledge and Learning [qiuzhi]Family and Society [jiating yu shehui]
3 Sports Field [tiyuchang], Colorful Square [caise guangchang]
4 Art [yilin]
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Similar to many other tabloids, the capitalization on “culture” was apparent for the early 
Southern Weekend. The inaugural issue on February 11, 1984 featured as cover story an 
interview with a well-known film actress who quit her career for a joint-venture business in 
Shenzhen, the first Special Economic Zone in Guangdong province. Editor’s Words on the same 
page further elucidated its editorial menu of “wholesome entertainment” for weekend leisure: 
Here’s the weekend again…Southern Weekend, the supplement of Southern Daily, is designed for popular 
demand and development of our society. We include what readers enjoy such as cultural news, popular 
science, the evolving southern culture, various artistic genres, academic and cultural debates, and answers 
to social and domestic questions…Overall, Southern Weekend provides our readers with wholesome and 
entertaining “mental food.” We are aiming to be a close friend of our readers toward the construction of 
socialist spiritual civilization. 
(Southern Weekend, 11 Feb 1984: 1) 
A few elements of the formula are worth attention. First, the temporal order of “weekend” 
unmistakably filtered out any grand narratives of national politics. Turning sharply away from 
Party news (mostly meeting news), SW catered to the popularity of star culture in the local 
population and filled the newspaper with “Three Stars” (singing stars, movie stars, and sports 
stars) and “Two Artists” (writers and painters) [sanxing liangjia]. Its cover stories were normally 
devoted to interviews with household names of stars or artists with a humanist perspective—that 
is, telling personal stories of them as ordinary people rather than as elites or authorities. Zhu 
Mingying, a singer who garnered her national fame in the 1984 Spring Festival Gala of CCTV, 
was interviewed for a cover story by Southern Weekend (20 Jul 1985). It was a timely and 
lengthy report (occupying a front page headline and the whole second page) coming at the time 
when the young artist became famous, got divorced, and was about to leave for America. Zhu’s 
narrative revealed how her artistic pursuit was in conflict with the authorities of the Association 
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of Musicians as well as her family life. In a modest and sympathetic tone, the report celebrated 
the individualism of Zhu as both artist and mother.  
In addition to star stories (usually on front pages), most of the page 4 spaces were devoted to 
domestic and foreign dramas and movies, serving a similar function as TV guides and movie 
weeklies. It included commentaries and feedback from readers on certain programs and previews 
of screening dramas. When the Japanese TV series Doubtful Blood Type [xue yi] was being aired 
on CCTV and received national popularity in 1984, Southern Weekend published notes and lyrics 
of its theme song as well as articles discussing the leading actress Yamaguchi Momoe. At times, 
Southern Weekend also introduced foreign TV shows that were not imported to China such as the 
American prime time series Dallas (e.g. 25 Aug 1984: 4). 
Though dominant, stories of celebrities in the mainland, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and western 
countries were not the only cultural categories that Southern Weekend captured in the 1980s. It 
shifted the dominant agenda, perspective and language from “Party and nation” to the 
“household.” As the Editor’s Words demonstrated, the qualification of “wholesomeness” was 
also critical. The double take on both “ordinary and healthy” lifestyle opened up a crucial realm 
for Southern Weekend’s journalism, resuming what Raymond Williams called “a whole way of 
life” (1958) previously touched on by evening papers yet denied entirely in Party dailies. But 
whose life(s) is it about now? Is there a gender divide, for instance, by attaching women with 
household affairs in achieving the domestic and cultural turn of the newspaper? 
It did not seem like the case. Zuo Fang, the inaugural editor-in-chief of the newspaper, 
remembered his early encounter with readers in the newsstands that included “mostly young 
workers, cadre-like men…but not many students or women” (Zuo, 2008: 59). In response, 
!47
Southern Weekend set up columns that encompassed an even wider range of everyday life agenda 
such as One Song Per Week, One Hair Style Per Week, One Book Per Week, Parents’ Heart, 
Weekend Recipe, and Shopping Guide for mass appeal. These popular columns and their 
inclusiveness, therefore, should be understood in market terms. Competing with the aggressive 
tabloids on the newsstands of the 1980s, Southern Weekend actively engaged with the “people-
cum-consumers” in an all-embracing way except for its revolutionary connotation during Mao’s 
era. If the pop songs and hairstyles were aiming at the youth, then the serial historical novels, 
cooking recipes and shopping guidelines were for their parents; anecdotes of literary figures, 
recent local art works, reading skills were for intellectuals and officials, and cartoons and TV 
stars for vernacular urban families.  
In short, drawing on “culture” as the off-hour agenda, Southern Weekend departed from Party 
journalism which prioritized one’s social (especially class) status rather than private identities. If 
the literary currents of the time such as “Scar Literature” [shanghen wenxue] presented personal 
and traumatic accounts of the past, this secular formula of the early Southern Weekend 
exemplified a similar humanistic approach to the contemporary. This is also represented in the 
suggestive tone of writing, as the inaugural editorial said, “being a close friend” with its readers 
instead of an omniscient voice-over of authorities. 
Let us now turn to three aspects that distinguished Southern Weekend from other tabloids to 
further make sense of the dilemma of a Party tabloid in 1980s’ Guangzhou: (1) the mixed 
temporalities; (2) the (rescaling) local lens; and (3) how both worked with a neo-authoritarian 
context of the “people”. 
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The classical, the socialist, and the popular 
It would be misleading to identify the early Southern Weekend with only humanism in 
editorial strategies to re-articulate its place into the popular realm. After all, the proliferation of 
tabloids and cultural journals in mid-1980s Guangzhou demonstrated an intense, if not 
overwhelming, reader-orientation on the booming newsstands. The question is: what was the 
order of the secular life on which Southern Weekend relied to compete with the tabloids or 
special interest journals when they shared a similar market mentality? 
The page 2 topics, Learning and Knowledge and Family and Society, were composed of sub-
columns of various kinds. Generally, they featured short and fragmented stories, anecdotes, and 
excerpts on domestic life. The miscellaneous collage of what Southern Weekend defined as 
“knowledge” here included classical literary culture (poems, reading skills, Chinese couplets), 
Western languages and social anecdotes, tips for everyday living (awareness of early education, 
nutrition facts, recipe, fashion trends, makeup, social delinquencies), humor and jokes, and the 
contemporary world in photography. The hybrid composition of information combined both 
“high and low” cultural elements in a hierarchical definition of “culture” that has yet to be 
resolved.  
Perhaps this is more obvious on page 4, the topic of “art,” which included columns such as 
In-outside the Silver Screen, Film and TV, Words from the Audience, Gallery, Cartoon, 
Photography, Dancing, My Art Way, Calligraphy and Carving. Southern Weekend published the 
“highest” forms of art in traditional Chinese culture such as calligraphy, carving, and ink painting 
on one hand and TV previews and theme song lyrics on the other. Indeed, the middle ground was 
more of a compromising effort than an editorial innovation. The wide spectrum of “culture” 
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loosely represented a hybridity of the classical (Confucian), the socialist (emphasizing mass 
education, learning, and "wholesomeness"), and the new “popular” from Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
and western countries (more on chapter 2), a mix of temporalities and cultural repertoire in 
restoring private identities at the “post-Mao” moment. 
Localizing the “south” 
For Southern Weekend, the shift from Mao’s journalism on national politics toward the local 
was marked most clearly by a group of new columns organized around the geography of “south” 
or “Guangzhou.” Best examples included the front-page column Southern Trends [nanguo 
fengqing], An Outsider’s Look at Guangzhou [waiburen kan Guangzhou], Social Lens [shehui 
liaowang], and Video of All [zhongsheng luxiang], all of which capitalized on the “south” with a 
progressive undertone of the economic reform.  
The early gaze of the regional and local was a mixture of old stereotypes and new changes 
from the eye of the outsider. Southern Trends, for example, introduced readers to downtown 
night markets, public parks, Cantonese cuisine, and fashion. These essayists’ snapshots of local 
life were neither consistent nor investigative, resembling personal travelogues more than 
anything else.  More stereotypical discussions could even draw on the biological features of 
Cantonese as a distinct group and talked about their height, longevity, and number of native 
talents in comparison with other provinces. It should be pointed out, however, that the local 
orientation had its national significance within the context of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform 
starting from Guangdong or the opening south. The south, simply speaking, was regarded as a 
national “south” that represented the future for the reform project nationwide. In chapter 2, I will 
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discuss in further detail the regional-national relations of the newspaper in policing the 
boundaries against the opening border. 
An Outsider’s Look at Guangzhou was one of the most long-lasting columns in the 1980s. 
The weekly column was written by Andi, a correspondent of a Shanghai newspaper in 
Guangzhou who had shown enormous enthusiasm in comparing the everyday life of the two 
cities. The column was first named A Shanghainese Look at Guangzhou [ala kan Guangzhou]. 
Topics revolved around what the (re)introduction of marketplace had brought to the daily life of 
local residents within a dualistic framework of the “have-s” in Guangzhou and the “have-nots” or 
“have-less” in Shanghai. The proliferation of entertainment in the city such as dancing halls, 
teahouses, video and movie theaters, and gaming centers captured much of the author’s attention. 
Even though Shanghai was the commercial center of the country dating back to the late 
nineteenth century, the socialist reform under Mao condemned the history of “old Shanghai” for 
its bourgeois culture and decadent colonial legacies. The Shanghai journalist did not conceal his 
celebratory and nostalgic sentiments in writing about how foreign trade was revived and 
experienced in the post-Mao south. When Guangdong exceeded Shanghai in export trade in 
1988, the writer exclaimed that “Shanghai is not No. 1 any more!” (15 Jan 1988). 
Overall, the column addressed changes in everyday life, including in language (from 
“comrade” to “Mr./Ms.”), shopping experiences (use of the credit card and the professional 
smile), leisure practices (from lovers wandering in street to multiple commercial spaces), and a 
seemingly new civic culture (change in the sense of time). Based on personal observation, the 
columnist championed the abundance, convenience, and egalitarianism the market had brought 
into the city of Guangzhou. Unlike Shanghai and elsewhere in China, he wrote, not only 
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foreigners, overseas Chinese or Hong Kong and Macau visitors but anyone could go into a five-
star hotel in Guangzhou (2 Jan 1987); taxi service was reliable (29 Apr 1988); and the Cantonese 
had shown no sense of nostalgia (25 Aug 1989). 
In the semi-tourist gaze of Andi, however, not all local identities of Guangzhou were 
celebrated by outsiders without reservation. Complaints arose when differences invoked 
exclusion. The Cantonese speakers in Guangdong and Hong Kong have been notorious for their 
Mandarin, the official language of China, not to mention their own diversities in dialects. 
Without longer immersion and learning, most out-of-town Chinese in Guangdong felt excluded 
in daily life and cultural identification. Most broadcasting programs in Guangdong, including 
local TV stations and radio channels, used Cantonese instead of Mandarin (more in chapter 2). 
Even though Mandarin education in Guangdong elementary schools resumed in 1984 after the 
Cultural Revolution, Cantonese remained the dominant speaking language in social interaction 
for local residents, especially the older generation. The press, though localizing, was probably 
the most inclusive way of communication in the local environment. While a rising “south” was 
distinguished to represent the direction in the central project of economic reform, its pioneer 
status could hardly be tolerated if it turned against the national. Rather than a departing south, its 
regional distinctiveness was presented with a national orientation. 
Post-socialist continuities and disruptions 
For Southern Weekend, the mixed and fragmented style of cultural journalism was rooted in 
institutional settings. Born from the cultural department of Southern Daily, Southern Weekend 
did not have its own reporting team until 1997 (Hong, 2004: 23). Running with eight editorial 
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staff in 1984, Southern Weekend shared even more with non-Party tabloids in newsroom 
production. It relied heavily on external contributions such as reprints, informal (though 
sometimes long-term) collaboration, and frequent interaction between readers and the newspaper. 
Journalists in larger news institutions also wrote for hungry papers—including cover stories—for 
extra income or personal reciprocity. All these practices, as discussed previously, indicated a 
relatively decentralized model of production and wide circulation of texts in tabloid markets 
across regions. The reliance on external authorship explained well the individually hybrid yet 
collectively similar form of tabloid journalism in the 1980s including Southern Weekend. 
Formally, the press called for submissions by holding writing competitions for major 
columns. This was, in part, to cultivate qualified authors as well as to expand topics without 
staff journalists. In 1986 and 1988, Southern Weekend launched year-long competitions on 
editorial interviews [zhuan fang] for its front page stories. Sponsored by a local pharmaceutical 
company, the newsroom asked for “readable, in-depth and novel reports” which would be 
evaluated, in the end, by a team of local writers and editors (28 Dec 1985; 18 Dec 1987). 
Published pieces from external writers automatically entered the competition for prizes which 
included, for the top six in 1986, a 20-inch color TV set, two double-door fridges, and three 
washing machines (5 Apr 1986: 1).   
Informally, sporadic submission and the habit of “newspaper clipping” editorship could at 
times recycle materials involuntarily. A reader wrote to Southern Weekend and complained about 
two such cases in 1985. As the disgruntled reader noticed, one piece was published at least twice 
in 1984 by two newspapers from other provinces and once by Southern Weekend itself about six 
months ago with only minor revisions (28 Sept 1985: 2). However, he did not blame the editors 
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more than the plagiarists [wen chao gong] as the pieces were credited under different authors. 
His opinion, which the newsroom immediately echoed, could attest to the widely accepted role 
of external authors in newspaper production. 
Like many other tabloids, the fragmented style of Southern Weekend was also visually 
represented. Most notably, it combined both vertical and horizontal layout in its printing format 
throughout the 1980s. The vertical format is normally associated with traditional Chinese book 
printing and is used only when classical literary genres or works are involved. Together, the 
inclusiveness of “high and low” cultural forms, decentralized sources, and the mixture of visual 
layout provided its readers with many entry points—instead of a suggestive order—in reading 
Southern Weekend. In the effort to further differentiate itself from Party dailies, light-hearted 
illustrations and other book-like typography were added to accompany or segregate individual 
columns, making visual and textual components interact with each other. Except for the front 
page, Southern Weekend did not have a visual editor until the new millennium (Yang, 2009: 15). 
The relatively loose organization in content and style symbolized a moment of transition, “the 
scattered yet lively pre-Tiananmen growth of a Chinese version of civil society structure” of the 
1980s (Zha, 1995: 106). 
Though Southern Weekend presented “culture” in an all-embracing style, it was presented 
with an interest to police the new boundaries. Some regular columns such as Law Counseling [fa 
lü guwen], Youth Mailbox [qingnian shenghuo xinxiang], Learn a Lesson [houche zhijian], and 
Must Read for Young Girls [shaonü bidu], all under the page 2 topic of Family and Society, 
explicitly spelled out the “wholesome” orientation in everyday social life. The first two columns 
published legal or personal questions from readers and provided feedback from newspaper 
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editors. The latter two exposed dramatic cases, normally involving the death of a person 
(including suicide), to demonstrate the moral behavior of involved subjects (a young girl who 
lost her virginity for vanity, a woman who incurred dispute to family by gossiping, a beautiful 
girl who confused herself by watching too much Hong Kong pornography, etc.). By displaying 
transgressing individuals (with an emphasis on young people and especially young women), 
these columns consistently promoted a set of moral guidelines on romance, marriage, inter-
personal relations that underlined a combination of moral codes from Confucian ethics (the 
intense surveillance on the virginity of women being a prominent example) and socialist ones 
(work over life enjoyment, national over personal value, the dichotomy of socialist/ capitalist 
culture).  
Here, I am not suggesting a well-defined division between two sets of moral value, many 
indeed overlapped. But we can at least identify how Southern Weekend highlighted the morality 
of ordinary individuals in approaching social problems. The problematization of individual 
subjects represented a strong continuity of the top-down approach to culture under Mao, which 
emphasized transforming subjective consciousness, “the nature of  man,” instead of socio-
economic conditions in achieving social change. It can be argued that even though Southern 
Weekend abandoned the national-Party agenda and adopted a humanistic perspective to everyday 
lives in the city, there were visible continuities of Party discourses imposed upon individual lives 
in its journalism. In the end, the weekly newspaper did seem to be negotiating a space between 
Party principles and the new popular culture printed by non-Party tabloids without moral 
concerns. 
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Conclusion 
The chapter describes how tabloids—Party and mostly non-Party ones—became major 
players in the post-Mao print market of the 1980s. The structural decentralization of the press 
released the right to print from Party committees to administrative departments and semi-social 
organizations. Compared to the pre-Cultural Revolution period (1949-1966), media liberalization 
in the 1980s featured overall structural diversification rather than the professionalization of 
journalistic practices. From production to distribution, tabloids took advantage of the emergent 
market with minimum respect to territorial, licensing, or content limits.  
Many official newspapers went ahead to publish soft supplements as income-generating 
devices. The limits of newsroom productivity at the time for both Party and non-Party tabloids, 
however, considerably confined their practices to reprint and informal submissions. From 
cultural to economic papers, I found no significant editorial markers separating Party and non-
Party tabloids except for the moment of top-down regulations—a practice adhered to the 
licensing system and central political rubrics.  
For Southern Weekend, the transitional approach to journalism from production to 
representation resembled non-Party cultural tabloids in the market yet added moral anxiety to 
supervise private lives under new social conditions. First, there was a trend of secularization of 
social life that shifted the focus of newspaper production toward the individual and the quotidian. 
Its humanistic perspective revolved around the “household" and, in effect, helped restore various 
aspects of private identities of post-Mao individuals while deconstructing the prioritization of 
“class” under Mao. The drastic shift, no doubt, pointed to the popular consensus on abandoning 
the radical leftist politics of Mao especially during the Cultural Revolution and a strong 
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aspiration to “a normal life.” In this sense, the cultural turn of Southern Weekend, along with 
other tabloids, rightly responded to and articulated the “structures of feeling” at the post-Mao 
moment. 
Second, starting as a Party subsidiary trying to accommodate social change, Southern 
Weekend offered a tentative and compromising prescription within an embracing spectrum of 
cultural forms across temporalities (ancient and contemporary), spaces (domestic and foreign), 
and genres (high and low culture). The restoration of cultural life based on the traditional, 
dominant and emergent forms of “culture” could be seen as negotiating a transitional space 
without leading it—an intermediate sense of “popular” (Williams, 1985: 49). 
Third, Southern Weekend signified the adaptability of Party dailies or the most arduous part 
of news reform in China. Aiming for mass appeal, Southern Weekend displayed an embarrassing 
identity triangulating between its Party affiliation and market expectations. Nevertheless, the 
self-identification of “south” and “weekend” was not yet the kind of conscious or professional 
identity for which it would be widely acclaimed in the late 1990s (chapter 3 and 4). But still, the 
synthetic and apolitical journalism of Southern Weekend was marking out a popular zone on the 
“south” both within and outside the top-down hegemony of economic reform. Hong Bing argued 
that the secular expression of Southern Weekend in the 1980s was meaningful because it heralded 
the gradual acceptance of popular culture in the mainstream discourses in the mid-1990s 
(2004:13). As we have seen, by mobilizing multiple cultural resources, Southern Weekend did 
acknowledge and elaborate on post-socialist subjects as individuals in the private realm.  
Pursuing the available and expanding spectrum of cultural forms, finally, Southern Weekend 
remained active in drawing boundaries for individual practices at the reform moment. Insisting 
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on its “wholesomeness” or a paternalistic take on culture, it shown not only “an intuitive grasp of 
the reviving humanity of the time and the diversification of insipid life from the past” as the 
autobiographical rhetoric briefly justified many years later (Yang, 2009: 95). It also shown a 
continuity of Party journalism and politics in trying to contain social-cultural changes. It is 
important to ask, at a time when the cultural influx of TV series and radio programs from Hong 
Kong were offering rich cultural resources to Guangdong areas across the border, how local 
media outlets—including the Party newspapers—responded to the cultural input. 
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CHAPTER 2  
A SOCIALIST CITY IN TRANSITION:  
THE GUANGZHOU PRESS AND ITS HONG KONG CONNECTIONS 
“Chimney, cable, fishbone antenna 
Kitting their net in the broken sky.” 
—From poem Dusk Star, 1981 (Shu, 2007: 63) 
Up until the Tiananmen democratic protest in 1989 and, more accurately, the souther tour of 
Deng Xiaoping to the SEZ Shenzhen in 1992, market reform in post-Mao China had been mostly 
regional and experimental. Mainland China in the 1980s was characterized by “Cultural 
Fever” [wenhua re] among intellectuals when wave after wave of reflexive and outward-looking 
literature, music, scholarship were created, introduced, translated, and discussed in the popular 
realm. Within this context, Guangdong province was an exception where economic reform and 
market exchange advanced quickly along with the cultural craze. What the local press faced was 
not only reviving cultural and social life but simultaneously an emergent market when the 
immediate border opened to the outside. For Guangdong more than elsewhere, post-Mao cultural 
formation was charged with the marketization of media institutions.  
Border reopened 
Deng Xiaoping's open reform since the late 1970s meant to re-integrate China to the global 
economy. In the reformist blueprint, China needed to expand its contact with foreign countries 
and, in particular, take advantage of increased commerce with other countries to learn from their 
technology and experiences. For Guangdong, the southmost province, this meant opening its 
door to Hong Kong. Despite several conservative rollbacks during the 1980s, the reformist 
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principle of “pouring out the dirty water but not everything foreign” [paiwu bu paiwai] generally 
kept the open policy in place for the province (Gold, 1993; Cheung, 1994). Without spelling out 
“dirty water,” however, the guideline in practice served more as a negotiating ground in the 
transitional period. 
As a national lab for the post-Mao reform, Guangdong was given more independence to 
respond to its own needs and moved boldly in introducing market practices in almost all areas of 
social life. In the following decade and after, Guangdong remained one of the fastest developing 
regions in China with its per capita GDP growth at an average rate of 11 percent annually from 
1978 to 1990 (Sung, 1995: 204). Within this context, how the Party press responded to radical 
social change in Guangdong is one useful entrance to understanding post-Mao newspaper culture 
and politics.   
Hong Kong had been part of Guangdong until the Opium Wars (1839-1842, 1856-1860), 
after which it was ceded as a British colony. By the time Beijing and London signed the “Sino-
British Joint Declaration” in 1984 and confirmed the return of Hong Kong sovereignty to China 
in 1997, the separation between Hong Kong and mainland Guangdong had lasted for more than a 
century. Unlike the instant re-connections of kinship and business investment, the reopening 
border had encountered a much-checkered story in cultural integration. The strong presence of 
Hong Kong culture in Guangzhou as well as further north provoked immense pressure and 
controversies in the 1980s. Even though my focus is the press, the most controlled media 
institution compared to TV and radio, it is impossible to ignore the audio-visual influx from 
Hong Kong that strongly transformed the local cultural environment.  
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To be sure, Hong Kong was not the only cultural source of post-Mao China. The popular 
term Gang-tai, an acronym coined for “Hong Kong (and) Taiwan,” indicated that both places 
became centers of cultural production in the post-Mao society. As one of the world's biggest port 
cities and financial centers, British Hong Kong also displayed hybrid forms of culture between 
the local and the global. What I call Hong Kong culture here, therefore, does not refer 
exclusively to cultural products that were produced in Hong Kong and consumed in the 
mainland. It includes cultural forms and products of various origins. But from the perspective of 
Guangdong residents, all of them came from or through Hong Kong, the major source of and 
portal to the global society for mainland China in the 1980s and 1990s. This chapter studies how 
the Hong Kong-Guangdong links were mediated by the Guangzhou press to understand the 
relationship between post-Mao media and social change. In the following discussion, I first 
outline the influx of Hong Kong culture in Guangzhou, followed by a focused analysis of how 
Southern Weekend dealt with the Hong Kong factor, and then ask how its approach informs us 
about the politics of what I call “Party-popular” newspapers within the local and national 
contexts. 
2.1 The Hong Kong Factor 
Li Ziliu, the Party leader of Shunde County, a major satellite town south of Guangzhou, 
visited Hong Kong for the first time in 1980 with nine colleagues. It took them more than six 
months to get the travel documents approved. This kind of danwei trip, group visits organized by 
governmental units and institutions to Hong Kong, quickly proliferated and normalized in 
Guangdong (Sung, 1995: 188). But for Li Ziliu, who later served as the mayor of Guangzhou in 
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the 1990s, the experience was above all eye opening. He recalled, many years later, “Hong Kong 
is not a capitalist hell, it is great” (Southern Metropolis News, 20 Jun 2013: GA12). 
The role of Guangdong, along with the Fujian province, in moving “one step ahead” in 
market reform in the late 1970s bears strategic significance for the post-Mao reform nationwide. 
Aside from broad historical connections with overseas Chinese communities, its geographical, 
linguistic (Cantonese), and cultural proximity to Hong Kong offered an immediate access to 
international connections. Politically, it was far enough from the power center of Beijing to avoid 
any unrest. Meanwhile, the role of Guangdong in the national economy had only been modest in 
Mao's command economy. And finally, the future reunion with Hong Kong and (most arguably) 
Taiwan, where the population had their family ties predominantly in Guangdong and Fujian 
respectively, could expect more popular support from renewed social connections (Vogel, 1989: 
82). The open policies, indeed, pointed to regional interests with a national implication. 
The economic integration between Hong Kong and Guangdong in the post-Mao era has 
been extensively documented (e.g. Kwok and So, 1995; Rao and Chen, 2006; Chen, 2011). 
Emphasis has been on the role of Hong Kong as a major financier, “middleman,” and trading 
partner in initiating a large amount of small investments in Guangdong (Sung, 1995). The 
general “front shop, back factory” [qiandian houchang] pattern indicated the massive 
northbound movement of Hong Kong manufacturing facilities across the border, relocating 
labor-intensive production to counties and towns in the immediate bordering Pearl River Delta 
for its export-oriented industries (Vogel, 1989: 445-6; Lin, 1997: 172-7). From 1979 to 1990, 
actual utilized foreign investment in Guangdong amounted to U.S. $8 billion or 37% of the 
national total, among which 64% or $5 billion were from Hong Kong (Sung, 1995: 183). The 
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“south window” [nanfeng chuang] soon became a popular reference of opportunities and sources 
for change in Guangdong and nationwide. 
The Guangdong-Hong Kong reconnection could be felt well beyond economic integration. 
The cross-border train connection between Guangzhou and Hong Kong resumed in April 1979 
and reduced a one-day trip to three hours. By the early 1980, airlines, ferries, and shuttle buses 
between the two cities all resumed service under bilateral agreements. Organized tours to Hong 
Kong were open to the general public in Guangdong via travel agencies in the mid-1980s (27 
Apr 1985: 1). Sheng-gang—literally (Guangdong) province and Hong Kong—sponsorship was 
soon initiated in cultural exchanges such as Cantonese opera, soccer games, and other cultural 
and academic activities (Guldin, 1995; Ma, 2012: 69-70). 
The TV “drama” 
But not all renewed contacts were embraced with consensus. Most notably, the TV and radio 
signals spilt-over from Hong Kong became a thorny issue for local and national Party officials in 
the decade to come. With UHF antennas and amplifiers sold in hardware stores, the four Hong 
Kong television channels (TVB Jade, TVB Pearl, ATV Home, and ATV World) could be watched 
within 100 miles of the border. Starting from the immediate bordering Special Economic Zones 
(SEZ) of Shenzhen and Zhuhai, self-made antennas in the shape of a fish bone quickly popped 
up across the Pearl River Delta pointing at Hong Kong (Chan, 2000: 249; Vogel, 1989: 66).  
The bottom-up reception of Hong Kong TV in Guangdong, however, was not an urban 
phenomenon. In 1988, 83.2% of rural families in the Pearl River Delta owned TV sets (either 
color or black and white) (Zhou, 1990: 39). In Guangzhou, there were 72.69 color TV sets and 
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44 black and white TV sets per one hundred households (Ibid). In villages and urban district 
counties noted for a high number of overseas connections (with relatives abroad), almost every 
household had a TV set equipped with UHF reception (“Vulgar TV,” 1982). Dongguan, a satellite 
county between Shenzhen and Guangzhou, had 112 color TV sets per one hundred households in 
the early 1980s (Lin, 1997: 183). The popularization of TV sets, in fact, was correlated with the 
pattern of economic development in the region where industrialization and urbanization occurred 
no less vibrantly in the countryside particularly between or around major metropolitan centers 
(Ibid: chapter 6).  
In March 1980, a young man in downtown Guangzhou reportedly died from a fatal fall from 
the top of his nine-story apartment building while setting up an antenna (Yangcheng Evening 
News, 30 Mar 1980). A long debate over Hong Kong television began to surface (Ou et al., 2006: 
7). Within two months of the front-page report, a top-down ban on Hong Kong television was in 
place (Yangcheng Evening News, 26 May 1980: 1). Later, Yangcheng Evening News (YEN), the 
municipal Party evening newspaper, published three articles debating the reception of Hong 
Kong TV. Chen Shunzhi, a deputy director of the provincial cultural department, denounced 
Hong Kong TV programs as “mental cancer” [xinling de aizheng] and avidly approved the ban 
(Yangcheng Evening News, 8 Jun 1980). Huang Shusen, a literary critic and editor of a non-Party 
newspaper South Wind [Nan Feng], advocated instead a more liberal approach, “Hong Kong 
television also has healthy and serious programs…we should not regard people as dupes, 
socialism as vulnerable…we need to reform our own institutions and learn from Hong Kong 
critically” (Yangcheng Evening News, 7 Oct 1980; Huang, 2010: 43). 
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Huang's article confused many local Party cadres in Guangdong who followed the ban and 
had flung themselves into demolishing “fish bone” antennas, an exhausting project for both 
firefighters and local police. Later, the provincial Party committee sent out investigative 
personnel to the YEN newsroom for inquiry. Partly a line toeing move, YEN published a lengthy 
response from Chen Shunzhi, again the cultural official, reinstating the conservative position on 
the pernicious effects of Hong Kong and foreign influences (Yangcheng Evening News, 18 Oct 
1980).  
The debate halted, at least in Party newspapers, but it did not represent the unfolding reality. 
Though state regulations against bottom-up TV reception were constantly implemented, they 
were also resisted inconsistently in time and institutional spaces. In Shunde County, an oral 
sanction on “fish bone” antennas was practiced except for government buildings (Southern 
Metropolis News, 2013). But jamming signals were sent out whenever top-down investigation 
was in town. Hence the “snowflakes” (the snowy noise image) on Hong Kong TV programs soon 
came to signify such censoring moments for local residents. In Guangzhou, many local residents 
adopted the guerrilla strategy of Mao and put up their antennas only after dinner, an ironic 
inversion of the daily flag-raising ritual in schools and other public institutions (Li, 2009). In 
brief, while formal channels of opinion were at the disposal of (and controlled by) higher-ranking 
Party officials and intellectuals, the practices of passive resistance by many local officials and 
residents remained a visible force in dealing with conservative—not necessarily national—
initiatives.  
Though on and off, “fish bone” antennas continued to spread despite constant regulatory 
efforts. For Guangdong residents, especially those in the Pearl River Delta, there were no 
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linguistic or technological barriers to receiving TV programs from Hong Kong during in the 
1980s. They watched live sports games that normally took up to two days for the local channels 
to relay, picked up cheap music cassettes from streets for Cantonese popular music ("Cantopop") 
they heard on the radio, and familiarized themselves with Hong Kong pop stars from television 
programs such as TVB Jade's popular Foon Lok Gum Siu [huanle jinxiao] or Happy Tonight, an 
imitation of the American Tonight Show. Through TV and radio input, Hong Kong popular 
culture came to be the defining factor of cultural life in Guangzhou. 
Guarded reception 
In history, popular culture [liuxing wenhua] had its linkages with the urban culture in major 
cities of mainland before 1949, which was denigrated as “bourgeois individualism” in the CCP's 
revolutionary ideology during the 1920s and 1930s. Now tongsu—a new term for “popular”—
was coined to avoid the negative connotations of liuxing from the past (Baranovitch, 2003: 
10-15). Similarly, the word dazhong—literally “big mass”—gained increasing currency while 
qunzhong (common people), previously used in the Maoist lexicon as opposed to 
“cadre” [ganbu], Party members [dangyuan], and “comrade” [tongzhi], quickly faded from 
everyday language to political jargon. Semantic changes, however, did not solve the problem. As 
the flooding “fish bones” indicated, they signified the points of tension when “people” were 
rediscovered as readers and audience who had alternative sources of information and 
entertainment.  
The strong presence of Hong Kong media, with its popular music and TV programs in 
particular, imposed immense pressure not only on conservative Party members and intellectuals 
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but also local media professionals. In response, the Guangdong television station (GDTV) started 
to broadcast Wanzi Qianhong ("A Blaze of Colors") in 1981, the first variety show in China and a 
direct imitation of TVB Jade's Foon Lok Gum Siu (Keane, 2012: 314). TV anchor [zhuchi ren], a 
completely new position, was initiated and began to talk instead of following pre-scripted 
narrative [bao mu] in television programs. In 1985, Wanzi Qianhong adopted multi-camera 
recording and live broadcasting after a learning trip to TVB's headquarter in Hong Kong. 
Coming from the Cultural Revolution with chaotic paucity in cultural life, there were indeed 
miles to go without violating the ambiguous guideline of “pouring out the dirty water but not 
everything foreign.” 
In 1994, the whole television “drama” that lasted for more than a decade was settled with 
conditional reception by incorporating all four Hong Kong channels into local provincial and 
municipal cable TV systems (Ou et al., 2006: 8). Soon noticed by the local audience, however, 
the reception was controlled and domesticated with any unwanted news reports censored and 
Hong Kong advertisements replaced with local commercials. With increasing sophistication over 
time, the censoring moments took the forms of still pictures, local ads, and pre-recorded local 
news. Regardless, Guangdong has become the only province in China—up until today—where 
Hong Kong TV programs are legally and structurally accessible, a distinct aspect of the media 
ecology in Guangdong (Ma, 2011: 161).  
2.2 Symbol of Modernity 
In sharp contrast to TV and radio, the Hong Kong factor in print media was much more 
restricted. Hong Kong newspapers and magazines were efficiently banned from import by border 
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customs. Exceptions included a few mainland-affiliated newspapers such as Ta Kung Pao [da 
gong bao] and Wen-wei Po [wen hui bao], which were subscribed by governmental units and 
hotels (Guangzhou Postal Gazette, 1994: 50). Hong Kong visitors brought with them copies of 
other newspapers to read on their way to Guangdong. And it was not uncommon that mainland 
tourists to Hong Kong would smuggle a newspaper copy or two on their way back, which 
normally passed on to a few more hands after they arrived but was very unlikely to go any 
further (Cheng, 1995: 44-45).  
Though contained on the ground, the local print culture was greatly informed by the 
sweeping audio-visual influx from Hong Kong. In 1985, there was only one Guangzhou-based 
magazine—Hong Kong Style [Xianggang Feng Qing]—that consistently covered the lives and 
culture of Hong Kong (Ma, 2012: 67-69). But no one could ignore the spate of knight errant 
[wuxia] fictions written by Hong Kong writers and promoted by private bookstores, which 
exceeded the state-owned bookstores in five years between 1985 and 1989 in mainland China 
(Liu, 2007: 29). Non-Party tabloids, too, were among the avid hunters for popular culture from 
and about Hong Kong. South Wind [Nan Feng] began to serialize the novel Tale of a Silver 
Haired Witch [baifa monv zhuan] by Liang Yusheng—a leading wuxia writer in Hong Kong—
since 1981. White Cloud Collection [baiyun jijin], another non-Party tabloid, adopted various 
“Hong Kong elements” and printed in its inaugural issue Liang Yusheng's wuxia fiction Love of a 
Jade Archer [Yunhai yugong yuan], a biography of a Hong Kong pop star Wang Mingquan, and a 
Hong Kong travelogue by a Guangzhou writer (Southern Weekend, 27 Oct 1984: 1).   
From what we learnt in chapter 1, it is quite possible that Party tabloids like Southern 
Weekend would handle the Hong Kong factor differently from non-Party tabloids. Since Hong 
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Kong influences on local print culture in the 1980s were predominately mediated by the local 
press rather than direct competition, the following discussion is based on a close examination of 
how Southern Weekend covered Hong Kong from 1984 to 1991 (before its first expansion from 
four to eight pages in 1992). I sampled 182 copies of Southern Weekend or every other issue of 
its publication during this period to offer my observations. 
A number of lenses 
Between 1984 and 1991, the majority of Hong Kong stories published in Southern Weekend 
covered cultural activities that quickly proliferated across the border. These stories often made 
their way to front-page stories, page four on Art and a major column on British Hong Kong and 
the Portuguese colony Macau. In particular, Hong Kong pop singers who travelled northbound 
and held their concerts in the mainland were normally covered in front-page interviews (e.g. 18 
Feb 1984; 29 Sept 1984; 16 Mar 1985). Other cultural exchanges between Guangzhou and Hong 
Kong such as co-productions in TV and radio programs, though still sporadic, were also reported 
yet with brief treatments. In August 1985, for example, Liu Jiajie, an English educator from 
Hong Kong, started a daily radio program teaching advanced English skills on three channels of 
the Guangdong People's Radio Station (27 Jul 1985). The short news was printed on page two 
under “Knowledge and Learning” of Southern Weekend. 
Another cluster of the Hong Kong factor in Southern Weekend could easily be found on page 
four of “Art” [yilin], where television programs, films, music from Hong Kong and other forms 
of popular culture claimed an increasingly larger share. Within the craze for Hong Kong 
television programs in the 1980s, GDTV imported a number of Hong Kong television dramas 
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such as Thousands of Rivers and Mountains [Wanshui qianshan zongshi qing] from TVB Jade 
and Huo Dongge from ATV Home to lure the local audience (a large number of self-relying 
“fish-bone” users) back to domestic channels. Probably imagining a significant overlap between 
local TV audience and its own readers, Southern Weekend published synopses of upcoming 
episodes on the “Art” page during GDTV's season like a TV guide (e.g. 16 Feb 1985). Without 
direct competition with Hong Kong newspapers, popular newspapers in Guangzhou capitalized 
on Hong Kong cultural input which, in turn, continued to gain its influences across the border.  
However, popular wuxia novels embraced by non-Party newspapers hardly made their way 
to Southern Weekend. Beginning on May 22, 1985, Southern Weekend had serialized a novel by 
the popular Hong Kong wuxia writer Liang Yusheng for ten months. But this was the only 
exception among the literature printed by Southern Weekend between 1984 and 1991. From 1986 
onward, in particular, Southern Weekend published predominantly “reportage literature” [jishi 
wenxue], a genre between journalism and literature, on the major events or political figures in 
Party-state history since 1949 and was ardently embraced by Party officials and intellectuals 
(Hong, 2004: 23; Laughlin, 2002).  
Running with eight staff in 1984, Southern Weekend did not have any journalists to dispatch 
to Hong Kong but heavily relied on external writers and publications. Among those who paid to 
visit Hong Kong for work or as tourists, many wrote about their experiences in the newly open 
territory. This kind of impressionistic essays on border-crossing experiences became a major 
genre of how Hong Kong was reported by Southern Weekend most visibly under the column 
called “Glancing at Hong Kong and Macau” [Gang’ao yi pie] (later “Glancing”). 
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The column “Glancing” was started in late 1984, not long after the inauguration of Southern 
Weekend (22 Dec 1984). Over the course of the 1980s, it had a relatively stable representation on 
the front or third page of Southern Weekend. Due to its collective authorship across institutions 
and professions, “Glancing” provided a good sample of a relatively large group of writers on 
how they wrote about Hong Kong for a Party subsidiary. Based on the 182 samples I collected, 
which included column entries and others freelance submissions, the following discussion will 
be structured around the polarized representation of Hong Kong I found between an affluent and 
a sinful city. 
An affluent society 
For those who travelled to Hong Kong in the 1980s, it was difficult to ignore the huge gap 
of living standards between Hong Kong and Guangzhou (Guangzhou Statistical Yearbook, 1985: 
155; Hong Kong 1981 Census: 37, 50). Huang Shusen, the literary critic and advocate for Hong 
Kong television programs, attempted to buy an imported electric fan in the SEZ Shenzhen but 
soon found out that his monthly salary as a newspaper editor was about one third of the price 
(Huang, 2010: 47). Looking at the gigantic gap of living conditions across the border, the meta-
narrative of “capitalist hell” began to falter. 
The first group of writings depicted Hong Kong in the 1980s as a prosperous modern 
society. Most conspicuously, material affluence and urban infrastructure struck the post-Mao 
visitors despite decades of socialist education on capitalist ills. Indeed, the open reform was 
initiated in Guangdong and Fujian a decade before the Cold War ended. Even though diplomatic 
relations between China and Western countries started to thaw in the early 1970s, the 
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informational and ideological gaps between socialist and capitalist societies were so huge that it 
provoked much bewilderment and amazement for many. As one writer pondered in his short 
travelogue: “no one in Hong Kong wears the same clothes…I wondered if they designed their 
own” (23 Feb 1984: 3).  
The huge differences between the two cities invoked the discourses of the “have-s” in Hong 
Kong and “have-nots” in Guangzhou as well as emulative initiatives. Differences of the two 
cities in everyday life tended to be understood as the very representation or even causes of falling 
behind. For instance, the highly dense yet efficient public transportation system in Hong Kong 
started to raise questions about bicycles used in Guangzhou, the major vehicles for everyday 
transportation in most mainland cities of the time. A writer complained that “both bikes and cars 
jammed the roads during rush hours” and suggested that “public transportation, not bicycles, 
should be promoted” (12 Jan 1985: 3). In other cases, emulative projects were justified if an 
example were witnessed in Hong Kong. The proposal for an underwater tunnel in Guangzhou 
between Huang Sha and Fang Cun districts was praised in reference to the submarine tunnel in 
Hong Kong (16 Mar 1985: 3). Similar to the case of TV, the Hong Kong factor became the 
legitimacy for many reformist projects in Guangzhou for approval from the government (Chan, 
2000: 266).  
The developmental narrative of comparison drew on another theme, namely, economism in 
defining the post-Mao project of modernity, which posited economic growth as its own end. The 
merits of submarine tunnels in Hong Kong were evidenced by the fact that “investment was 
returned in only five years” (16 Mar 1985: 3); and the Hong Kong subway company was 
applauded for “producing its own merchandise and installing retails shops in terminals to brand 
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itself while making money” (12 Jan 1985: 3). Social space and development, in short, were 
understood in Deng Xiaoping's apothegm of “getting rich is glorious” without presupposing 
either the subject (who is getting rich?) or object (for what/whom?).  
The market, in particular, was seen as the indispensable engine of development that brought 
in material wealth and consumerist modernity. There appeared no difficulties for post-Mao 
visitors to admire the prosperity of trading activities in their various forms. Consumer 
marketplaces like “Men's street” [nanren jie] and “Ladies’ street” [nüren jie] in Hong Kong were 
recommended as a “must-go” shopping paradise for visitors. (8 Jun 1985: 1). The very existence 
of a tertiary sector as well as chances of self-employment in Hong Kong also offered desirable 
images of a modern lifestyle—however vaguely defined—yet to come for mainlanders (27 Jan 
1989: 3). 
Sites of ambivalence 
Moving beyond the conspicuous affluence in material life and public infrastructure, there 
were increasing points of ambivalence in interpreting the differences. The pace of living in Hong 
Kong, for instance, was palpable to tourists even from observing the walking speed in the street, 
and aroused much misgivings. “No one is strolling,” one writer reported, “and people are 
speeding as if they all had a full bladder. You cannot see any sauntering lovers, at least much less 
visible than in Guangzhou” (8 Jun 1985: 1). Though tentatively, the author continued to question 
whether people in Hong Kong had any time for romantic relationships. “A relative told me that 
friends and families don’t normally visit each other in Hong Kong. They just give a call instead 
even on holidays. So young people follow suit and “boil the telephone lines” [bao dianhua 
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zhou].” The altered sense of time, noticed more deeply with mixed feelings by many of those 
who immigrated to Hong Kong from Guangdong in the 1980s, pointed to the strong disciplinary 
power of modernity yet to be grasped (Ma, 2012: 27).  
Religious activities, condemned as feudalist superstition in Mao's socialism, incurred 
tremendous difficulties in experiencing Hong Kong's modernity. The prevailing worship of the 
“God of Wealth” [caishen ye] and “Goddess Guanyin” [guanyin pusa] in households, shops, and 
factories in Hong Kong was seen as incompatible with a modern society. After visiting a dozen 
of friends and families who had shrines at home, a mainland writer did not hide his confusion,  
[I]n mainland, even people living in rural areas don"t perform daily rituals of worshipping except during 
traditional holidays like the Spring Festival or Tomb Sweeping Day [Qingming]. It is unbelievable that 
these activities exist here in Hong Kong, such a high-tech place. 
(6 Jul 1985: 3) 
Another writer, similarly, discussed the prosperity of modern temples in Hong Kong, the 
popularity of choosing a “propitious time” [ji shi] and lucky numbers in everyday activities (such 
as for car license plates), and how a teacher friend converted to Buddhism. In their attempts to 
explain the perceived “contradiction,” both writers fell back to almost a textbook description on 
capitalism under Mao. One concluded with a tone of confidence: 
Hong Kong is a playground for adventurers. They play capital games on real estate and the gold market, 
they gamble and they rob. Many become millionaires overnight while others go bankrupt and commit 
suicide. Horse racing, lotteries, and all types of gambling activities made people believe in luck. On the 
other hand, frequent traffic crash, fire in slums areas, and crime activities perpetuate the belief that life is 
precarious as if some supernatural forces were at work. Superstition comes right in place. 
(Ibid) 
This explanation obviously was not what the writer experienced but from the political 
language of the previous era. In Mao's socialist modernity, religious worship was attached to 
feudalism and superstition—the residual culture—while socialism and science point to the 
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future. The epochal divide between spiritual activities and modernity was so deeply entrenched 
that a “modern temple” was oxymoronic within the Maoist ideology. In the most empirically 
grounded piece I found, the author reviewed the major religious groups in Hong Kong 
(Buddhism, Taoism, Catholicism, Christianity, and Islam) and their contemporary developments 
especially in providing educational, medical, and other social services (30 Nov 1985: 1). Still, 
the article concluded with a sarcastic tone on the modern “veneer” of religion. The author armed 
the final point with further observations: 
The Taoist temple in the New Territories [xin jie] was now presided by young and beautiful nuns instead 
of the traditional Taoist priests…During off-hours, these nuns would dress up with their curly wigs and 
fashion clothes, and descended back to the mundane world. Most ridiculous are those Buddhist monks 
who collected donation in downtown areas with a portable radio chanting for them and filled their 
pockets quick and full… 
(30 Nov 1985: 1) 
Here, no distinctions among religious institutions, everyday practices, and (perhaps) 
mountebanks were made. Such seeming contradictions between modernity and “regressive” 
religious lives, therefore, are suggestive of how modernity was imagined by many writers of a 
Party subsidiary. In addition to the legacy of Mao's atheist modernity, these contradictions also 
indicated a monolithic understanding of culture that, even in its anthropological definition to 
include everyday life practices, was subject to top-down scrutiny. 
2.3 City of Sin 
Aspiring to material modernity yet still captured within the Maoist taxonomy of feudalism, 
socialism, and capitalism, the implicit reservations on Hong Kong's success easily lapsed into 
moral accusations whenever its social problems came into focus. Even in explicitly admiring the 
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professional practices of Hong Kong journalists, for instance, the author of “The Hardworking 
Hong Kong Journalists” linked their professionalism to the prevalence of crime in Hong Kong: 
In this tiny place [danwan zhi di] with a population of only about five million, there are 50 newspapers, 
520 journals, 10 radio stations, and 2 television networks. These numbers told us a lot about the fierce 
competition in Hong Kong's news front [xinwen jie] especially when the society is highly dysfunctional 
[yanzhong jixing]. Murder, mugging, rape, drug dealing, smuggling, fire…all kinds of accidents and 
human tragedies [tian zai ren huo] abounded. It would be real news for Hong Kong if no speeding police 
cars with a blaring honk were seen in one day.  
(12 Sept 1986: 1) 
The sinful depiction of Hong Kong by mainland writers is arguably more imaginary than 
experienced. Far from what its Chinese name Hong Kong, literally “fragrant port,” indicated, in 
the mainland history Hong Kong represented the debacle of the Qing dynasty against colonial 
power in the nineteenth century as well as the capitalist West in the Cold War era. After more 
than a century of segregation in the political order between Hong Kong and mainland China, the 
historical representations of Hong Kong as the ideological other were actively at work for 
mainlanders that even reformist-minded officials and intellectuals would not easily challenge.  
Chen Canyun, the head of the Guangdong Writers’ Association, led a group of local writers 
to Hong Kong in August 1985. A writer and Party member himself, Chen used to work in Hong 
Kong in the 1930s and 1940s when the Chinese Communist Party organized its united front in 
Hong Kong against the Nationalists (KMT). Linking his memories to what he saw years later, 
Chen talked favorably about British Hong Kong as “a prosperous metropolis” [fanhua dushi], “a 
civil society” [wenming shehui], and “a world of entertainment” [wanle shijie] with the exception 
of one thing: it was also “a market of sex trade” [seqing shichang] (7 Sept 1985: 1). In a front-
page interview in Southern Weekend, Chen mentioned the titillating pictures he saw on Hong 
Kong newsstands. The author then echoed Chen's argument about the international market of 
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“human flesh” [renrou shichang] in Hong Kong as a prominent social problem, and ended the 
story with a standard bash on the capitalist ills, “the class divide in a prosperous city was huge; 
for the weak-minded who could not withstand poverty, alienated human relationships, and the 
temptation of consumerism would probably be trapped (into sex trade). The underworld is a 
pushing hand of evil” (Ibid). 
The debauched and the incorrigible 
Sex trade and pornography, or “yellow poison” [huang du] in the socialist parlance, were 
both recurring themes in the coverage of Hong Kong. In a column article titled “A World of 
Kaleidoscope,” an author recalled his experiences in a Hong Kong bookstore where “of more 
than a hundred titles of magazines on sale, all of them could use anything but naked women on 
their covers” (3 Aug 1985: 1). Although this might sound as an exaggeration, at the time when 
hand-drawn illustrations for a Party subsidiary like Southern Weekend were part of the reformist 
initiatives, it is not difficult to understand why visual sensation hardly failed to sensitize 
mainland visitors. 
The “yellow poison” of the capitalist world, on the other hand, was deemed incurable in 
most mainland writers’ accounts. While the writer of “A World of Kaleidoscope” admitted that 
the debasing effect of “yellow poison” had gained significant attention in Hong Kong, he argued, 
without any explanation, that “In a capitalist society, it is impossible to eliminate it.” In 
conclusion, he qualified the hopeless outcome by using the “majority vs. minority” dichotomy in 
the socialist parlance, “Even in Hong Kong, the majority of youth are healthy and progressive… 
only those weak-minded would be captivated by the insidious and vulgar.” In differentiating 
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readers between the good majority and the corruptible minority, a line between “healthy-
progressive” and “insidious-vulgar” publications was invoked. The dualism in imagining both 
readership and newspapers of the time, again, was consistent with the permanent class struggle 
between “people” and “enemies” in Mao’s political language.   
In another piece I found with an explicit focus on Hong Kong publications, “Newsstands in 
Hong Kong,” the author reported that an adult magazine Dragon Tiger Balm [Lung Fu Pao] had 
one of its issues accused of being “partially inappropriate” [bufen neirong buliang] by a district 
court in Hong Kong (8 Mar 1986: 1). After the litigation and amercement, the dissatisfied author 
complained that “the magazine was still openly sold on newsstands though packaged with a 
white plastic cover now.” He then argued that the problem reached far beyond where the law 
enforcement stopped: 
In fact, almost every issue of this magazine (Dragon Tiger Balm) was inappropriate. There are so many 
more out there! Lots of magazines had similar content with Dragon Tiger Balm, stuffing their stories with 
sexual depictions and titillating pictures of naked women… Newsrooms in Hong Kong have been calling 
for attention on the pernicious impacts of pornography on teenagers. According to a Hong Kong 
newspaper, a member of the Regulatory Committee on Pornographic Publication [seqing kanwu guanzhu 
weiyuanhui] stated on December 7 last year that “the impact of porn on teenagers has reached an 
astounding level. Besides psychological disturbance for many, there has been incest that involved young 
girls having abortions in the fifth or sixth grade!” Another newspaper commented that “there are not 
many good solutions to these publications.” 
Without clear references to the two Hong Kong newspapers or the member he quoted, the 
emphasis of the report was on the prevalence of pornographic publications in Hong Kong and its 
alarming effects on teenagers. More implicitly, as the last quote from a newspaper indicates, 
there was an unasked question why Hong Kong had no good solutions to the debasing social 
problems of “yellow poison” or, in short: why were not these publications banned? 
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In contrast, Southern Weekend reported on underground publications in Guangzhou with a 
different light. The growing private network of printers, wholesalers [bao kan tou], book dealers, 
and individual newsstand owners in mainland cities like Guangzhou—the unofficial “black 
market”—was covered within the context of capitalist influences and (effective) legal 
crackdown. Among the stories in Southern Weekend, the problematization of unofficial 
publications and the derogatory tone were in strong resonance with the voices of demolishing the 
“fish bone” antennas. Let me give an example to illustrate this collective stance. 
“Shedding light on the ‘Black Spiders’: the Black Market of Illegal Publications on 
Dongyuan Road in Guangzhou” (11 Sept 1987: 1) reported on the rectifying movement of the 
local police department aiming at the underground printing markets. The story began with the 
arrest of a book dealer “Su something” [su mou]—a combination of the last name and an 
anonymous cover of his first name—in his apartment of Guangzhou. Along with Su's arrest, 
readers were informed that “more than 10,000 illegal publications and 8,000RMB illegal income 
were confiscated,” which “served as the opening scene of the legal movement against the black 
market in Dongyuan Road.” 
The story, running slightly shorter than the second half of the front page, was organized 
around three subtitles: “Networks of spiritual opium” [jingshen yapian], “ ‘Black spiders’ in 
action,” and “Craving for money.” The writer reported on the thriving unregulated printing 
market, which involved both public and private-individual dealers: 
[T]here are (in Dongyuan Road) ten distributors of public institutions [danwei] and twenty black market 
bao fan tou (newspaper wholesalers) who had interprovincial connections with ban fan tou in other 
provinces. Each bao fan tou connects with dozens of individual newsstand owners and supplied with 
them various illegal publications. In good seasons, hundreds of book and newspaper dealers were 
congregating here in Dongyuan Road, riding bicycles, three-wheelers, and even driving cars to distribute 
bags after bags of illegal publications to elsewhere. In an incomplete survey [ju bu wanquan tongji], 
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many vulgar publications—more than ten titles of pornographic magazines including the Dragon Tiger 
Balm—were occasionally found. That's why people said: “Dongyuan Road is a network of spiritual 
opium.” 
This “network of spiritual opium” is indeed an underground network of distribution. The bao fan tou here 
not only had their wholesale spaces, but also suppliers, storage spaces, printers, retail outlets—all 
connected together and spread toxin [du su] to people. It is not uncommon that a tabloid printed yesterday 
in other provinces was on Guangzhou newsstands today.  
From the incomplete investigation or vague terms like “occasionally” [bu shi], it is unclear 
to us who distributed what in Dongyuan Road along the public-private divide and the proportion 
of pornography in circulation. The differences between “vulgar” [yong su], “pornographic” [yin 
hui], and “illegal” [fei fa] remained undefined, if not used arbitrarily. And even though ten out of 
thirty distributors mentioned in the report were public institutions [danwei], the focus was clearly 
on individual or private wholesalers and especially those involved with pornography or the 
“black spiders”: 
Some people called these black market book and newspaper dealers “black spiders,” knitting the 
underground network of distribution with their dirty black wires. How do these “black spiders” work? 
Let's look at a few examples. Wang Quan, a bao fan tou nicknamed “Human King” [ren wang] got a call 
from Hunan province. “Hello? Human-king? I have some stuff here. Do you want them? All right, that's 
the deal. I"ll send you telegraphy when they come.” A week later, Wang Quan and his partners picked up 
the illegal publications from Guangzhou railway station and immediately wholesaled them to dozens of 
newsstand owners in contact.  
Another “black spider” Su something [su mou], teamed up with a woman named “Fat-woman Lian” [fei-
po Lian], was previously arrested and fined by the police department for distributing pornographic 
publications. Last January, Su something bought in 47 issues of Dragon Tiger Balm at the price of 
13.5RMB per copy and sold them for 15RMB or 17RMB each. He was detained for 15 days and fined 
1,500RMB but continued his business in Dongyuan Road with “Fat-woman Lian.” 
The narrations of individual wholesalers—especially on “human king” Wang Quan and his 
phone call with suppliers in Hunan—were no doubt imaginary. The omniscient perspective and, 
in the case of “Su something,” the derogatory nickname of his partner “Fat-woman Lian” both 
fulfilled the purpose of story telling, making it more interesting and relatable to readers. The 
arbitrariness in addressing the private distributors using their real name, formally disguised 
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name, and sobriquet was also suggestive of their social status as criminals—the immoral 
minority—in the story. 
In the last section, “Craving for money,” the author began to questioned the ten public 
institutions involved. Even though individual cases mentioned above made the connections 
between the private wholesalers and pornography, there was no indication what types of 
publications those public institutions distributed. But it was apparent that the participation of 
public institutions in the unofficial network of distribution disturbed the dichotomy of the 
“public vs. private” divide: 
It is not accurate to call Dongyuan Road an underground distribution network of illegal publications 
because, as previously mentioned, there were not only individual distributors but also ten distributors of 
danwei. Some of these distribution sites belonged to cultural institutions but some were completely 
irrelevant. For instance, the Guangzhou Scale Equipment Plant [Guangzhou tianping yiqi chang] had a 
distribution outlet in Dongyuan Road. Another magazine, which had its distribution site in south Zhixin 
Road, relocated it to Dongyuan Road to “join the craze” [gan re nao]. 
Acknowledging a messy picture of major players in the bottom-up network of distribution, 
the story was completed in condemning market orientation while celebrating the triumph of law 
enforcement: 
Why are these danwei so obsessed with wholesaling illegal publications? It is, above all, about money 
making. The participants or leaders in these danwei reek of the money odor of the capitalist class [zichan 
jieji de tongchou]. 
In a week since July 15, the police department had arrested 16 illegal book wholesalers, raided 15 storage 
sites, and confiscated more than 96,000 copies of illegal publications and 27,000RMB illegal income. The 
illegal market in Dongyuan Road is now crumbling. And the “black spiders” who sold spiritual opium 
without conscience but the craze for money only destroyed themselves in the end!  
It can be argued that, in the case of the print market, law enforcement worked hand in hand 
with moral discourses in maintaining the boundary between mainland Guangdong and Hong 
Kong. Compared to the problems of TV reception, the defense in print was even stronger and 
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more successful partly due to the underdevelopment of bottom-up production and distribution by 
domestic players. Unlike Hong Kong TV programs, I found no debate or concerns on a 
comparable level about the (debasing) value of unofficial prints. In chapter 1 I discussed how the 
“curious case of southern newspapers” in Guangzhou aroused national concerns and how 
Southern Weekend maintained “wholesomeness” as its identity within the thriving non-Party 
tabloids. The report on Dongyuan Road by Southern Weekend, too, indicated where the 
newspaper stood.  
Again, opposing the illegal publications as a solvable problem in China and an insolvable 
one in Hong Kong worked to reinforce the ideological buttress against the open border. This 
moral stance could not be more telling when the incorrigible social ills in Hong Kong were 
treated in mainland. A cover story in July 1985 reported that a few Hong Kong drug addicts were 
detoxified in a Guangzhou hospital by traditional acupuncture (27 Jul 1985: 1). Titled “Hong 
Kong Drug Addicts and the “Super Needle” of Guangzhou” [xianggang yinjunzi he Guangzhou 
shenzhen], the front-page feature unmistakably drew a line between drug use and cigarette 
smoking as geographical: “Acupuncture brings good news to Hong Kong drug addicts as well as 
smokers in mainland.” 
Finally, the dour depiction of social problems in Hong Kong was most revealing in stories 
about Hong Kong police and law enforcement. In September 1985, Southern Weekend reprinted 
a short article from New Evening News [Xin wan bao], a Hong Kong newspaper and indeed very 
rare source for Southern Weekend. The article “The Family Tragedy of a Hong Kong Policeman” 
reported on the personal predicaments of a low-ranking police officer, who had a wife with a 
gambling problem, a son who turned into a rapist, and a daughter befallen by the porn industry 
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(28 Sept 1985: 3). Omitting all background information, the story of the misfortunate police 
family exemplified almost all major social problems of Hong Kong, including sex trade, 
gambling, and a failing legal system—almost like a metaphor. 
In less dramatic accounts, the Hong Kong police were often associated with corruption and 
colonial governance. Within the double mechanism of socialist and nationalist discourses, the 
Hong Kong police were seen as institutionally flawed and morally deplorable. “The Multiple 
Faces of Hong Kong Police” column essay in 1986, pointed out the explicit racial line in Hong 
Kong police administration: “Of course the British occupied high-ranking positions… things 
only began to change in recent years after the Sino-British talk” (12 Apr 1986: 1). In addition to 
racial inequalities, Hong Kong police were also seen as battening on the underworld of crime and 
prostitution. The intertwining network of law and crime, the author explained, “is why the sex 
trade has been so prosperous” and “why Hong Kong police tried so hard to improve their public 
image” (Ibid). In another revealing case, the well-acclaimed ICAC (Hong Kong Independent 
Commission Against Corruption) was introduced to readers yet in a skeptical tone. 
Acknowledging their recent achievements, the author of “The Thorny Rose of Hong Kong” 
concluded, almost self-contradictorily, that “In capitalist Hong Kong, ICAC cannot solve the 
problems of government corruption, not to mention other social depravities. But the fact that it is 
welcomed by the general public has some useful lessons for us” (16 Jun 1989: 3). 
Boundaries revamped 
In addition to prostitution, drug dealing, corruption, gambling and various kinds of 
organized criminal activities—all outlawed in mainland China as well as in Hong Kong—were 
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distinctively attached to the colonial territory. For Macau, the Portuguese colony where casino 
gambling was legalized and became a major sector for the local economy, gambling became 
almost the infallible vantage point in the mainland travelogues. From what I examined from 
Southern Weekend, in general, there were a consensus on both the prevalence and debasing 
effects of the gambling industry in Macau. But there were points of divergence on its relations to 
the local culture. While some took the lens of “the good majority” and expressed a strong distaste 
for the “bad apples,” others might see a more complicated picture. One author argued that neither 
the casinos nor the brothels were where the “ordinary Macau residents” went for leisure (25 Jan 
1986: 1). Another one, contrarily, saw gambling attracting both global tourists and the local labor 
class [laogong jieceng] (28 Nov 1986: 3; 10 Feb 1989: 3). 
The instability of these accounts had many sources. Again, the coverage of Hong Kong in 
Southern Weekend in the 1980s was mostly from short-term mainland visitors, whose 
experiences depended largely on their hosts and itineraries that, in turn, correlated with their 
social status back home. There were more frequent writers whose professional positions 
demanded constant border crossing to Hong Kong or Macau. But for Southern Weekend, there 
were no hired writers who could report as journalists. These mediated accounts therefore 
represented the continuity of Party journalism in covering non-political stories, carrying on the 
“truth” from the past more than the present—what Dough Young called “a surrealistic Pollyana-
esque glow” (2013: 12).  
For the opening province of Guangdong, Hong Kong indeed came to be the immediate 
representation of capitalist culture. But the defensive ground, as we have seen from the war on 
TV and the superficial coverage of Hong Kong by Southern Weekend, did not only include top-
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down initiatives. If the flourishing “fish bone” antennas, resistance to regulatory practices, and 
the heavenly depiction of Hong Kong constituted the embracing forces of Hong Kong culture; 
the central and provincial ban on self-made antennas, demolishing teams of fire departments, and 
the sinful discourses on Hong Kong represented the conservative front. In brief, the push and 
pull within the cultural influx were practiced on both institutional and representational levels. 
The dramatic struggle ranging from policy making to grassroots practice and individual accounts 
in the 1980s also indicates the lack of consensus on the difficult question of what exactly defined 
“dirty water” in the vague guidance of “pouring out the dirty water but not everything foreign.” 
While the question remained unsettled, the paternal impulse within the Party as well as among 
intellectuals to a “prescribed popular” (Link, 1987: 155) continued to assert its place in the 
formation of a post-Mao society for cultural and ideological leadership.
These individual and often contradictory observations, swinging between Hong Kong as 
heaven and hell, were clearly filtered through the ideological baggage formed during Mao's 
socialist era. Wang Fang, a mainland journalist working in Hong Kong, published an anthology 
in 1986 called The Various Tastes of Hong Kong Living (Wang, 1986). “Hong Kong is neither 
heaven nor hell.” Wang Fang's closing remark in the book was a symbolic gesture to intervene in 
the superficial antagonism. However, while the imagined boundary between the national-
political community of mainland and British-capitalist Hong Kong continued to claim its power 
in the changing social map, the cultural front could not but be charged with an active 
marginalization of Hong Kong despite its role in economic and social re-integration. In the next 
section, I will focus on the last “sin” of Hong Kong—culturelessness—and discuss what 
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contributed to the symbolic sources and material conditions of the defensive project. In other 
words: how did culture come to the front of journalism? 
2.4 The “Cultural Desert” 
Among the many “sins” of Hong Kong, cultureless-ness is probably the most historically 
invested one. The spatial bias of Chinese culture or “Central Plain Syndrome” [da zhongyuan 
xintai] prioritized unity in the making of national identity and history while suppressing internal 
differences (Fu, 2003: 67; Lee, 2002: 169-181). Xenophobic especially in late imperial history 
and beyond, Chinese culture has regarded regional formations and meanings as opposed to 
national integration and hegemony thus suppressed them both materially and discursively. The 
historic “south” in China emerged less as a defined place than as a process of mobility, 
experience, and difference (Cartier, 2001: 31). In the long sweeping course of dynastic China, the 
larger south or “land of savage” [nan man zhi di] was barbarous [man] under the scourge of 
pirates and sinful aliens [yi] in the literary writings of scholar-officials in exile. The cession of 
Hong Kong to British rule further subjected the southern islanders, in particular, to “non-
Chinese” or “foreign slaves” [yang nu] who acclimated to the colonial power against their 
homeland. 
During the political turbulences of the twentieth century, the discursive formation of the 
south as a “cultural desert” on the south was further reinforced by intellectual migration and 
wartime politics. When WWII broke out, tens of thousands of mainland refugees moved to Hong 
Kong in the 1930s and 1940s, including many educated elites—so called “southbound 
literati” [nanlai wenren]—from big cities (Su, 2001). Yearning for a strong nation yet dislocated 
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by war, southbound intellectuals recognized Hong Kong as more or less a “non-place,” either a 
temporary shelter or a cultural front of mustering popular support for mainland politics (Ip & 
Choi, 2001). Within the context of mainland politics and family segregation, expressions like 
“southern kingdom” [nan guo] and “cultural desert” both came to communicate the collective 
feeling of cultural displacement within this community of expatriate intellectuals.  
Since the late 1970s, Hong Kong popular culture had inserted a strong presence in not only 
Guangdong but also further north (Gold, 1993). Despite its apolitical and individualistic 
orientation, for mainland Chinese the light-hearted Hong Kong (and Taiwan) popular 
entertainment was an instant release from the political culture that strictly suppressed personal 
interests. Even though tongsu (popular) songs and singing styles were gradually assimilated by 
official performances (Baranovitch, 2003: 15), the culture from the “cultural desert” stood out as 
a controversial point of reunion. 
Returning to the “central kingdom” 
The most explicit form of “central plain syndrome” in post-Mao journalism reported Hong 
Kong singers as overseas Chinese with “a heart for homeland.” Since the signing of the Sino-
British Declaration in September 1984, a number of Hong Kong singers were invited by the 
CCTV Spring Festival celebration to perform songs with nationalistic themes (Zhang, 2010: 45). 
Within the framework, returning to mainland China became an emotionally charged moment of 
“root searching” [xun gen] for the popular artists as well as for the business community. 
Homecoming, either to perform or invest, came to represent resuming an essential identity for 
Chinese expatriates.  
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Southern Weekend followed these homecoming stories closely and coherently within the 
nationalistic lens. When the Hong Kong popular singer Lo Man [Luo Wen] held his mainland 
concerts in Guangzhou in 1985, the event took the front-page headline on Southern Weekend 
titled “Lo Man's Ultimate Dream” [Luo wen de su yuan] (16 Mar 1985: 1). The author 
introduced Lo as a globally successful pop star dreaming to perform at the Sun Yat-sen 
Auditorium of Guangzhou. “Lo confided to me,” the author wrote, “Guangzhou is my 
hometown, a place I never forgot where I watched performances as a kid while the seeds of art 
were sown in my heart. I have been hoping to return for years because I think performing at the 
Sun Yat-sen Auditorium is the symbol of one's status and ability.” 
Referencing mainland China as the unchanged center for Hong Kong and diasporic Chinese 
communities constantly depicted the overseas experiences, if ever mentioned, as intensive 
personal and professional struggles, foreign lands as places to work but not to live. The 
narratives of cultural nationalism positioned Chinese culture as the essential source of one's 
identity and, quite often, the (secret) formula of secular success. Patriotic businessmen, 
represented by Hong Kong tycoons like Li Jiacheng whose biography was serialized in Southern 
Weekend in 1988, was one case in point. The son of a school principal in western Guangdong, Li 
and his family were wartime refugees to Hong Kong in 1940. He named his first manufacturing 
shop in Hong Kong after the Yangtze River [chang jiang], as highlighted in the biography, which 
came to evidence his outstanding vision and a well-grounded Chinese identity (5 Feb 1988: 3). 
In fact, for the early Chinese business communities returning to Guangdong, their 
investment in the mainland was repetitively seen as a patriotic act rather than for personal 
interests. Expressions such as “I was in Hong Kong yet with my mind in mainland” [ren zai 
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xianggang, xin zai zuguo] echoed strongly with the ages-old “Central Kingdom” sentiment while 
justifying the renewed economic contact between the mainland and overseas Chinese. Chen 
Zhihe, an interior decorator raised in the Philippines and working in Hong Kong, started his joint 
venture in Guangzhou in 1984 (23 Jun 1984: 1). Similar to those returned singers, Chen was 
reported by Southern Weekend as a patriotic expatriate [aiguo huaqiao] who gave up his 
inheritance in the Philippines to “fill the blanks of lighting decoration in China so we soon can 
lead the global trend as well” (my emphasis). Along with the report, a passport style photo of Mr. 
Chen completed the nationalistic narrative by showing an amiable Chinese face in suit without 
noticeable foreign references.  
No doubt, highlighting the Chinese “roots” of Hong Kong singers and businessmen united 
the new members on the national stage. But it functioned at the expense of the differences that 
might categorize their cultural membership otherwise. The moment of re-discovering the 
national identity of Hong Kong people for renewed contact worked hand in hand with the denial 
of their experiences or identities outside the national border,“a double mechanism of inclusion 
and exclusion” (Hall, 2006: 228). In 1986, a few Hong Kong residents joined a summer camp of 
folk dancing in Guangzhou. The news report was a dramatic explication of such imagination. 
“They are still Chinese and love Chinese food…[I]t is difficult to find authentic folk dancing in 
Hong Kong” (19 Sept 1986: 4). Likewise, a review on Hong Kong film studies made a 
concluding remark arguing that “even though they live in a colonial society and studied western 
film theories, but they are standing on the rich ground of Chinese culture!” (22 Jun 1990: 4) 
The discourses of cultureless Hong Kong, on the other hand, were fueled by the “high vs. 
low culture” dichotomy. With the increasing share Hong Kong culture claimed in the mainland 
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market, resistance strengthened the gatekeeping of high cultural forms particularly in Art the 
theme of page four on Southern Weekend. “[I]f Hong Kong is a cultural desert, then the art center 
is the oasis.” A writer started his piece with an unmistakably elitist “common sense” after paying 
a visit to the Hong Kong Art Center (29 Apr 1988: 4). A cover story in 1986 reported on a joint 
performance of a Guangzhou pianist with Hong Kong musicians. The warm reception, the author 
wrote, “proved that Hong Kong people still could understand mainland music.” To the surprise 
of the author (as well as his imagined readers), however, “Hong Kong in fact has quite a few 
groups performing orthodox [zhengtong] music regularly” (19 Sept 1986: 1). 
Among the gatekeeping frontline against “low culture” from Hong Kong, film was perhaps 
the form that encountered most the critical review. After watching a horror movie in Hong Kong, 
a mainland film critic launched a vehement attack on the fact that a female ghost who drowned 
in the story was from mainland. He used the example to question the resurgent argument that 
there was no “social consciousness” in entertainment. “Isn’t the very fact that this drowned ghost 
was a mainland girl [dalu mei] the reflection of some kind of social consciousness?” The 
criticism, in particular, echoed Mao's cultural policies dating back to his talk in 1942 that art and 
literature—both high and low—are class-based and that their political functions prioritize 
aesthetic features (Mao, 1975: 30-32). With the emphasis on the educational role of culture, the 
value of entertainment and individualistic expressions were both suppressed as capitalist instead 
of serving the proletariats. In literary and art criticism, Mao pointed out, it is by social effects 
[shehui xiaoguo], not one's own claim, that the creative motive of the author could be justified as 
politically progressive or otherwise.  
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Indeed, the Maoist cultural critique on Hong Kong popular films was in line with the sinful 
imagination of Hong Kong. In the residual critical framework, producing entertaining content 
irrelevant to national politics could be seen as regressive or anti-revolutionary. Likewise, 
portraying a mainland girl drowned dead could indicate an anti-mainland or separatist politics, a 
centrifugal movement against the return of Hong Kong. Ironically, however, Hong Kong since 
the 1970s had witnessed the rise of local identity when the “local” instead of the “remote” China 
started to become a point of reference for especially the locally-born generation (Ma, 1999: 35). 
Between “central plain syndrome” unchanged in mainland China and de-sinicisation in Hong 
Kong, the battle over “culture” at the point of reunion was deemed unavoidable. 
The decertifying south 
As the economic integration between Guangdong and Hong Kong took off and accelerated, 
the anxiety over culture of the south rose up to the surface. Partly the backlash of the Cultural 
Revolution when culture suffered excruciating purges in political struggles, “culture” in 
mainland China of the 1980s came to the center of social awareness. As a few Beijing-based 
intellectuals recalled, it was an age of “cultural renaissance” in the post-Mao period, a decade 
when discourses of humanity came to the front of the public (Zha, 2006: 7-9). Within the elitist 
discourses of “cultural fever,” however, both Guangzhou and the adjacent SEZ Shenzhen were 
problematized as the “cultural desert” for national concern. I now group the collection of 
writings on this topic into three positions to briefly mark this expansion of anxiety in the post-
Mao press.  
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The first group of writings questioned the absence or paucity of “high culture” in 
Guangzhou, an extension of the problematic we have seen on Hong Kong earlier. The incoming 
cultural forms were questioned as opposed to art. “Why is there no ‘Yellow Earth’ in 
Guangzhou?” for instance, interrogated the limited audience for the internationally awarded art 
film [yishu dianying] in Guangzhou (27 Jul 1985: 1). “Why no one dance ballet in Guangzhou,” 
questioned whether disco was taking the place of art in the southern city (19 Apr 1986: 1). “Is the 
‘leg’ a bit shorter?” asked why literature and art works in Guangzhou won many fewer national 
awards compared to other big cities, and whether romantic and martial art novels were taking the 
place of literature (3 Apr 1987: 1). In 1989, Coastal Culture News [yanhai da wenhua bao], a 
non-Party tabloid, opened up a debate on “Culture: is Guangzhou decertifying” and called for 
responses to the crisis. 
The skepticism on the cultural identity of Guangzhou was often raised with implicit attack 
on its localism. Le Di, the column journalist from Shanghai, wrote “Guangzhou people should 
know themselves within a bigger picture” on the differences among Beijing, Shanghai and 
Guangzhou. In a descending order, he concluded, the three cities differed on their spatial 
imagination of daily references (2 Feb 1989: 1). While people in Beijing tended to think and 
speak “globally,” Shanghai people shrank it drastically to the relationship between Shanghai and 
the rest of the nation. For Guangzhou people, Le Di wrote, “[T]hey have an even smaller 
purview and mostly attended to their own city…Many Shanghai friends, like me, feel that 
Cantonese do not really know much about the country. So they cannot think from a national or 
global perspective.” 
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Understandably, these criticisms against Guangzhou were raised when 80% of its population 
watched Hong Kong television instead of national channels. The economic integration with the 
outside—mostly Hong Kong—also indicated the outward orientation of social formation in 
Guangdong. The “south wind,” similarly, suggested how Hong Kong became the immediate 
social and economic reference for Guangdong. The tension of going “one step ahead” yet as a 
national project created a peculiar space for the southern province. As it quickly resumed its 
Hong Kong connections, its cultural identity as a socialist city came into question regarding its 
connections with the nation state.  
The second position on Cantonese culture involved many questions (and confusion) on 
whether the flooding cultural commodities qualified as “culture” yet, in general, expressed some 
willingness to understand the nature of Cantonese culture in the making. The mildly defensive 
side, interestingly, also relied on the same cultural hierarchy even though “low culture” is being 
redefined as “mass culture” [dazhong wenhua] or, like the case in music, tongsu culture. “Who 
said Guangzhou is cultureless?” for one example, argued tentatively that mass culture, including 
movie theaters, libraries, bookstores, and newsstands in Guangzhou, all made one “feel as if 
walking in a modern city” (6 Oct 1989: 1). In justification, the author cited the 66 radio stations 
and 31 TV stations of Guangdong in 1988, ranked the first and second respectively in number 
nationwide, and argued that “culture does not belong to the few.” 
Again based on observation, another writer pointed out that the shrinking audience of elite 
culture was only a relative pattern in comparison to the emergent popular culture. “There are a 
couple of classical music concerts every week and usually a full house for ballet performances, 
but none of these could compete with the craze for Hong Kong pop singers like Mei Yanfang” (7 
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Apr 1989: 4). Recognizing the diversification of cultural consumption, this position allowed a 
loose (and overlapping) definition of “culture” but also called for order: 
A friend from Beijing wrote to me and suggested, “…for the current status of Guangzhou culture, the 
propaganda department shall direct them back to history and to think about the subject of human 
nature”... We do not hope Guangzhou culture remained as what it is right now; the government shall 
encourage the rich enterprises in Guangzhou to invest in cultural production. 
(Southern Weekend, 17 Feb 1989: 1) 
Legitimization of the “new popular” also borrow power from the past. Huang Wenyu, the 
editor-in-chief of Southern Daily in the 1970s, justified the emerging popular culture with Mao's 
“mass line” [qunzhong luxian]: 
Tongsu (popular) culture is, as Mao previously defined, “the elementary forms of art and culture; they can 
easily be accepted by most people and influence millions of families. This is what advanced culture 
cannot compete. Just as Lu Xun characterized tongsu fictions as “primarily heart lightening and 
occasionally edifying,” in our own language, this is called “education coated with entertainment.” 
(Huang, 1986) 
The last group of writings on Southern Weekend, finally, confirmed popular culture in 
Guangdong areas as constituting an alternative and—in acute contrast to being cultureless—a 
more progressive cultural space. Jin Zhaojun, a writer of People's Music [Renmin Yinyue], 
quoted a Guangzhou official and echoed that “reviving culture did not mean resuscitating the old 
forms even for traditional culture” (Jin, 1987: 2). In “The Backbone of Southern Culture,” the 
author contended that there was no coincidence that a few TV journalists in Guangzhou founded 
the first anti-suicide NGO in mainland China: “this, indeed, represents a better culture” (15 Jul 
1988: 1).  
Despite the differences, however, all three positions belonged to the same “problematic” 
which acknowledged the distinctive formation of southern culture in Guangdong. This discursive 
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explosion in the mid- and late 1980s over “culture,” as we have seen from Southern Weekend, 
was fueled by a set of conditions. The historical marginalization of Hong Kong and its post-Mao 
northbound economic movement created a gap within the “central plain syndrome” mentality. 
Meanwhile, the coming return of Hong Kong sovereignty to China in 1997 also confirmed the 
status of political periphery for Hong Kong and further mobilized the repertoire of cultural 
nationalism. Finally, within the intellectual backlash in the wake of Cultural Revolution when 
“culture” regained unprecedented currency in post-Mao social life, the speeding integration of 
Guangdong province and Hong Kong at the southern border inevitably triggered a defensive 
cultural elitism.   
Conclusion 
It is helpful for us to remember that all the writings discussed above from Southern Weekend 
were produced within its mass authorship during the 1980s. Decentralization in newspaper 
production represented the post-Mao release from the meta-narrative of revolution and a 
collective call to resume a life outside of political mobilization. While the press was driven to the 
market for financial independence and resumed its connections with readers and the outside 
world, the connections were being made in an uncharted realm of social and cultural changes. 
Without clear official prescription, the culture of the post-Mao society in fact became a relatively 
open ground of contestation at least for the moment. Huang Wenyu, again the editor-in-chief of 
Southern Daily in the 1970s, commented upon the fifth anniversary of Southern Weekend in 1989 
that pointed to the moment when—for the press—social life was unleashed for discursive 
formation and overlapped with its market orientation: 
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Though Southern Weekend discussed various kinds of social issues, its major coverage was on cultural 
development that encompassed many different fields. It included education, technology, literature, art, 
journalism, publication, TV, radio, hygiene, sports, and libraries… A cultural newspaper cannot talk 
about everything. But if it tried to cover as much as possible, then it could satisfy all kinds of readers  and 
therefore be well received. 
(Huang, 1988) 
In Guangdong, the post-Mao reconnection with readers by newspapers had a re- 
territorializing dimension, which powerfully shaped the contours of the new local culture. In this 
chapter, I have reviewed one thread of newspaper production by Southern Weekend regarding, 
namely, the “problem” of Hong Kong culture. Despite the national consensus on economic and 
open reform, at no time during the 1980s was there a fresh ground for the incoming Hong Kong 
culture. Instead, a strong link between the past and the present was actively at work during the 
process of social integration to defend an imagined boundary against the blurring border. As in 
history, the overriding order of temporal continuities upon spatial differences has been embedded 
within China's communication bias. In this contemporary case, as we have seen, the cultural 
front could not but be charged with active marginalization of Hong Kong despite its role in 
economic and social re-integration.  
The problematization of Hong Kong culture in both TV and newspapers, on the other hand, 
cannot be simply grouped within the oppressive forms of state censorship or top-down 
intervention. It can be argued that the moral stance taken up by Southern Weekend, indeed, 
represented a national—including the Party-state—concern of the opening south in rapid 
economic reform. Such national orientation of Southern Weekend could be testified not only in 
its journalism but also distribution, a happy convergence of ideological continuities and 
economic incentives for the newspaper. Dissatisfied with the overloaded postal system, Southern 
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Weekend set up regional printers in Shanghai in 1987 and Hainan in 1988 for the eastern and 
southern readership (e.g. 5 Dec 1986:1; 6 Nov 1987: 1; 4 Dec 1987: 1). In January 1990, 
Southern Weekend started to print locally in Beijing under the auspices of People's Daily, the 
central newspaper, for its northern market. By March 1991, the circulation in Beijing alone 
reached 150,000 copies, a ten-fold increase from 14,000 copies in 1985 (through postal 
subscription) in the capital city within six years (“25 Years,” Southern Weekend, 30 Nov 1980: 
1). By 1992, Southern Weekend had reached out to most provinces across the country. Its retail 
sales and postal subscription claimed equal shares in circulation, with 95 percent of its 
subscription coming from individuals or families rather than public institutions (9 Oct 1992: 1).  
In the last few months of 1991, Southern Weekend called for readers’ input on its coming 
page expansion. From the selected letters published later, only three out of thirty were from 
Guangdong province. Self-promotional concerns aside, the national interest in the changing 
south now in contact with the outside world were unmistakable. As a government official from 
Hebei province commented, “…the only complaint I had about Southern Weekend was that it did 
not really take advantage of its proximity to Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. I hope these areas 
would be introduced more including the people, society, ethos, economy, and culture” (20 Sept 
1991: 1). “We need to know more about the life in Special Economic Zones, Hong Kong, and 
Macau,” another reader from a high school of Anhui province suggested, “the ‘south’ should 
embrace the nation, expand our horizon by introducing the world of today and future” (6 Sept 
1992: 1). 
To know more about the “south,” in sum, became a nationwide concern in the post-Mao 
society as related to reform and the global society. Yet the decentralizing production and national 
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distribution of Southern Weekend, as the readers of northern provinces responded, went hand in 
hand with the cautious mediation in its journalism. While some read it satisfactorily as the “tastes 
of southern kingdom,” the informational gap between the newspaper and the “reality” others felt 
was apparent. For Guangdong residents, it was most likely the TV programs from Hong Kong in 
the air and personal connections on the ground instead of Party tabloids that fed the 
informational needs. Up to the 1990s, Hong Kong television still compared favorably for 
Guangzhou audiences with newspapers even in terms of depth, contradicting the newspapers 
universal excellence in this area (Chan, 2000: 260). For Southern Weekend, then, the shift from 
Party politics to popular culture could not simply be read as a regional formation as opposed to 
national concerns. Similar to the pioneering economic developments of the province, the 
defensive “Party-popular” in journalistic production pointed to a moment when national interest
—both from the past and the present—became symbiotic with the opening south. 
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PART  II 
The 1990s in China’s newspaper history was a time of radical changes as market reform 
became the national agenda while political debates silenced. Certainly not for everyone, it was 
also a time of “getting rich without talking [mensheng fa dacai],” as Deng Xiaoping’s successor 
Jiang Zemin once famously put. After the backlash of Tiananmen massacre (1989-1992) when 
numerous outspoken newspapers during the democratic movement were shut down, there had 
been a steady recovery and further commercialization of newspapers nationwide. While 
“culture” receded along with ideological debates, the post-Tiananmen reform of the printing 
press came to a full scale and installed the wheel of commerce on the institutional level.  
This section attempts to understand the paradigmatic change of post-Mao journalism again in 
a “zoom-in” manner: chapter 3 locates the macroscopic conditions of the printing press in 
Guangzhou during the early 1990s, and discusses how these particular sources of change, 
including policies, institutional networks, and newsroom production, constituted a crisis for 
Southern Weekend and its previous model of journalism. Chapter 4 captures the responses of  
Southern Weekend in pursuing a new journalistic paradigm, investigative reporting, during the 
late 1990s as the convergence of external and internal interests. 
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CHAPTER 3  
THE ROAD TO NEWS:  
SOUTHERN WEEKEND AND THE GUANGZHOU PRESS IN THE EARLY 1990S  
Since Mao’s time, Chinese newspapers have been located at the center of Party politics, 
performing as instruments of a top-down model of communication to synchronize the 
understanding and practices of central policies at all administrative levels. When the right to print 
was extended to various state institutions on most bureaucratic levels after the Cultural 
Revolution, the process of decentralization—or what some others called deregulation 
(Stockmann 2013: 8)—had the potential to pluralize press culture. It had prompted optimistic 
speculations on its democratizing power (e.g. Lynch 1999; Wu 2000), but skepticism soon 
increased as the process of press conglomeration took off in the late 1990s (e.g. Zhao 2000; Lee 
et al. 2006). 
To a lesser degree, some argue that the exponential growth of popular media contributed to 
political indifference, cynicism, a global consumerist culture, or even postmodernism (e.g. Dirlik 
and Zhang 2000; Zhang 2008). In either case, a historical question remains largely 
unsubstantiated: when and what accounted for the gradual marginalization of the propagandist 
model in popular journalism in mainland China? Major connections need to be made between the 
structural transformation of the press and an evolving journalism culture in the post-Mao context. 
Suspending the teleological assumption that media marketization leads to Western-style 
democracy in post-communist countries (Sparks, 2008), I suggest that rather than the emerging 
commercial activities of the press, it was the changing relationship between the press and the 
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public which began to shift the fundamental notion of “news” for popular newspapers around the 
mid-1990s.  
The following discussion has three parts addressing both the continuities and ruptures of 
Guangzhou press at the turn of the 1990s, a transitional period toward the corporate stage of 
Chinese newspapers. The first section discusses the organizational reform of Party and non-Party 
newspapers within the context of press commercialization. The second part deals with how 
Southern Weekend can be located within such trends toward a modern press, and how that 
informed its journalism. The final section examines two legal cases involved Southern Weekend 
in the early 1990s to suggest an inherent crisis it faced which paved the way to the factual 
orientation in journalism. 
3.1 Party Press in Renewal 
Party-state policies continued to push newspapers and the press toward financial 
independence in a top-down manner. Two major policies in the late 1980s, in particular, 
accelerated the establishment of economic machinery within the press. Despite occasional 
government attempts to curb unexpected outcomes, the staggering market development of the 
press was not an ironic by-product of post-Mao economic reform but, instead, deeply rooted in 
deliberate policymaking as much as reform initiatives that, together, gave rise to the continuous 
expansion of the post-Tiananmen press.  
In March 1988, the State Press and Publication Association (SPPA) and the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) co-issued a directive which sanctioned the 
economic activities performed by newspapers, periodicals, and book publishers (Press and 
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Publication Law of PRC, 1949-1990: 529-30). The list broadly approved commercial activities in 
advertising, consulting, commercial conferences, cultural activities, printing, reader services, 
training courses and other educational activities, and paper supply, etc. The only limit was that 
the press could not run any business “unrelated to its own areas” which, as exemplified in a 
follow-up directive, was defined by the content of the publication. “For example, a professional 
newspaper on fashion has the right to run fashion related businesses but not unrelated areas such 
as agricultural, electronics, food, etc.” (Ibid 532). The criteria of doing business based on the 
areas of journalism no doubt favored comprehensive Party dailies more than special or 
professional newspapers. In Guangzhou, as will be seen, it was the Party press which led the 
second round of press expansion on multiple fronts in the 1990s. 
As state subsidies diminished since the end of the 1970s, how to run the press as a business 
had been imperative. The initial stage of pushing Party newspapers to the market in the 1980s led 
to a mobilization for external sponsorship. It was encouraged, often with financial incentives, for 
press, including newsroom, workers to make contact with local enterprises and beyond. This 
overlapping function between the newsroom and marketing was more prominent in smaller 
newspapers especially in the 1980s. For newspapers initiated within the bureaucracies, in 
particular, the market and Party-state principles seemed most ironic to outsiders as the editor-in-
chief, usually the Party leader of the sponsoring unit, was also the general manager of the 
newspaper. Thus, mobilizing the newsroom for financial independence had led to “paid 
journalism” and other forms of corruption (Zhao, 1998: 72-93). But before editorial and business 
departments were fully separated, occasional top-down campaigns against demoralized 
journalists proved to be futile, serving no more than the political correctness of the Party. The 
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ways in which “corruption” was defined also lent power to the amply staffed Party press against 
small post-Mao publications. 
The economic freedom now endorsed by the central government drove the press to re-
organize in order to instigate comprehensive changes. Beginning in the 1990s, the departmental 
division between the editorial and business side of the Party press took off. In accordance with 
the Party line, a consensus was reached among press leaders and in academia on the importance 
of understanding the press as a business and so—as a central metaphor—“two wheels need to 
reel together.” As Liu Tao, the Party director of Southern Daily, unambiguously put it: it was 
necessary to hold “one hand on the newspaper, the other on dollar bills” (Liu, 1996). 
Generally, the organizational reform took three steps to institutionalize the economic 
mechanisms of the press. First, individual accounts were set up for the previously peripheral 
departments such as reader services, photography, and distribution, and held them financially 
accountable. Then new enterprises in related areas—paper supply, photo technologies, printing, 
and information service—were established. And finally, the press also ventured into other 
booming industries such as real estate, tourism, hotels, restaurants, and public relations. In 
Guangzhou Daily, most supporting departments extended their services into the marketplace by 
establishing affiliated companies. These business departments, in turn, were elevated in 
bureaucratic ranking within the press (Li, 1993; He, 1995). As “press economy” [baoye jingji] 
came to be a buzzword in the early 1990s, the relationship between newspaper making and its 
economics consequently became a heated topic in press circles (Han, 1995; Liu, 1996; Ma, 1996; 
Huang, 1996).  
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The other wheel of commerce, once installed, brought the scope of market activities of the 
Party press to a frenzy. Before 1992, Southern Daily was already running two hostels and 
another two companies. Three years later, it was part of more than thirty new companies in 
various areas, partnering with various domestic, Hong Kong, and foreign enterprises (Han, 
1995). Guangzhou Daily not only established semi-private companies in news image services, 
technologies, paper supply, printing services, and public relations, but also invested enormously 
in hotels, real estate, and restaurants, including a joint beauty studio with a Hong Kong company 
(ibid). Its business plans reached out to adjacent areas of the Pearl River Delta and even Hainan 
province. Yangcheng Evening News, perhaps the least aggressive among the “newspaper trio” in 
economic expansion, was also involved in more than a dozen joint ventures, running four 
advertising companies by the mid-1990s including one with Hong Kong and the other with Japan 
(Ma, 1996). All these market practices had eluded the eyes of those who mourned the decline of 
Party dailies judging solely by market share in newsstand circulation. 
The institutional reform of the Party press culminated in the introduction of the general 
manager as a parallel position to editor-in-chief. Yangcheng Evening News and Southern Daily 
pioneered in adopting the new leadership structure in the mid-1990s. The two posts reported to 
the director [she zhang], and the trio—director, editor-in-chief, and general manager—
constituted the power center of a press committee or the highest echelon of the institution, which 
usually had around ten members. Guangzhou Daily set up a general manager in 1983 but kept 
bigger power in the hands of editor-in-chief, who played a similar role to the director in the other 
two newspapers. By 1995, it had established an editorial board and a managerial board under the 
general press committee (Tang & Li, 2012: 200). Elevating the head of the growing business 
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departments to equal bureaucratic ranking with editor-in-chief, finally, institutionalized the dual 
wheels of the press in the market economy.  
As all these changes outlined indicate, the narrative of a failing Party press could not 
withstand even a casual examination of the entrepreneurial endeavors, not to mention the 
skyrocketing advertising sales of the Party press in Guangzhou. The municipal Guangzhou Daily 
expanded from four to eight pages as early as 1987 in order to double its advertising space, 
which took in an annual income of 10.45 million RMB that single year (Guangdong Local 
History Editing Committee, 2000: 230). Taking advantage of its municipal jurisdiction which 
now could be conveniently translated to a booming urban economy and wealthier readership, its 
advertising income doubled in just another three years and reached 20.5 million RMB in 1990 
while circulation slightly dropped from 274,100 in 1987 to 249,000 in 1990 (Ibid). Southern 
Daily had its advertising revenue leap from 0.4 million RMB in 1979 to 15 million RMB in 
1989, a handsome thirty-seven-fold increase in the first decade of the economic reform while its 
circulation fluctuated mildly between 660,000 and 850,000 (Guangzhou Local Gazette Editing 
Committee, 1999: 979; China Journalism Yearbook 1988, 1989, 1990). Similarly, Yangcheng 
Evening News started to publish a four-page advertising subsidiary—Golden Page [jin ye]—in 
1993 exclusively provided for readers in Guangzhou areas at no extra cost. Advertising sales had 
replaced newspaper distribution to be the major income source for Southern Daily, Guangzhou 
Daily, and Yangcheng Evening News, respectively, by 1988, 1990, and 1992 (Guangdong Local 
History Editing Committee, 2000: 186; Guangzhou Local Gazette Editing Committee, 1999: 
976; Yangcheng Evening News History Editing Group, 1997: 384). Consequently, the former 
definition of “big papers” [da bao] based on bureaucratic hierarchy, spatial jurisdiction, and 
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circulation was fundamentally shattered. The national paper Worker’s Daily in Beijing, for 
instance, had a circulation of 1.72 million and 10 million RMB in advertising sales in 1991 while 
Shenzhen SEZ News, a municipal paper, took in 30 million RMB from advertisers with a 
circulation of 138,000 or less than one tenth of Worker’s Daily (Cai, 2006: 321). The rise of 
urban centers like Guangzhou and Shenzhen, in brief, was restructuring the Chinese press by 
their financial health on the market. From a local-urban perspective, the Party press had 
unquestionably managed to renew its structural dominance. 
Dong Tiance (2007) suggested that it was between 1987 and 1995 when economic reform 
on organizational, editorial, distributional, and managerial levels of the press came to full scale in 
Guangdong (91). Soon, the central mandate of press conglomeration began in 1996, hand-
picking Guangzhou Daily to be the first one in the country to organize a news group. It can be 
argued that the lasting discourse of a declining Party press suggests, at least partly, an out-of-date 
measurement of newspaper development with its central concern on circulation, and therefore 
failed to capture the novel practices adopted by the Party press. The Party press in urban areas, as 
I outlined above, were quick to follow (if not exploit) the economic freedom deliberately 
authorized by state policies including, for instance, that the price limit was lifted in January 1989 
for most Chinese newspaper, and the power of setting the price for both retail sales and 
subscription was devolved to the sponsoring department or the press itself (Fang, 2000: 2212; 
Yangcheng Evening News History Editing Group, 1997: 381). How other non-Party papers 
responded to the aggressive development is the focus of the following section. 
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New printers, old system 
The growing pattern of Guangzhou newspapers from the late 1970s to early 1990s generally 
resembled the national situation identified by previous scholars (Esarey 2005: 9; Stockmann 
2013: 56). Except that the post-Tiananmen crackdown was remarkably less dramatic, the number 
of newspapers surged around the mid-1980s, curbed during the Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization 
Campaign in 1987, dropped in post-1989 crackdown, and then slowly recovered in the 1990s. 
Figure 3.1 Number of Guangzhou Newspapers in Print, 1975-1995 
   
(Source: Guangzhou Municipal Gazette, Guangdong News Gazette)  1
However, the number above is insensitive to the structure of the press or types of 
newspapers entering and exiting the market. Nor is it informative about the qualitative changes 
 Here, the numbers of circulating newspapers come from the listed titles entered and exited the market each year. 1
They represent the newspapers I was able to identify in the municipal and provincial gazettes, not statistics directly 
from official numbers. 
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among them especially in the 1990s. To get a closer look at the share of various newspapers over 
the years, I sorted them by genre: 
Figure 3.2 Number of Categorized Guangzhou Newspapers in Print, 1975-1995 
   
(Source: Guangzhou Municipal Gazette, Guangdong News Gazette) 
From the second chart, it is clear that while the previous longitudinal mode still applies to 
most types of papers, their development was far from “natural evolvement” but marked by 
structural intervention. Three types of the newspapers—economic, literary-artistic, and 
educational newspapers—accounted for the biggest press growth in the mid-1980s, and 
contributed to the “cultural turn” of the print market. It was also clear that two genres—literary 
and lifestyle newspapers—suffered the most in the post-Tiananmen shutdown as well as the local 
regulatory campaign in 1986, when economic papers were promoted. Growing steadily 
throughout the 1980s, finally, political and judicial newspapers [fazhi bao] were the only type of 
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newspapers unaffected by the post-1989 shutdown and they also became the major contributor in 
post-1992 establishments.   
What I meant here by “political-judicial” referred to the non-Party papers that, while not 
affiliated with Party committees, were sponsored by various administrative departments on 
governmental as opposed to cultural, economic, technological, and educational affairs. The five 
new papers founded between 1989 and 1994, for instance, all reflected the increasing 
governmental concern with the emerging labor market and rapid changes of local population.  2
The rise of these papers indicated strong political concerns that were inseparable from the 
expansion of the post-Tiananmen press.  
Heedless to the structure of the print market, the first picture above is also insensitive to the 
internal expansion of newspapers, a conspicuous strategy adopted by the Party press at the turn 
of the 1990s. This seemingly mild wave of press expansion in the early 1990s took place rather 
radically within extant papers by page expansion. Unlike the “cultural turn” of the mid-1980s, 
literary, artistic, educational, and lifestyle newspapers were no longer the powerhouse of the 
popular press as they were quickly imitated by Party newspapers in their newly added weekend 
editions. The municipal Party paper Guangzhou Daily took the lead in expanding from four to 
eight pages in 1987 when all other Chinese newspapers, Party and non-Party alike, were still 
printed in the four-page format. In fact, before the“weekend craze” in the early 1990s, the Party 
trio in Guangzhou all added weekend pages in 1988 and 1989 to expand coverage on social and 
cultural life as well as advertising spaces. If the structural decentralization of the 1980s had 
 The five newspapers were Population Observation [renkou guancha bao] (1989), Guangdong Transportation and 2
Security [Guangdong jiaotong anquan bao] (1990), Guangdong Labor News [Guangdong laodong bao] (1993), 
Guangdong Population [Guangdong renkou bao] (1993), and Southern Workers [nanfang gong bao] (1994).
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achieved, at least to some degree, pluralism in content, there was increasing evidence to show 
that such a trend, what Hallin & Mancini called “external pluralism” (2004) or pluralism 
achieved on the level of the media system, started to turn to “internal pluralism” as Party dailies 
began to target at the largest possible audience. 
Figure 3.3 Page Expansions of Party Newspapers in Guangzhou, 1984-1999 
   
(Source: Guangzhou Yearbooks, Yangcheng Evening News History, 60 Years of Guangzhou Daily) 
In 1992 and 1993, all Party papers, including Southern Weekend, thickened their pages. The 
first page expansion of Southern Weekend took a similar approach of internal pluralism for mass 
appeal. The four added pages—People & Law [ren yu fa], Readers’ Digest [wen hai ji ying], 
Grass Land [fang cao di], The Globe [huan yu]—and two added columns of Family Life [jia ting 
sheng huo] and Medicine and Health [yiyao yu baojian] were clearly informed by the most 
marketable newspapers and sought-after content of the time: judicial papers, readers’ digest, and 
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the best selling magazines Family [jia ting], and Family Doctor [jiating yisheng] (Zuo, 2014: 
233). 
Both external and increasingly internal, the structural expansion of the press was 
coterminous with their extended collaboration especially for non-Party newspapers. Though 
structurally contained within Party-state institutions, the founding units often collaborated within 
and across the bureaucratic system in mobilizing resources, including personnel, licenses, 
printing facilities, offices and distribution support within their command, for the new 
publication. This expansion bespeaks extensive interests of Party-state institutions—the 
legitimate printers—in entering the marketplace.  
This contained expansion and cross-sponsorship of the press had two forms: vertical and 
horizontal. Vertical expansion refers to the alignment among sponsoring units across bureaucratic 
ranks. Horizontal expansion, on the other hand, involved institutions on the same administrative 
level which therefore were organized by economic interests more than bureaucratic command. 
The two models of coalition, as exemplified by China Golden Herald [zhongguo jin bao] and 
Modern Mankind [xiandai renbao], were eventually opted out in newspaper making. But they 
nonetheless represented part of a complicated picture within the structural decentralization of 
newspapers until the late-1990s, when the printing press re-centralized around Party dailies. 
The economic newspaper China Golden Herald (1989-1990) was sponsored by the 
Provincial Propaganda Department of Guangdong, the powerful political-ideological institution. 
As the supervisory department, it mobilized a group of media institutions mostly within its 
administrative power to form a small newsroom. Less than twenty well-trained staff came from a 
variety of Party dailies and Party bureaucracies, including Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 
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News, Southern Daily, Guangzhou Daily, the Pearl River People’s Radio Station, and the 
Provincial Party School of Guangdong (Chen, 2003: 97). All the contributing units involved—
newspapers, radio stations, propaganda departments, and Party schools—were within the 
jurisdiction of the provincial propaganda department and therefore represented a vertical 
mobilization in newspaper making.  
Horizontal alliances, on the other hand, were also performed within the Maoist institutions 
in newspaper establishments. Modern Mankind, for example, was founded in 1985 in Guangzhou 
by the South China Book Corporation [zhongguo nanfang tushu chuban gongsi] (SCBC), which 
was a newly-minted enterprise organized by four major publishing houses—Guangdong People’s 
Publishing House, Guangdong Science and Technology Publishing House, Huacheng Publishing 
House, and Lingnan Fine Arts Publishing House in Guangzhou. Relying on their institutional 
networks within the publishing system, the proposal of founding a domestic joint venture in 
publishing attracted more than a hundred publishers across the country, from whom 20 million 
RMB was amassed. As for newsroom staff, SCBC adopted a dual-track employment model and 
organized its newsroom both from the sponsoring publishers and the open labor market.   
Essentially an economic venture, SCBC also adopted bureaucratic practices to mobilize 
economic and political sponsorships, absorbing resources from across public and private sectors. 
Upon the approval by the Provincial Propaganda Department of Guangdong, the proposal of 
SCBC was taken to the Central Propaganda Department and other publishing and governmental 
units in Beijing and Shanghai to build its supporting network. And even though its financing 
scheme [jizi fang’an] was geared toward domestic publishers, it also opened to investment from 
Hong Kong, Macau, and foreign countries. Somewhat surprisingly, though, the first application 
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for a share of 400,000 RMB came from People’s Publishing House of Yunnan, a state-owned 
publisher of a southwest province known for its economic underdevelopment.  
Despite disparate organizational backgrounds and scale, China Golden Herald and Modern 
Mankind both spelled out the market initiatives released within the old institutions. In both cases, 
the connections of funding sources and labor force between sponsoring departments and the 
newspaper were remarkably high, an aspect that tends to be underrated in theorizing the market 
reform of Chinese press.  
In brief, both the internal expansion of Party newspapers and bureaucratic coalitions among 
non-Party departments offered the organizational foundation of post-Mao press development. 
The expansion of the basis on one hand diversified the press structure to an unprecedented 
degree in the history of PRC, but the invariable high degree of organizational and financial 
connections between the Party-state and the printing press also compounded press development 
with bureaucratic principles on the other. While Party newspapers quickly grew and reorganized 
from within, ambitious non-Party printers aligned, mobilized resources within their reach, and 
yet remained vulnerable to targeted regulations. This entanglement of Maoist institutions in post-
Mao commercialization thus bears strong authoritarian characteristics of state capitalism (Lee, 
2000). Continuities aside, let us look at how the labor force, a strong variable of the post-Mao 
press in Guangzhou, was mobilized in shaping the newsroom and journalism culture.  
3.2 Locating the Itinerant Journalists 
The press was part of the state-owned enterprises under Mao, the dominant economic sector 
which absorbed eighty percent of the urban labor force (Ngok, 2008: 47). Like the urban 
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population in various industrial and governmental work units, all press workers—in the 
newsroom, the printing plant, or the dining hall—were state employees who had their jobs 
assigned and, along with it, lifelong job security and comprehensive welfare packages of 
housing, health care, child care, training, and a pension. For journalists and printing workers 
alike, the press was fundamentally a Party-state organ, the only source of their livelihood and 
subjective identification.  
This unified scenario of labor conditions and social status gradually broke down for press 
workers as new employment models were adopted and enforced. Initially a response to the 
massive unemployment at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, socialist labor policies have 
gradually been replaced by contract-based employment and an open labor market over the past 
three decades. In the 1980s, jobless youth were encouraged to be self-employed, selling small 
consumer goods from newspapers to street food or fixing bicycles in the street. The emerging 
trading activities and new employment opportunities eventually lured not only the jobless but 
also a growing number of state employees to “jump into the sea” [xia hai] of the market 
economy especially when state institutions began to adopt new labor policies, firing unqualified 
workers, and mobilizing competitive mechanisms to enhance productivity.  
By the early 1990s, a highly elusive group of “itinerant journalists” [liulang jizhe] migrating 
from elsewhere to Guangzhou and other big cities started to capture public attention. Unlike 
millions of peasant workers [min gong] seeking manufacturing jobs in township and village 
enterprises (TVEs) in Guangdong, the itinerant journalists concentrated in urban Guangzhou, 
where the newspapers and periodicals proliferated. Also known as “three-without” individuals 
[sanwu renyuan]—people without local residency [hukou], stable employment, and any social 
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benefits just as other migrant peasant-turned-industrial workers in coastal factories—migrant 
laborers, rather than local Cantonese, constituted the first generation of professional journalists in 
the PRC. Any cultural explanation of the distinctive southern press, which explains the 
particularities of post-Mao Guangzhou newspapers through an essentialist southern culture, 
should be alert to this fact.  
Southern Weekend published its first job advertisement at the end of 1992. The listed 
qualifications captured quite well the stereotype of the itinerant journalists of the time: 
Male, 38 or younger, healthy, has college education (can be exempted in exceptional cases) and at least 
three years of reporting experience. 
(6 Nov 1992: 1) 
Compared to newsroom staff today who are mostly hired as new graduates from well-
known universities, these journalists of the early 1990s seemed significantly older and perhaps 
insufficiently educated. Even in comparison to their senior generation who had been assigned to 
the press and then stayed (happily or not) thereafter, these migrant journalists came with much 
more diverse and humble experiences. It was not uncommon to find among them formerly 
underpaid school teachers, writers, workers, and the unemployed in inland areas as well as 
journalists in struggling news institutions elsewhere. Formal college educated or not, many of the 
migrant journalists had not worked in the newsroom before. Zhao Shilong (b. 1967), who was 
hired in the early 1990s by Modern Mankind, the non-Party newspaper founded by the 
publishing system in 1985, had left his working unit as a technical worker in Hunan province and 
stayed jobless for almost two years. Like Zhao, a lot of the itinerant journalists in Guangzhou 
had previously worked in state-owned enterprises and yet were deeply demoralized in the 
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floundering institutions which continued to be plagued by stagnant wages, bureaucratic 
nepotism, over-staffing, and lack of social mobility. For the unemployed and recusants in their 
twenties or thirties, the growing print market in urban centers became an attractive, if not 
involuntary, option. 
Personal backgrounds aside, the migrant journalists encountered quite an unexpected 
working and living environment in the expanding urban press, which worked to deepen their 
socio-economic differences from the pre-reform press workers. With shrinking state subsidies for 
the press, tenured workers or those who could remain on state payroll stagnated. And most 
previous labor policies and benefits were suspended for the new comers by default. “Old policies 
for the old, and new for the new” [laoren lao banfa, xinren xin banfa] became the common 
practice in news organizations. In studying the labor policies of a Shanghai newspaper, Zhao 
Xiaojun (2011) found that media workers within the same institution were deeply stratified along 
the various employment models, all of which worked in favor of the previous generation with 
formal appointments (11-16). As a result, Zhao argued that the market reform of the press did not 
compromise the interests of “the old” or institution leaders but instead, institutionalized the pre-
reform group as beneficiaries of marketization without exposing them to its risks. 
Like other hiring newspapers in the early 1990s, Southern Weekend was unambiguous in 
spelling out the inferior status of the new recruits from its standing labor force, who secured the 
tenured “iron rice bowl” at least for the time being. Again in the job advertisement: 
Monthly salary is above ¥1,000 (approximately 120 USD, my calculation) and negotiable; no formal 
appointment [diao dong] or residency relocation [qian hukou], no medical benefits (unless caused by 
work). Labor contract is renewable, and those who demonstrate exceptional performances during 
employment can apply to be formal [zheng shi] newsroom staff. 
(Southern Weekend, 6 Nov 1992: 1) 
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Similar to Southern Weekend, the post-Mao press created a de facto dual-track employment 
system which was comprised of both tenured and contracted journalists. As a Party subsidiary, 
the first eight editors of Southern Weekend were all appointed by and from its parent paper 
Southern Daily (Zuo, 2014: 194). In preparing for its first expansion in 1992, Southern Weekend 
increased its editors also by formal appointment (Ibid: 234). Though limited, its continuous 
capacity to provide tenured jobs as a provincial Party subsidiary was utilized as an award 
mechanism to attract experienced journalists on the market until tenured jobs were eventually 
marginalized. 
Therefore, one significant aspect that defined the post-Tiananmen urban press was the 
changing composition of its labor force. For the migrant journalists, the structural differences 
between the two groups in the newsroom had defining consequences in their working and living 
experiences. Income and benefits aside, only in rare cases until the 2000s would migrant 
journalists be granted a journalist pass [jizhe zheng], the official identity proof to get permission 
for interviews or even just going through the security check of a governmental institution. Zhao 
Shilong, who started in Modern Mankind in the early 1990s as a migrant journalist did not get his 
journalist pass until 2000 (Bai: 2011: 128). In flexible employment with quite often an unheard 
publication and at best dubious identity proof, it was not uncommon for migrant (mostly male) 
journalists to take up freelancing jobs and constantly negotiated for a more stable position with 
some kind of social benefits. Xinwen mingong, literally “news peasant-workers,” prevailed as a 
metaphor in self-identification among itinerant journalists (Ibid: 127). 
Coming from a diverse social background with high mobility in job placement and lower 
identification with their tenured seniors in the newsroom, itinerant journalists distinguished 
!117
themselves, for the first time in the PRC, as a group with a new relationship with the printing 
press. “These itinerant journalists are now competing with the ‘welfare journalists’ [fuli jizhe] on 
stories, topics, and even jobs” (8 Oct 1993: 1; 27 May 1994: 1). Exaggeration aside, they did toil 
for alternative news sources and styles to compete with Party dailies, which continued to rely on 
local correspondents and bureaucratic support from various levels in news production. As a 
group, itinerant journalists ceased to exist around the turn of the century as labor contracts 
became the norm for all press groups. But the early migrant journalists in the 1990s, in sum, bore 
with them socioeconomic and symbolic resources that contributed to an emerging journalism 
culture.  
Limited commercialization of Southern Weekend 
A subsidiary of Southern Daily, Southern Weekend’s affiliation with the provincial Party 
paper was arguably a blessing in respect to organizational growth. The economic initiative, while 
constrained on the institutional level, was channeled through its small editorial room and 
alternative practices. With diminishing support for newspapers as the growing trend, Southern 
Weekend shared in many aspects with other non-Party papers of similar size in struggling for 
their financial health and readership especially after a separate account from Southern Daily was 
set up in 1993 (Hong, 2005: 29). The practical arrangements of its newsroom had a strong 
imprint on its journalism of the time.  
Since its inauguration, Southern Weekend had been actively taking advantage of the rising 
market in Guangdong in almost every possible way. The most visible form, no doubt, was 
advertising. Yuezhi Zhao found among the samples she collected in three cities outside of 
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Guangzhou in 1994, Southern Weekend devoted the most space, approximately 20 percent, to 
advertising (1998:132). Here I would like to discuss other important forms of market initiatives 
adopted by Southern Weekend in commercial sponsorship, sourcing, and distribution.  
For Southern Weekend, advertisers penetrated far beyond the increasing advertising spaces. 
Commercial sponsorship had been a prominent approach for Southern Weekend to connect with 
advertisers, freelancers, and readers in the form of writing contests. In 1986, 1988, and 1990, for 
instance, Baiyunshan Pharmaceutical Company became a sponsor for Southern Weekend in its 
open call for reportage that was “readable and lively, with insightful themes and refreshing 
topics.” All accepted submissions printed on Southern Weekend throughout the year would 
automatically enter the final competition judged by “renowned literary critics and journalists” (4 
Jan 1986, 18 Dec 1987). In 1990 alone, six major columns of Southern Weekend were sponsored 
contests, calling for reportage, essays, and photos from external writers and readers. 
This sponsoring approach had several ramifications, sometimes enlisting jingles for a 
sponsored product (6 Oct 1984; 24 Jul 1987), quizzes (31 Jul 1987; 26 Feb 1988), film reviews 
(8 Apr 1988), photo contests (19 Jun 1987), and prose (1 Dec 1989). Before the advertising 
department was fully separated from the newsroom, this kind of commercial sponsorship 
represented a direct penetration of advertising into news form, both relying on informal sources, 
the readers, for production.  
The assimilation of external contributors was further normalized in the attempt of the 
newspaper to expand its network of authors without expanding much of its work force. Wu 
Qinying, a journalist from Guangming Daily in Beijing, started to write for Southern Weekend 
upon requests and reported on Beijing-based artists and writers (29 Aug 1986, 28 Nov 1986) and 
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fashion-related topics in the capital city (12 Sept 1986; 12 Nov 1986; 20 Mar 1987; 13 May 
1988). Two of Wu’s fashion reports won the writing contests sponsored by Baiyunshan 
Pharmaceutical Company in 1986 and 1990 (20 Mar 1987; 22 Mar 1991). And her investigative 
report on domestic human trafficking (2 Sept 1988) won the first award sponsored by the same 
company in 1988 (20 Jan 1989). Like Wu, a number of award-winning writers came from 
frequent contributors and so their affiliated identities with Southern Weekend strengthened. 
Externalizing news sources from beyond local areas, on the other hand, meant that “news” 
was rare. Hong Bing argued that the connections with outside sources and authors played an 
important role in the development of Southern Weekend after 1995 as it gradually built up its 
own reporting teams (2005: 28). Before this, as Hong aptly pointed out, there were hardly any 
exclusive stories on Southern Weekend due to its heavy reliance on external writers. And only in 
rare cases would journalists send stories to Southern Weekend when their own newspapers 
rejected them. The identity of the “weekend” newspaper was, at least partly, defined by these 
“peripheral” materials. 
Slow in hiring new labor, Southern Weekend sought to cultivate qualified authors, but it also 
opened to a larger pool of informal contributors beyond geographical and institutional 
boundaries. By 1993, a year after its first page expansion, its eight pages were still filled with a 
mixture of staff editing and writing, and large amounts of external submissions. This informal 
network of sourcing included freelancers, string reporters, and writers across the country, who 
contributed to the prevalence of pseudonyms and the rare practice of bylines that blurred the 
boundaries of their geographical and institutional identities. In a sense, Southern Weekend was 
not only the subsidiary of Southern Daily but also a subsidiary of established Party dailies in 
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general. In 1994, as the newspaper reached 835,000 in circulation (CJY 1995: 876), the total 
number of its employees—including the newsroom staff, advertising, and distribution—was only 
27 (Ma, 2009). The newspaper was replete with external submissions that sustained the small 
newsroom and, as we will see later, soon triggered the change of its journalism.  
Distribution of the press was also open to market forces which, as it advanced the territories 
of circulation, contributed to its expanding network of sources. As the post office required a 
minimum of 100,000 in circulation for service, none of the post-Mao papers were qualified to 
join when they first started. Consequently, in the course of mid-1980s to 1990s, independent 
networks of distribution expanded quickly, encompassing not only new establishments but also 
the increasingly market-oriented Party newspapers. In Guangzhou, the exponential growth of 
publications in the 1980s led to sluggish and expensive delivery by the post office. In response, 
Guangzhou Daily retreated from the post office in 1990 and started to build its own distribution 
network of local retail stores, transportation vehicles, and eventually the establishment of its own 
distribution company in 1993 (Tang & Li: 2012: 70). In fact, 128 out of 300 municipal Party 
papers in mainland China had retreated from the post office and established their own retail 
networks by 1990 and about 500, approximately one third of Chinese newspapers, had done so 
(CJY 1991: 124). Southern Weekend, on the other hand, adopted a “dual-track” in distribution 
and relied on both post office subscription and individual newsstand dealers, which reached more 
than 2,000 in downtown Guangzhou by 1993 (Yang, 1994: 321). As it had reached 260,000 in 
circulation since 1985, Southern Weekend was qualified for post office network (CJY, 1986: 
317). 
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For Southern Weekend, a few connections could be made between the open newsroom and 
its style of journalism at the time. As many contributors came with a literary background as 
professional or amateur writers in various institutions, they followed the convention of using pen 
names to represent their literary identities. For regular journalists and editors in news institutions, 
the use of pen names or pseudonyms could avoid overexposure. It was, for instance, easier for 
journalists in a Party newspaper to write more outspoken commentaries for a popular one. Party-
state officials might do the same for political or economic interests (or both). Non-tenured 
migrant journalists, finally, quite often used pseudonyms for outside submissions in order to 
increase their income without alerting their own newspaper.  
Informal sources also came with multiple forms of authorship during this period. Regardless  
of how it was signed—either in full name or pseudonym, the piece could come from one’s own 
writing, clipping [zhai], editing [bian ji], and “translating and editing” [bian yi]. These variations 
further blurred the line of formal and informal sources. Except for submissions requested through 
personal networks of editors, the newspaper was open to those with literary qualifications 
without discriminating in their geographical and social status. This openness and option for 
anonymity continued to give a lively feel of multivocality for the newspaper—similar to a public 
display of newspaper clippings. As a general trend especially after 1987, however, stories were 
getting longer as more news was incorporated. If we look at the average number of items—
including writing and photos—per page during the decade, there was a steady decrease from 
1985 to 1995, when longer genres like feature [te xie], serial literature [lian zai], and visual 
manipulations gradually took over the space occupied by earlier and shorter forms.   3
 I sampled Southern Weekend quarterly—four issues per year—between 1985 and 1995 and counted the average 3
number of items of each. Over the decade, it dropped from 12.5 in 1985 to 5.2 in 1995.
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The other aspect of multiple authorship and openness of the newspaper was the rare usage 
of bylines, which accounted for less than 4 percent of published items until 1993. The very few 
exceptions I found in samples represented two types of relationships with the newspaper: experts 
and outcasts. Experts supplied the newspaper with authoritative voices as informal 
correspondents in public institutions. “Scholars & Professors on Reading” [xuezhe jiaoshou tan 
dushu], the advice column on page two of “Knowledge” [qiu zhi] where the experts introduced 
learning skills for the general readership, was one of the major spaces that bylines were used. 
Outcasts, on the other hand, could not be more revealing when letters by inmates were published 
in late 1989 (29 Sept, 13 Oct, 27 Oct, 10 Nov 1989), all of which printed under the column 
“Monologues from Death Row” [siqiu de zibai]. The explicit moral voice of Party journalism, 
both in its positive form of teaching and learning and the negative form of law and punishment, 
continued to find expression in popular journalism.  
Finally, institutional and symbolic continuities between the Maoist and post-Mao press also 
manifested financially. Though direct state subsidy was vanishing for Party dailies, other forms 
of subsidies were still made available to them. From 1983 to 1989, Southern Daily was granted a 
tax-exempt policy by the provincial government of Guangdong to help finance its new 16-story 
office building, to which the press relocated on 1 July 1989 (Southern Daily History: 114-5; Cai, 
2006: 309). These favorable treatments were not, if ever, extended to non-Party papers despite 
their popularity in the retail market. As the Party press quickened its financial, industrial, and 
institutional reform in early and mid-1990s, the prospects of non-Party papers began to dim. 
However, for Southern Weekend, the disparity between its official identity and the structural 
“popular turn” of Chinese press soon came to a point of crisis.  
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3.3 A Propaganda Model in Crisis 
Timothy Cheek had pointed out long ago that “propaganda” [xuan chuan] in Chinese is 
more closely related to its original meaning in English, a neutral term indeed, as “propagating 
what one believes to be true” (1989: 53). The Enlightenment tradition in political journalism or 
what he called educational journalism has more powerful roots in Chinese popular and elite 
society historically than informational or critical journalism. In Mao’s socialist China, the 
tension between the two continued to be manifested in CCP’s Party journalism which, in theory, 
meant two-way communication between the Party and the people yet in practice instrumentalized 
the press as a form of top-down political communication (Zhao, 1998: 24-29). On the 
institutional level, it followed the Pravda model of the Soviet Union and co-opted newspapers 
and intellectuals within the Party-state bureaucracy, which fundamentally changed the 
relationship between the press and the state. Ideally, the top-down communication system 
functions to promote social values and behaviors that would facilitate material production and 
cultural formation of socialism. In serving this ultimate goal, newspaper journalism was meant to 
educate rather than to inform, to guide public opinion in line with Party politics rather than to 
offer alternative views. Like the Soviets, the system guarded against competing information or 
deviation from the “Truth” provided by the Party-state.  
Such guiding principles and legitimacy of Party journalism have practical implications in 
reporting styles which began to be confronted by post-Mao conditions. Throughout the 1980s, 
however, even though the newly founded newspapers like Southern Weekend turned to cover 
various aspects of social life—family, leisure, entertainment, art, sports—and eschewed Party 
politics as news sources, the fundamental break from the propaganda model toward facticity or 
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informational journalism in reporting had not yet been in place. Regarding the form of news, the 
cultural turn I discussed in chapter 1 did not simply mean depoliticization but in fact a 
continuation of the reporting model in uncharted areas. Both sides of the debate on Hong Kong 
television across the 1980s, as I traced in chapter 2, were charged by the moral concerns of 
foreign programs over the mass population regarding the fate of socialism and were still highly 
didactic and openly value-oriented. The governing ideology of news as “mouthpiece” of a 
national life under elite supervision had not yet shifted. It was over the course of the 1990s that 
newspaper journalism started to incorporate some news orientation. How that happened—
sources that directly triggered this transformation—is the focus of the following discussion on 
two cases.  
The case of Chen Maya 
The transition from the model of Party journalism to news orientation was tied to the rise of 
the reporter, instead of editor, moving to the center of newspaper journalism. It was, however, 
not a progressive invention from within the newsroom. The process toward a preoccupation of 
accuracy in constructing a story was closer to what Timothy Cheek predicted as “muddling 
through”—no press law, seesaw swings between “retrenchment” and “relaxation,” and a 
continued stalemate between reformers and conservatives in journalism (Cheek, 1989: 73). The 
process can be demonstrated by two cases in Southern Weekend in the mid-1990s. 
On September 13, 1991, Southern Weekend published a story by Yu Daqing, a writer from 
Wuhan, Hubei province. Titled “From Journalist to Villain: an Interview with Actress Chen 
Maya,” the 800-word piece was published on page four of  Art. In a typical reporting style on 
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stars and artists, the story addressed the background and achievement of Chen Maya, who 
graduated from a prominent journalism school and had worked for Xinhua News Agency before 
she finally gave up her career as a journalist in order to become an actress in 1982. As common 
practice, a photo of Chen was placed right next to the title. 
Clip 3.1 The report on Chen Maya, Southern Weekend, 1991 
   
(Southern Weekend, 13 Sept. 1991: 4) 
In January 1993, Chen Maya filed a lawsuit against Yu Daqing, the author of the story, and 
Southern Weekend for libel. The major evidence included a few inaccuracies in the report: 
instead of a journalism major from Renmin University, Chen never went to university; she “had 
worked for Xinhua News Agency but not as a journalist”; and she was only nominated for a TV 
award instead of winning it. And finally, the photo was published without her consent. Later, the 
lawsuit was settled in Wuhan in favor of Chen. Southern Weekend was fined ¥10,000 for 
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“defamatory acts” and infringing Chen’s “right of publicity” [xiaoxiang quan] (¥2,000). Yu 
Daqing, along with another two newspapers that recycled the piece, received similar penalties. 
The trial invoked an angry outcry from the newsroom. In defense, Southern Weekend soon 
published a signed article titled “Get Out of Misleading Zones: Afterthoughts on Our Recent 
Lawsuit and Other Press Litigation” (10 Sept 1993: 5). Using a rare byline “staff 
reporter” [benbao jizhe], the full-page diatribe rebuked, quite bitterly, the rationality of the court: 
In brief, an encomiastic piece replete with admiration, respect, and celebratory enthusiasm on the 
struggling experiences and spirit of a young actress eventually “defamed” her merely due to a few 
“overstatements” and so led to her loss. 
(10 Sept 1993: 5) 
Though neither press legislation nor law enforcement is my focus here, Chen’s case 
represents the rising conflict against the press since the early 1990s, an indication of a significant 
change of the press in its relation to the state and its readership. Southern Weekend, for instance, 
hired its first legal consultant during the trial of Chen Maya (23 April 1993: 1). The question is: 
what explained how “an encomiastic piece” by Southern Weekend, which was by no means an 
exception in its reporting agenda, became “defamatory” for Chen? And what can this inform us 
about the popular press in transition to emphasize facticity—prioritizing accuracy over moral 
education—in news making? 
The inherent contradiction, it seems, lies between a lasting model of Party journalism and 
the structural expansion of the popular press. Whether Yu Daqing was a professional journalist or 
not, it would be difficult to overlook the habitual treatment in portraying Chen Maya as a role 
model, a paragon [dianxing renwu], of her profession. As a genre in Party journalism, promoting 
paragons or so-called positive reporting [zhengmian baodao] is to exemplify certain desirable 
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qualities of a moral example for the majority to emulate especially during political campaigns. In 
reporting moral examples, neither the editors nor writers and readers devoted much attention to 
accuracy but a gao da quan—literally, tall, big, and good—image of the chosen individual. To 
propagate the underlying values, this mode of reporting often adopts literary devices in 
storytelling for better pedagogical effects. It was not uncommon, for instance, that the author 
would switch to first person perspective at some point to reveal to the readers the psychological 
activities or even conversations of the protagonist. So “truth” in this news model, is the ultimate 
truth as seen through the lens of Party-state politics. The point, again, is to educate rather than to 
inform their readers. And journalism, as well as the role of the press, is to foster the Party line. 
This Soviet or Pravda model of journalism, not far from what the Four Theories of the 
Press characterized (Siebert et al., 1956), is deeply rooted in an authoritarian society where the 
central state and a scholar-literati class dedicate to setting up norms on virtually all aspects of 
social life. This worldview and its subsequent practices are different from the corporatist 
tradition such as in ancient Athens in that it is not open to democratic processes of public 
communication (Christians et al., 2009: 21-22). During Mao’s time, this model of journalism was 
made possible when a small number of media institutions were closely following the central 
newspaper. But as the press decentralized and content diversified, the legitimacy of the press as 
the “mouthpiece” of Party-state politics retreated. For the press, the loss of “aura” was liberating 
perhaps as much as frustrating. The lawsuit against Southern Weekend, a post-Mao Party 
subsidiary, is indicative of such a moment in the press-public relationship when, despite 
institutional affiliations with the Party-state, the previous legitimacy and power of the press 
began to be questioned.  
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Moving out of politics as a Party subsidiary, Southern Weekend found itself on the defensive 
over a conflict in Chen Maya’s case. It argued that there was no subjective intention of the 
newsroom to “defame” Ms. Chen. Instead, “our newspaper intended to propagate [xuan chuan] 
and praise Ms. Chen Maya” since 
[O]ur newspaper is the subsidiary of Southern Daily, the organ of Guangdong Party Committee. It is a 
component of the Party press. Promoting the artistic achievements and personal qualities of an actress is 
the legal responsibility of Party newspapers. Apropos the author who mistaken some facts without careful 
interview but instead using a few published reports, it is a question of moral rather than legal issues.  
(Southern Weekend: 10 Sept 1993: 5) 
Justifying the “overstatements” by the moral responsibilities (and power) of the Party press, 
the defense of Southern Weekend revealed a serious conflict between the context of post-Mao 
press expansion and the model of Party journalism, a “body-and-soul” split between its 
economics and newsroom identification. As discussed above, the economic machinery of the 
Party press was installed from a convergence of bureaucratic decentralization and market 
incentives. After a decade of economic reform, the press had already changed how newspapers 
met their readers. From free copies in working units to a commodity on newsstands and a 
growing long list of titles in post office begging readers’ attention and pocket money, the political 
role of newspapers—the legitimacy of Party journalism—seemed to have collectively lost.  
On the practical level, the model of journalism production now opened popular newspapers 
to external authors further delinked journalism and Party-state politics. Reading through the 
myriad of light-hearted pieces written and (un)signed by a large group of individual authors, it is 
very unlikely for one to imagine a story on Ms. Chen Maya as a signal of another political 
movement. The structural absence of Party-state news in popular newspapers and the general 
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turn to softening ideological control in the wake of the Cultural Revolution discouraged such a 
reading.  
For popular newspapers, mass authorship invited to the newsroom a loose control over the 
editing process. Editors could barely verify the details of external submissions from a variety of 
sources (even when they claimed or tried to do so), not to mention orchestrating a collective 
voice for the newspaper. The question here, however, is whether the editors wanted to. In other 
words, was the idea of accuracy a goal in the newsroom? As the angry newsroom argued: 
The court argued that “the press is responsible for what is published.” This is true in theory, especially 
when the report was written by our own journalists. In practice, however, it is impossible for the press to 
verify every detail in the large amount of daily submissions, most of which sent from external writers. If 
so, how many journalists should the newspaper feed? At what cost? After all, news is a timely matter.  
(Southern Weekend: 10 Sept 1993: 5) 
However, the ground of practicalities was hardly defendable. Page expansions by Party 
dailies, for one thing, were continuously supported by its former network of local respondents 
and public subscriptions (Zuo, 2014: 285). Journalists in Southern Daily, for example, were still 
received and accompanied by news secretaries [xinwen mishu]—a position installed in every 
county of Guangdong during Mao’s time—who assisted their local interviews and data 
collection. The monopoly on the bureaucratic system of communication could not be extended to 
other popular newspapers. The turn to external authors, in this sense, was a remedial rather than 
long term tactic.  
Constrained by a relatively small newsroom and an editing mode of news production, 
finally, the crisis of Party journalism in a radically different media environment also manifested 
itself in how to understand the commercial nature of the newspaper. For the author(s) of the 
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diatribe, the newspaper was not at all “profit driven.” Against the preliminary verdict that “the 
newspaper is profitable,” the defense again resorted to the newsroom identification with the 
Party press and its legitimacy:  
Yu Daqing’s article was an interview, a popular genre in journalism. Publishing an interview with a photo 
of the interviewee (including working photos and life portray) is the most common practice—“text with 
image” [wen pei zhao]—in propagandist [xuan chuan] work which has nothing to do with profit driven 
practices. 
Regardless of how Ms. Chen Maya may take this personally, she—a 36-year-old actress—is no top-tier 
star among the Chinese film and TV talent pool. Publishing one of her photos does not increase our 
circulation or other financial income.  
Granted, the newspaper is making money. But that does not mean our newspaper is profit driven. Not to 
mention publishing a photo of Chen Maya. Just as cars are capable of killing people and yet it would be 
ridiculous to argue that car producers “meant to kill people by making cars” therefore should be 
prosecuted. 
(Southern Weekend: 10 Sept 1993: 5) 
A week after the defense, Southern Weekend published a full-page compendium of a 
symposium where a group of local senior editors and lawyers convened to discuss the case (17 
Sept. 1993: 5). One of the agreements reached among these attendants was that publishing a 
photo of Chen did not infringe her right of publicity. Chen Lin, a Guangzhou lawyer who was 
hired in April 1993 by Southern Weekend as legal consultant, argued that “just as the court 
charging money for litigations does not submit it to a profit driven institution, there is no reason 
to criminalize the press for this (profit driven motive) even when personal agreement is in 
absence (in publishing one’s photos).” Clearly, the idea that “Party press was inherently non-
commercial” was so entrenched that even in acknowledging the different financial sources 
between the press in Guangdong and elsewhere, Zhang Zong, the chairman of the Guangdong 
Journalists’ Association, insisted: 
Party newspapers are not profit driven. To be sure, Guangdong newspapers have more ads due to a 
prosperous market economy in this area, but this does not categorize them as commercial newspapers. 
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Many newspapers in inland China are still subsidized by state money. Can we say that they are not profit 
driven whereas Guangdong newspapers are? Nonsense.  
(Southern Weekend, 17 Sept. 1993: 5) 
Here, the gap between the economics of the press and its newsroom ideology seemed huge. 
In October 1993, around the controversy of Chen’s case, Southern Weekend reached one million 
in circulation for the first time (“25 Years of Southern Weekend”). In the same year, it established 
its own departments of accounting, distribution, and advertising, and reached an agreement with 
Southern Daily, the mother paper, to retain 10 percent of its annual profit for staff bonuses (Hong 
2005: 29). Meanwhile, the ideal of Party journalism—its political role, social responsibilities, 
and public or non-commercial nature—had remained in place. The tension between the two 
aspects contributed to a dubious relationship between the newspaper and its readership. The 
significance of the case here, therefore, is irrelevant to whether the defense of Southern Weekend 
was merely rhetorical, but pointed to the absence of alternative legitimacy of the popular press. 
The case of “Police Raid” 
The case of Chen Maya was not an exception but neither the dominant scenario when 
newspapers relocated outside of Party-state politics. There were greater areas of convergent 
interests between the model of Party journalism and the rising economic interests. After all, the 
post-1989 agenda for propaganda work nationwide especially after 1992 was to help Chinese 
people to come to terms with the new economic order (Brady, 2008: 3). When Party journalism 
shifted its focus from political mobilization to Deng Xiaoping’s economic modernity, such 
“positive reporting” and promotional news about reform achievements became instantly 
!132
desirable not only for regional Party officials as credits for their bureaucratic career but also, and 
increasingly, for entrepreneurs as free advertising—neither of which, unchecked by the press or 
other sociopolitical forces, had yet held public accountability as their own professional principle.  
Happy stories aside, the rising number of press litigations in the early 1990s was suggestive 
of the contradiction between a widely circulated newspaper, its heavy reliance on external 
sources, and the persistent reporting mode of Party journalism had led to new afflictions. But the 
disastrous point was somewhere else. In the following discussion, I will further trace the tension 
between the mode of journalism production and Party journalism, as represented by another case 
on Southern Weekend, which contributed to the evolvement of its news form. 
Even though the standard form of news in Party journalism focused on policies and 
achievements of the Party state in a positive light, there has been an alternative form of Party 
journalism, so called negative or critical reporting [fumian/piping baodao]. Normally, negative 
news about social problems especially when involving Party officials went to internal 
publications [nei can] for the government before (if ever) being granted external publication. 
When published, this form of critical report, also known as yulun jiandu or “supervision by 
public opinion” is, in essence, a government mandate for the press, by using an official frame, to 
monitor official power (Cho, 2007: 4). Compared to the classical liberal theory of the press, 
however, it is not a call for a free press or independent journalism. The legitimacy of the press, 
again, lies on the ground of Party politics instead of principles.  
Stories of scandal expose, similar to the promotional stories on economic enterprises, had 
considerable potential in the marketplace within the post-Mao context. The popularity of judicial 
papers on crime reports, most conspicuously, represented such a commercial exploitation of 
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Party journalism. Southern Weekend included People and Law in its page expansion in 1992 to 
publish crime stories in tabloid styles from various sources, where the problem of facticity bore 
the most devastating scenario.   
In July 1993, People and Law published a full-page story on a sanguinary murder of two 
corrupt policemen who were involved in blackmail (30 Jul 1993: 5). Without revealing any 
background information—time, place, identities of the involved individuals, the author only 
identified the story happened at “B city” which was located “at the crossroad of three provinces” 
and presented the story in a lurid style. It later transpired that the author Liu Yushun, who used 
the pseudonym of Yu Yang, was a freelance writer in Nanchang, Jiangxi province and wrote the 
story based on local rumors and his own creativity. Upon an inquiry from the Ministry of Public 
Security for further details, the fabricated story was found out and led to an outraged push from 
the Ministry of Public Security to the Central Propaganda Department to shutdown the 
newspaper. In the end, the crisis was resolved after tortuous negotiation among the provincial 
government of Guangdong, Southern Daily, and the Central Propaganda Department. 
The crisis following the report “Police Raid” [xi jing an] was documented in detail by 
Hong Bing and Cho Li-fung (Hong, 2005: 74-8; Cho, 2007: 141-147; 2014: 183-185). In 
addition to power struggles between the central and regional bureaucracies, the ensuing six 
months became a moment of “soul searching” for the press, publishing multiple apologies on the 
newspaper by both the newsroom and the author. Hong Bing emphasized that, by ordering a 
direct shutdown, the regulatory approach by Party-state was in serious conflict with Southern 
Daily, as its parent newspaper, which insisted on containing the problem in professional rather 
than external—i.e. Party-state—disciplinary measures (78). Concerned primarily with the 
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development of newsroom professionalism, similarly, Cho (2007) argued that the crisis forced 
the newspaper to “articulate its standards of reporting both internally and externally and to 
clearly commit itself to reporting based upon verifiable facts, documentation and solid 
proof” (147-148). 
What I would like to draw attention to, however, is the difference between the cases of 
Police Raid and Chen Maya, which took place in the same year among increasing lawsuits 
against the press. In the case of Chen, when the conflict was invoked between the press and an 
individual, the newspaper defended itself primarily on the legitimacy of the Party press; but 
when it came to the case of Police Raid in which the coverage involved the power struggle 
within the Party-state (the powerful Ministry of Public Security in this case), the legitimacy of 
Party journalism, which assumed a united and rational Party leadership, ceased to protect the 
press and exposed it to the vagaries of power struggles within China’s extensive bureaucratic 
system.  
On the other hand, the crisis of Police Raid, like the case of Chen, underlined the problem 
of heavy reliance on external writers and the “fax-driven” journalism of Southern Weekend at the 
time. It also illustrated the market potential of Party journalism. According to the newsroom, the 
fabricated story of Police Raid eluded the editors since “the writer was out of town when we 
called and he had also been writing for our newspaper for quite a while so had built up his 
credibility” (29 Oct 1993). However, the very decision to publish the story without verification, 
in the end, bespoke a shared ground between the writer and editor on the value of the story 
driven by a combination of propagandist impulse and market pressure. On the front-page self-
criticism, the newspaper admitted that “the craze for readability led to our irresponsible 
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mistake…We had worried that other newspapers might publish the piece before us…and so 
decided to take the risk.” In the author’s self-criticism, in contrast, Liu Yushun explained that  
[I]n writing Police Raid, I succumbed to a passing thought that perhaps I should change my normal 
approach of writing positive coverage on heroes and their achievements, which did not seem very 
effective, and try using negative examples of corrupted individuals to promote positive themes. Perhaps 
this might have a bigger “effect”? 
(Southern Weekend, 26 Nov 1993: 1) 
It is clear that the consideration of Liu Yushun, a freelance writer, revolved around the two 
major genres of Party journalism—positive and negative reporting—with a priority on 
pedagogical concerns. It was different from the market concerns with readability and timeliness 
by the newsroom, but as he seasoned the story with palatable elements—an act largely 
acceptable in morally charged Party journalism; it also fell nicely within the editorial strategies 
of the popular press now capitalizing on the readability of non-political content. In other words, 
while popular journalism and propaganda seemingly belonged to two different ideological 
realms, they converged on their persuasive devices for mass appeal even though, ultimately, 
diverged on their legitimacy of doing so. While Party-state departments like the powerful 
Ministry of Public Security could file grievance against the inaccuracies within the political 
system, still, it is difficult to find an easy channel for individuals and groups less resourceful than 
an actress like Chen Maya, who initiated the first lawsuit against Southern Weekend. But the two 
cases discussed here, after all, represented not the exception but increasing dilemma the 
newspaper was confronted with.  
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Conclusion 
In retrospect, decentralization of newspaper production since the 1980s was initially 
conducive to diversifying the press system when its institutional sponsorship expanded to 
governmental organs and semi-social organizations through sponsorship and co-sponsorship. It 
was this institutional liberalization, by granting rights to public institutions to print, which 
opened the gate of post-Mao newspaper expansion. After a decade of the Cultural Revolution 
and chaotic paucity in both cultural and economic lives, the decentralization or “the dispersion of 
power to run the press happened along the path flowing from the political centers to those 
administrative departments” (Wu, 2000: 51) evoked tremendous interests in printing as a new 
post-Mao enterprise.  
The decentralizing process indeed created a system of limited competition among printers 
across bureaucratic rankings. For the Party trio in Guangzhou, the municipal Guangzhou Daily 
demonstrated no less mobilizing power in competing with the provincial Southern Daily and 
Yangcheng Evening News when the market economy took root in urban centers. For non-Party 
papers, similarly, multiple institutions and departments competed in a certain area of expertise 
and shared comparable potentials through co-sponsorship. It was, however, along the lines 
between Party and non-Party newspapers where the hierarchy of bureaucracy was translated into 
most unequal means of production. In spite of their collective popularity in retail sales, post-Mao 
newspapers outside the parameters of the Party press fell far behind the development of the Party 
press in almost every aspect of production, distribution and governmental support.  
It is true that competition brought in some editorial innovations, as we have seen in the open 
and multi-vocal Southern Weekend of the time. It was another question, however, whether this 
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could lead to pluralism especially due to the continuous power of Party-state institutions over 
funding sources and formal employment. In addition, the active assimilation of popular genres 
and content in the print market by Party papers also increased the degree of homogeneity in 
journalism that, in turn, provoked regulatory attempts on non-Party papers to reduce redundancy. 
A proposal to merge all economic newspapers in Guangzhou to form South China United Times 
[huanan lianhe shibao] was raised by Situ Jiongchang, the director of China Golden Herald in 
the wake of 1989 crackdown. This was perhaps the first alternative proposal in regulating 
newspapers in addition to license control, direct closure, and rectification since the open reform. 
Complicated by the bureaucratic rankings of personnel involved, however, the proposal was 
strapped in administrative impasse when re-organizing the stakeholders in the new enterprise 
(Liu, 2000). This, on one hand, attested to the limited liberalization enabled within the extensive 
bureaucratic network of Party-state, and it also reflected the disabling authoritarian forces that 
prioritized hierarchical privileges and power over professional values on the other.  
Finally, the integration of bureaucratic institutions and newspaper commercialization 
created fundamental problems in newspaper journalism in extending its coverage to social life 
outside national politics. As suggested in the litigations of Southern Weekend, the link between 
the legitimacy of the Party press and its assumed public—the consensual majority of Mao’s 
regime—was dissolving in the changing media environment. To establish an alternative 
relationship was largely the task and challenge of the generation of migrant journalists, who 
ascended to the center of the press and public life in the late 1990s and developed a well-
acclaimed form of muckraking journalism in negotiating between the legacies of critical 
reporting in Party journalism and role of traditional intellectuals. 
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CHAPTER 4    
THE RIGHT STORY: 
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM OF SOUTHERN WEEKEND IN THE LATE 1990S 
Information is a genre of self-denial, the story one of self-indulgence. 
(Michael Schudson, 1978: 119) 
A reader wrote an essay titled “Afraid of Living” [bugan shenghuo] in 2001 and described 
her experience of reading Southern Weekend as the following: 
After reading Southern Weekend for a long time, I all of a sudden wanted to stop reading it once and for 
all because I had an ambiguous feeling of fear deep inside my heart that has made me afraid of living in 
the world. 
I am afraid of going to the hospital even just taking a walk or visiting patients. Heaven knows what was 
in the minds of those lab-coat wearing and self-claimed angels… 
I am afraid of going to the streets. The outside world is nice but not as good as home. The polluted air, 
severe sand storm, just name a few… 
I am afraid of buying commodities. As most of us are not experts, we never know whether the electric 
heater we are using had passed quality control, the beer we are drinking explosive, and the hygiene 
practices that produced our roasted chicken or bread… 
I am afraid of using the phone. Sometimes it cost you an arm and a leg even for dialing a wrong 
number… 
I am afraid of living in high-rise buildings, not knowing whether the elevator might fall like a free object, 
the concrete wall really contained steel instead of newspapers… 
(Hua, 2001: 79) 
Paranoid in tone, the piece presented an alternative reading of Southern Weekend’s 
journalism in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a period widely celebrated as its “Golden Age” by 
newsroom staff and many readers for its investigative reporting. However read, it was clear that 
by the late 1990s, Southern Weekend was no longer a light-hearted cultural “weekend” paper as it 
was in the 1980s and early 1990s. A wave of investigative reporting became associated with this 
southern newspaper nationwide. Despite its popularity, however, the rise of critical exposure of 
social ills was not a phenomenon unique to newspaper journalism. Focus Report [jiaodian 
fangtan], the news program of CCTV launched in April 1994, labelled itself investigative 
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journalism [diaocha baodao] and received national attention. On the national level, that is, a 
bigger trend of social news began to move to the forefront of journalism in the mid-1990s and 
offered a world of redefined “reality” as the ground of public discourse. Southern Weekend, in 
this sense, was a leading voice but not an exception in the development of the late 1990s’ news 
culture.  
The “social” turn of weekend journalism and media culture in general had multiple sources. 
The Chinese government adopted the five-day working week in 1995 and reduced labor time 
from 48 to 40 hours per week in public institutions and state-owned enterprises. This on the one 
hand accentuated leisure and consumption as a legitimate component of the increasingly urban-
based market economy; it also, on the other hand, encroached on weekend culture as a distinct 
temporal space outside of Party journalism. As an editorial policy, “weekend” journalism was 
quickly expanding and open to a broader social life.  
Changes within the print market also contributed to the re-structuring of journalism 
production. Weekend newspapers increased rapidly in the early 1990s during the “weekend 
craze” while Party dailies followed up (Zhao, 2002). In 1993 alone, more than 150 Party dailies 
added subsidiary pages or weekend editions across the country (Hu, 2004: 8). Meanwhile, the 
Party press trio in Guangzhou all extended their foothold in the booming urban economy: 
Southern Daily started another subsidiary—Southern Metro News [nanfang dushi bao]—in 1995; 
Yangcheng Evening News launched a metro daily News Express [xin kuai bao] in 1998; 
Guangzhou Daily, hand-picked as the first press conglomerate in 1996 (chapter 5), grew 
aggressively from 20 pages in 1995 to 40 in 1999 and led in advertising revenue among media 
institutions nationwide throughout the 1990s (Fan, 2009: 281-98). Along with these accelerated 
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expansion of weekend newspapers and Party subsidiaries, how to redefine weekend journalism 
became an urgent question for Southern Weekend.  
To be sure, the transition of Southern Weekend to investigative journalism involved a set of 
internal and external conditions of the printing press. Its paradigmatic shift in journalism grew 
with the formation of a national market, the rapid rise of metro newspapers, the specialization of 
labor division in the newsroom, structural development of the newspaper, and the renewed role 
of the intellectual in political participation. All of these transformations and renewed conditions 
had in one way or another contributed to a distinct form of popular journalism—investigative 
reporting, when the newspaper jumped from 8 to 28 pages between 1995 and 2001. 
The following discussion will be organized into three parts: the first one traces the 
infrastructural and market developments of Southern Weekend during the rise of investigative 
journalism; the second describes the diversification of newsroom labor in response to the macro 
transformations; and the last one outlines the characteristics of investigative reports in reference 
to the above conditions. In the end, my discussion revolves around how all these changes came 
to explain the sources of journalistic paradigm, a new form of “popular.” 
4.1 Conquering the National Space 
The year 1996 was a significant moment of change for Southern Weekend signaled by its 
second page expansion from 12 to 16. The newspaper initiated a series of institutional 
transformations that, eventually, established itself as the benchmark of Chinese journalism in the 
post-Mao era. In about five years, it built up its own reporting team, broke into numerous 
unprecedented topics and geographical areas, and became a profitable newspaper known for its 
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consistent production of investigative reports. By 2001, Southern Weekend was a 28-page weekly 
newspaper with a national circulation above 1.3 million (CJY, 2001: 526). At one telling moment 
of its ascending popularity, the central newspaper People’s Daily bought half a page on Southern 
Weekend to advertise its fiftieth anniversary edition sale in 1998 (26 Jun 1998: 16). 
Although the journalistic change of Southern Weekend in the late 1990s was an active 
exploration toward a new journalism, the paradigmatic shift did not happen exclusively in the 
newsroom. The content bias normally downplayed the other areas of changes especially in 
business investment, distribution, and other infrastructural development. Why did Southern 
Weekend come to choose cross-provincial investigative reports as its main news genre? Before 
discussing the characteristics of its new journalism, three interconnected conditions should be 
traced in reference to the ascendence of investigative report: a national market, a small and 
democratic newsroom, and the transformations of the newspaper in editorial structure.  
Selling it to the nation 
Southern Weekend was not external to the dramatic re-ordering of the institutional and market 
conditions on the national and regional level. In the early 1990s, one common problem shared by 
more than 600 weekend newspapers was that there was, indeed, not much “news” in weekend 
journalism (Zhong, 1994). Meanwhile, many daily newspapers were adding pages of popular 
content to incorporate weekend journalism. To make things even worse, most weeklies, like 
Southern Weekend, relied on external writers who often submitted to various papers and 
therefore further homogenized the market of weekend newspapers. How to enhance 
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newsworthiness [xinwen xing] became imperative for weekly newspapers especially when state 
subsidies were no longer an option.  
The discussion on newsworthiness, however, underrated innovations outside the newsroom, 
reducing the popularity of the newspaper to merely editorial innovations. In practice, distribution 
and advertising were both raised—along with editorial innovations—as the “three wheels” of the 
press in 1996 (Southern Weekend advertising board, 1997). For Southern Weekend in the 
mid-1990s, marketization meant selling the newspaper as a commodity across the country as 
well as selling its newspaper spaces to advertisers for the national readership. By 1995, the year 
before its page expansion to sixteen and its retail price increased to ¥1 Yuan, the newspaper had 
already reached 950,000 in national circulation (CJY, 1996). 
The national distribution of Southern Weekend was exceptional comparing to the fast-
growing metro newspapers in Guangzhou. Beginning in the early 1990s, Southern Weekend 
started to expand its printing infrastructure out of the province to reduce delivery time. By 1996, 
it had established eight regional printers outside the Guangzhou headquarter and the number had 
grown to fifteen by 2003 to cover major urban areas across China. Even though Southern 
Weekend relied on both postal subscription and retail sales for national circulation, the 
establishment of printing branches across the country considerably reduced its dependency on 
the postal system.  
For Southern Weekend, the development of distribution in these regional printing branches 
relied heavily on Party press facilities as well as private distributors. Just as Southern Daily 
opened its printing plant for out-of-town newspapers for profit, the central newspaper People’s 
Daily became its printer in Beijing, the Shaanxi Daily in Xi’an, Fujian Daily in Fuzhou, and 
!143
Zhejiang Daily News Group in Hangzhou. In Shanghai, its first and only regional printing branch 
established during the 1980s, Southern Weekend hired one staff for distribution who, eying the 
profitable Shanghai market, later proposed to work on commission instead of a fixed salary 
(Zhang and Liu, 2004). They soon, like in Guangzhou, collaborated with private distributors as 
well as regional wholesalers, who enjoyed longer-and-better terms in contract with the press to 
market the weekly newspaper into the local distribution networks. By the end of the 1990s, 
Southern Weekend had set up a two-tier national network of distribution: wholesalers at the 
provincial level (including mega cities like Beijing and Shanghai), and second-tier wholesalers 
within provincial regions. In 1998, Southern Weekend adopted satellite technologies to 
synchronize printing time for the ten regional printers—hence a national space of the weekly 
newspaper (25 Years of Southern Weekend, 2009). 
Unlike Guangzhou Daily and other metro newspapers which relied exclusively on 
independent distribution around the affluent Pearl River Delta in Guangdong, Southern Weekend 
kept itself alive on the postal network despite higher and non-negotiable fees and well-known 
inefficiencies (Wu, 2013: 244). It was likely that that it stayed with the postal system to ensure 
its distribution especially for remote or less connected areas. In 2001, circulation of Southern 
Weekend grew more rapidly outside Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou (Zhang and Liu, 2004: 
23). Even though the dual-channel distribution combining postal and private networks was not 
uncommon among post-Mao newspapers, Southern Weekend had a rare place for its national 
orientation in comparison with Party newspapers that were contained within their administrative 
jurisdiction and the booming metro newspapers hovering exclusively around urban centers. 
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The aggressive expansion in national distribution had to do with the fact that, unlike the 
“Party trio” which all had relied on advertising revenue as the major income by 1992, advertising 
did not become the financial backbone for Southern Weekend until the late 1990s. In early 1995, 
there were only 2 to 3 people working in its advertising department (You, 2013; Southern 
Weekend advertising board, 1997). Though the relationship between circulation and annual 
revenue soon reversed when advertising became the largest income source for the newspaper (Li 
et al., 2001), the national market of Southern Weekend made possible the renewal of the national 
“imagined community” in news production.  
Laboring the newsroom 
The growing consensus of relocating journalism toward contemporary social life did not 
directly translate into a new form of journalism. Before restructuring the newsroom and  
production, the newspaper had to rely on freelancers and editors who often traveled to cultivate 
new authors (chapter 1). Compared to other popular newspapers founded in the 1980s, the 
process of opening its newsroom for Southern Weekend to the emerging labor market was slow 
and was not put into practice until its hiring power was devolved from Southern Daily in 1996 
(Hong, 2005: 61).  
The first journalist to join Southern Weekend under a labor contract was after its second page 
expansion in 1996. Before that, Zhu Defu was the only reporter, who was transferred from 
Southern Daily in 1991 in preparation for the first expansion of Southern Weekend. The number 
of reporters grew to 25 by the end of 1997 and 36 by 2000, when economic news was set up as a 
news department. The newsroom experienced the biggest growth from 36 to 103 staff in 2001 
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after its editor-in-chief Jiang Yiping was removed (Southern Weekend, 26 Dec 1997: 16; 28 Dec 
2000: 31; 27 Nov 2001: 26-27). 
The growth of newsroom staff also came with a re-organization of labor division. Within five 
years, reporting and editing went from porous to formal separation. Editors' work became more 
desk-based instead of traveling and making contact with external authors. Chen Juhong, who 
joined Southern Weekend in 1995 as a fresh journalism graduate remembered well how the 
newsroom was organized during the transitional period: 
There were no proofreaders, no visual editors (Zhang Xiangchun only worked for the front page and the 
“art” page). Many editors were just trained to work on the computer. Whenever the two computer 
assistants were occupied, editors would do all the work from typing out the articles to proofreading by 
ourselves. It was overwhelming but I learnt the whole working procedure quickly and later abandoned 
paperwork once and for all. I simply started on the computer and managed to complete a satisfying page 
by myself. 
(Chen, 2005: 267)  
Editorial re-organization in Southern Weekend could also be seen from the spatial 
arrangement of the offices. At the end of 1997, the newspaper had five offices in the 16-story 
building of Southern Daily. Each office was shared by editors and reporters working for the same 
page (Southern Weekend, 26 Dec 1997: 16). By 2000, the 36 staff were divided into three formal 
departments: News [xin wen], Economics [jing ji], and Supplementary Sections [fu kan] (28 Dec 
2000).  
In addition to its small size and enhanced autonomy in recruitment, the newsroom of 
Southern Weekend was much less hierarchical between the non-tenured journalists and senior 
leadership in both editorial work and the renumeration system (Cho, 2007: 151-9). Though the 
first generation of investigative journalists came as both tenured and non-tenured labor (Southern 
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Weekend, 20 Jan 1995: 1), Southern Weekend reformed its salary system in 1997 to minimize the 
institutional discrepancies between tenured and non-tenured staff especially in income. Jiang 
Yiping, the editor-in-chief between 1996 and 2001 remembered how, before the reform, “an 
embarrassing situation emerged in Southern Weekend when we practiced income inequality on 
one hand yet promoted justice and equality on the other” (Jiang, 2013). The new renumeration 
system, instead, subjected all newsroom staff to the same criteria—a basic salary plus bonus that 
was related to work load and quality rather than terms of employment. The policy change 
generally doubled the monthly income of non-tenured track journalists to over 10,000 RMB 
despite the two groups still differing in other benefits and job security. Nan Xianghong, a veteran 
journalist in Xinjiang province who wrote for Southern Weekend in the late 1990s as an external 
author, made from 4,000 to 5,000RMB for one in-depth story, approximately six-month of her 
income in Xinjiang as a journalist (Wang, 2013). Unlike later labor policy changes that subjected 
journalists to a much more hierarchical system (Zhong, 2009), these efforts toward a democratic 
newsroom in labor relations attracted quite a few veteran journalists in other provinces and 
institutions, like Nan Xianghong, to join the newspaper during the late 1990s.  
Covering the “society” 
Little has been said about the structure of the newspaper beyond its well-known investigative 
reports. In cases like Southern Weekend, it seems even harder for one to pay attention to its 
journalism beyond what it has made its name for. It is true that not everyone read every story of a 
newspaper. But it is important to note that for a specific newspaper, every reader holds and flips 
through the same object despite their own selections. What remains common for all, then, is the 
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editorial structure of the newspaper that persisted over a much longer period of time than its 
stories. 
Southern Weekend has gone through a total six page expansions since its inception in 1984, 
four of which took place between 1996 and 2001. As discussed in chapter 1, the first expansion 
from four to eight pages was an extension, instead of a break, within weekend journalism. It was 
organized by a populist strategy of incorporating several best-selling genres on the market. Four 
years later, Southern Weekend grew to sixteen pages in 1996, twenty in 1998, twenty-four in 
1999, twenty-eight in 2001, and finally thirty-two in 2004 (Appendix C). It was over the period 
of frequent page expansions and restructuring in the late 1990s and early 2000s that Southern 
Weekend ultimately marginalized the initial weekend journalism while social news rose to the 
center.  
Instead of a separate move, however, the widely acclaimed investigative reports indeed 
evolved from a series of earlier explorations toward social news. On 11 December 1992, less 
than a year after its first page expansion, the added page “Readers’ Digest” was replaced by 
“Economy and People” [jingji yu ren], which signified the transition toward stronger socio-
economic life. In the second page expansion in 1996, this social turn was more clearly spelt out. 
Southern Weekend added pages such as “News” [xin wen], “Society” [she qing], “Fashion” [shi 
shang], “International Economy” [guoji jingji], “Sports” [tiyu], and “Current Affairs” [shishi 
zongheng], all of which distanced the newspaper further away from the cultural orientation it 
started with in the mid-1980s.  
Over the years, the actual page changes have been fluid and also complicated, reflecting an 
active process of selection and exploration in defining the identity of the newspaper. Both the 
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order of pages and amount of printed stories fluctuated, often due to advertising placements; and 
there were experimental pages and columns that disappeared over time or morphed into stable 
sections. The whole new section of “New Life” [xin shenghuo] in 1999, for instance, took its 
earlier form under “Trial Section” [shiyan tekan] in 1998. But gradually, news reporting gained 
its dominance by ten pages in 2001, including the front-page, “Trend” [dong xiang], “The 
World” [tian xia], “Focus” [chuanmei zhongdian], “Southern Weekend Investigation” [diao cha], 
“Law and Order” [fa zhi], “Observation” [guan cha], “People” [ren wu], “Current 
Affairs” [shishi zongheng], and “Consumer Square” [xiaofei guangchang].  
The relocation of the newspaper toward social news, in addition, can also be seen from the 
pages abolished over time. “Serial literature” [lian zai] was gone in 1997; “Medicine and 
Health,” “Sports,” “Fashion,” and the “Cartoon” page [wu yang jiao] were given up while 
“Journalists Observatory” and “Southern Weekend Investigation” [ben bao diao cha] were added 
in 1998. Beginning in January 2001, the newspaper has been printed on Thursdays instead of 
Saturdays (Feb 1984 - May 1986) and Fridays (Jun 1986- 2000), and literally shredded its 
“weekend” identity regarding the time of publication. 
The rapid expansion in news production has also meant the specialization of news reporting 
in market competition. When the rising metro newspapers began to embed themselves into the 
everyday urban life to highlight the local, the informational, and news as services for the 
urbanites (Sun, 2004), weekly newspapers began to explore depth, perspective, planning, 
background, and even knowledge in reporting (Song and Wang, 1999: 51). After all, weekly 
papers had not comparable advantages to compete with the metro dailies in timeliness; but the 
national readership of the weekly newspaper nonetheless created a unique space for in-depth 
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reports with a domestic purview and an interpretive impulse. “A new 'cultural map' is needed 
when information proliferated beyond people's empirical world” (Huang, 2001: 12). 
Investigative reporting, from this regard, was as much a result of market calculation as a 
continuous intellectual enterprise in revealing the “truth” for the people. 
4.2 Lenses of Truth 
The transformation of journalism in Southern Weekend began as the role of editors 
diversified. Starting with eight in 1984, the number of editors did not increase dramatically while 
news sources and journalism practices evolved during the mid-1990s. As the labor division with 
the reporters formalized, however, newspaper editors began to take a more active role inside the 
newsroom. All kinds of writing contests, for instance, which opened the newspaper to external 
writers, diminished quickly along with commercial sponsorship of specific columns. The trend 
toward specialization began to take shape in the newsroom. 
 Among other things, two major editorial approaches—one old and the other new—were 
amplified during the page expansion in 1996: the traditional commentator and the surveyor. In 
particular, the role of news commentator took the page of “Current Affairs” [shishi zongheng], a 
news digest combined with scholarly and readers’ opinions. The new approach adopted was the 
survey method in representing social changes and public opinion. Both approaches developed 
along with the growing reporters whose social status rose to a profession in the late 1990s. 
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The commentator 
News commentary is not new to Chinese newspapers. Political participation of scholar-
officials [shi da fu] was institutionalized in Imperial China through the national exam system [ke 
jü] which selected young men (not women) well-versed with the Confucius canon into the 
bureaucratic ranks. In the late nineteenth century, the ideal and practices of traditional 
intellectuals speaking for the (mostly illiterate) people continued in political newspapers and 
journals in fighting against the crumbling Qing Dynasty and also colonial power. The end of the 
imperial examination in 1905 and the Xinhai Revolution in 1911 after which the Republic of 
China (ROC) was founded further drove traditional literati to find their way into the press and 
publishing (MacKinnon, 1997; Wang, L. S. 1994;  Wang, 2012). The origin of the modern press 
in China has been charged with the marginalization of traditional intellectuals while news 
commentary, as a result, has become their new form of political participation. 
Both political parties, the Nationalists (KMT) and the Communists (CCP), utilized 
newspapers for political mobilization in wartime China. The Communist Party had been actively 
publishing newspapers since its early formation and during the Civil War (1946-1949) for 
popular support against the KMT. Mao’s new China and the project of socialist modernity, 
however, fully integrated news media into the bureaucratic ranks of the Party-state. In Mao’s 
journalism, the editorial of People’s Daily represented the voice of the Party-state if not Mao 
himself. Even though readers’ letters were also published and emphasized especially in light of 
Mao’s “mass line” journalism [qunzhong luxian] (Zhao, 1998: 24-30), they were handled not by 
the newsroom but a separate department—literally, the mass work department [qun gong bu]—
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where the letters were selected for publication either in Party dailies or for internal references 
(Hong, 2005: 109). 
The tradition of news commentary was revived in the 1980s in the booming popular 
newspapers and journals. One example was the editor-in-chief of Yancheng Evening News Xu 
Shi (1919-2004), who began to use the pseudonym Wei Yin—literally, a micro voice—and kept a 
front-page column called “Talk of the Street” [jie tan xiang yi] in the following three decades. Xu 
Shi had been a veteran journalist since the 1940s in the Guangdong area and worked for the 
CCP’s newspapers in both Vietnam and Hong Kong. To represent voices from below, Wei Yin 
was known for his regular visits to a downtown teahouse-restaurant in Guangzhou and sat among 
local residents during the morning tea (and dim-sum) hour, a daily ritual for Cantonese seniors 
and family weekends, when many read newspapers and chatted. Though limited, Wei Yin’s 
vernacular account and writing style on everyday urban experiences of ordinary people 
represented perhaps the best practice of the intellectual tradition and the “mass line” of Party 
journalism in “speaking for the people.” 
For Southern Weekend, similarly, the intellectual tradition also found its way to the front-
page column “Weekend Teahouse” [zhoumo chafang] since its inauguration. Normally a 300-
word long opinion essay from an external writer (including veteran journalists like Wei Yin), the 
short piece was not necessarily based on news stories published by the newspaper. The topics 
could range widely from everyday experiences to cultural or historical phenomena. Wei Yin 
criticized, for instance, the corrupted manipulation in entertainment awards (7 Mar 1987: 1) and 
the problems of (lousy) musical concerts burgeoning in the city (27 Mar 1987: 1). These 
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practices of channeling bottom-up voices can be seen as the early efforts in post-Mao journalism 
to break away from the monopoly of the Party in addressing social changes.  
The column “Weekend Teahouse” stayed throughout the late 1990s, but its significance was 
largely replaced by the new page “Current Affairs” established in 1996. Edited by Yan Lieshan 
(1952-), a newspaper editor from Yangtze Daily in Hubei province and an external author of 
Southern Weekend earlier, the new page became a pioneer in publishing intellectual news 
commentaries in various forms. The inaugural page included five components: a column of four 
to five news digests with short comments [xinwen pingdian], two or three longer abstracts from 
other newspapers with the editor’s comments [te bie tui jian], a forum for readers’ letters 
[baixing chafang], a scholarly column, and an editorial column written by Yan Lieshan himself 
[zong heng tan]. Rather than an alternative voice against Party journalism, according to Yan, 
“Current Affairs” was aiming for a common ground between Party policies and popular 
concerns. “We should be accepted from above (complying with Party policies and directives) and 
below (concerning with social reality and express how people feel” (Yan, 1997). He further 
characterized the new page of Southern Weekend in direct reference to Bai Jüyi, a Tang Dynasty 
poet known for his involvement in the New Yuefu Movement, which emphasized social and 
critical engagement in poetry writing.  
In practice, “Current Affairs” indeed worked to go beyond reviving intellectual discourses by 
bringing news into an interpretative framework from scholars, editors, and also its readers. But 
the division between intellectual and ordinary people was never resolved. “Civic Teahouse,” the 
forum for readers’ letters was later developed into a full page in October 1997 when  “Current 
Affairs” became gradually dominated by experts. The separation was, on the one hand, an 
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expansion of both; but it also reinforced the gap between the two groups in sociological 
imagination on the other. Unlike the op-ed page adopted later on many metro newspapers, “Civic 
Teahouse” and its later derivative “Civic Notes” [baixing jishi] on stories from readers moved 
into the cultural section and illustrations were added. The symbolic conversation among experts, 
journalists, and the reading public eventually retreated.  
The sociological lens 
Another fresh approach in representing the society in the weekly newspaper was signaled by 
the page “Social Observatory” [shehui guancha] also added in 1996. Taking up the lens of 
sociological survey, it was a significant shift in channeling social realities in journalism beyond 
individual purview and intellectual discourses. Though eventually dropped in 1998, “Social 
Observatory” can be seen as one alternative approach to “society” in the journalism history of 
Southern Weekend that should not be overlooked.  
In fact, Southern Weekend was not the pioneer in adopting survey methods in news 
production. Modern Mankind, a non-Party popular newspaper closed down in 1994, was a much 
earlier leader in this respect. Also a weekly founded in the mid-1980s, Modern Mankind indeed 
adopted a much more “modern” approach, using opinion polls in reporting domestic politics and 
organizing its content around pro-reform themes. Its inaugural issue on 20 September 1985, for 
instance, printed a cover story titled “Reform was received favorably by the public” [gaige 
shende renxin]. Seemingly a self-serving headline by Party dailies speaking for the people 
without real inquires, the story was instead a survey conducted by the newsroom with one 
hundred anonymous interviewees, asking how living standards in the family had changed since 
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the economic reform and how they perceived the obstacles of the reform, etc. The survey 
reported “20 voted for ‘significantly improved,’ 75 for ‘slightly improved,’ and 5 for ‘no 
improvement.’ ” As a follow-up question, the household durables recently bought by the family 
were also inquired among the 100 interviewees, reporting “TV set (78), fridge (40), washing 
machine (56), radio (68), VHF (1), Nothing bought (16).” Regarding the major barriers of the 
open reform, 27 people voted for “Party corruption” [dangfeng buzheng], 22 for “ossified 
ideas” [sixiang jianghua], 7 for “the ‘leftist’ residues,” 17 for “poor management,” 4 for “the 
money mindset” [yiqie xiang qian kan], and 22 unspecified. 
For Southern Weekend, early explorations of social science research were conducted, but for 
the purpose of reader survey rather than news production (e.g. 4 Dec 1992: 3). The new page 
“Social Observatory,” instead, normally organized columns of “social research,” “focal point,” 
“statistics,” and “research trend” on a selected topic. In the trial version, the leading article was 
written by a sociologist, Wu Pengsen, on migrant peasants (3 Nov 1995: 10). The topic was 
complemented by a commentary from the historian Qin Hui about the social problems invoked 
by the massive domestic migration, a photo of migrant peasant-workers in the city, and statistics 
on consumption and income levels in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Sichuan province, and 
Gansu province.  
“Social Observatory” covered a variety of topics on social changes especially within the 
urban environment. Topics included literary reading among young people (29 Mar 1996), income 
level (10 May 1996: 7), experiences with airline service (12 April 1996), definition of 
“privacy” (15 Aug 1997), etc. Some of the studies were partnered with  survey companies (e.g. 
26 Apr 1996), others done by researchers, teachers, and also journalists. While the content was 
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still divided between external and newsroom labor, the lens of social science was nonetheless 
coherent, representing the reading public by demographic categories of region, gender, age, 
income level, and profession rather than “people” [ren min] of the national-political community.  
A byproduct of the changing approach to news was the lasting importance of editors, who 
orchestrated authors, research agencies, and other complementary materials such as statistics and 
opinion pieces closely around a planned topic. Unlike the 1980s when editors’ work concentrated 
on literary values and readability of individual submissions, the gravity of editorial work shifted 
to setting the agenda and manipulating the relationship among individual pieces. Under a 
stronger role of the producer, editor’s notes and comments emerged regularly as a governing 
device to guide readers. “Consumer Square” [xiaofei guangchang], a new page added in 1996, 
set up a column called “editor’s word” [bianji ganyan] where the page editor Cao Xihong wrote 
his own commentary. Zhang Mei, the editor of “Family Life,” added “Producer’s word” [cehua 
ren yu] on top of the page. The voices from various freelancers in previous news production 
became outweighed by that of the editor, who organized individuals and institutions in revealing 
a “big picture” of social life. 
“Social observatory” was abolished in 1998 along with cartoon, fashion, family, and 
medicine and health while the pages “Journalists observatory” and “Southern Weekend 
Investigation” were added. For the weekly newspaper, reporting eventually dominated the work 
of journalism. 
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The birth of reporters 
It can be argued that the editorial approaches, news commentaries and sociological research, 
were both within the efforts of Southern Weekend to improve accuracy and accountability in the 
mid-1990s. As represented by the crisis of Police Raid in 1994, the problem of credibility was 
still haunting as Southern Weekend went into the expansive areas of social life yet with 
ambiguous relationship with the Party press. The aggressive expansion of the newspaper in the 
marketplace was heavily charged with the ongoing explorations of its own legitimacy as a 
popular newspaper.   
Some of the considerations to enhance credibility were direct and conspicuous. On March 11, 
1994,  editors began to sign their names on each page, signaling an increasing sense of 
accountability in the newsroom. But the representation of credibility was eventually outweighed 
by that of the reporters as their work increased in both old and new pages. “Journalists 
Observatory,” the cover page, “People and Law,” and “Consumer Square” regularly published in-
depth stories written by its own reporters. The new page of “Southern Weekend Investigation 
[benbao diaocha] launched in 1999, in particular, was devoted exclusively to investigative 
stories written by Southern Weekend journalists. The increasingly frequent byline of “our 
journalist XXX” [ben bao ji zhe], which was close to zero before 1996, indicated the rising status 
of reporters and the importance of credibility for the newspaper.  
The development of reporters also brought in a growing emphasis on news sources. Instead 
of following the official Xinhua News Agency or governmental agenda, Southern Weekend set up 
its correspondent posts in Beijing and Shanghai, and dispatched regional reporters there in 1994 
and 1995 respectively. News hotlines were soon opened to the general public in 1995 one by one 
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in Guangzhou, Beijing, and Shanghai with telephone numbers printed on the front-page. In 1996, 
the sixteen-page Southern Weekend publicized a total of eight telephones lines, one each for the 
general office, computer room, visual editors, journalists, distribution office, and three for the 
advertising department. In addition, a telephone number was printed under the heading of each 
page and directly opened the sixteen editorial desks for public contact. Most desks shared a 
telephone number with at least another one, which indicated sharing office space. But exclusive 
lines were reserved for two major news pages: “Economy and People” and “Current Affairs.” 
Opening the newsroom through telephone lines considerably changed the scope and types of 
incoming stories. For one thing, direct contact between news sources and editorial desks 
eliminated the mediation by individual freelancers. More importantly, the circuit no longer 
supported the previous relationship between the newspaper and local governmental offices in 
relaying a reported problem from the readers. The “problem-solving” framework did not work, in 
particular, for cross-provincial stories because the newspaper and its sponsor had no direct 
administrative power or contact over the governmental departments in another province even on 
a lower level. When the link between government and an out-of-town press was at least 
temporarily interrupted, the newsroom was released from its identity as the affiliated paper and 
shifted its focus of work onto reporting for its readers instead of as internal references for 
government departments. Such an unexpected irony between the Party-press relation and an 
empowered newsroom in reporting opened up an unprecedented social space for perhaps the 
most important genre of post-Mao journalism. 
 Now that in a telephone call away, the relationship between newspaper readers and the 
newsroom changed. Readers began to call for a variety of reasons. “Some provided stories and 
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help, some gave feedbacks, some pointed out our mistakes, and some told us the injustice they 
experienced…” (29 Dec 1999: 16). Rao Lüfei, a journalist of Southern Weekend, found it quite 
often that she could not even understand the dialects of the readers, which indicated a large 
proportion of cross provincial or at least translocal calls. At the time when “Party corruption” 
rose up to the top popular concern, as the opinion poll on Modern Mankind showed, it is 
reasonable to suggest that a weekly newspaper with national circulation and an open newsroom 
from Guangdong became a channel to file social grievances especially for readers in inland cities 
or rural areas with underdeveloped markets and press investment. CCTV’s Focus Interview, the 
investigative program endorsed several times by central leaders, was well-known for having 
visitors from across the country lining up in front of the TV station to file their cases (Zhang, 
2002: 226).  It is not surprising that an external newspaper, out of direct control by the local 
government, served as an alternative resource. 
The national market of Southern Weekend also created a potential channel for journalists in 
other provinces to get their stories out in case of local censorship. In such cases, local journalists 
might offer their work in progress as well as assistance to Southern Weekend reporters so that 
their efforts would not be wasted. In 2000, for instance, a case of collective plagiarism during the 
national college entrance exam in Jiahe, Hunan province was censored by the provincial 
government. Though the story was first reported by a Hunan TV station, showing an under-
covered video tape taken during the exam, media outlets in Hunan were later requested to drop 
any follow-up investigation and printed only the official account from Xinhua News Agency. By 
the time of the ban, however, Liu Xianghui, an entrepreneurial journalist from Changsha Daily, 
had already finished an in-depth report. While local outlets were shut down, his work was 
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published on Southern Weekend in full (14 Jul 2000: 1, 6). Though excluding most freelancers or 
part-time writers in the previous decade, the open newsroom of Southern Weekend therefore 
became an alternative channel not only for cross-provincial readers but also journalists, 
promoting horizontal connections between media outlets in news production. 
Relying on the national market of Southern Weekend, then, such cross-provincial 
collaboration in reporting strongly disrupted the power relationship between the corresponding 
governmental supervisor and affiliated media in controlling information (Chan, 2003). In fact, it 
soon became a prominent approach to investigative news reporting for the newspaper. Cho Li-
fung found that, for investigative journalism targeting governmental power or what she called 
watchdog journalism from 1996 to 2001, 21.3% of the watchdog stories covered malfeasance 
occurring at a national level, 12.3% in Guangdong province, and 66.4% outside of Guangdong 
province in a specific region (Cho, 2007: 191-2). That means over 85% of the watchdog news 
reports on Southern Weekend between 1996 and 2001 were stories located outside Guangdong. 
The increasing mobility and specialization of the working reporters, whose labor could no longer 
be replaced by editors, also fostered socialization among investigative journalists and the 
formation of a professional community that reinforced their connections and the rising 
prominence of reporting as an occupation. Despite the common criticism that it was only 
“swatting flies and dead tigers” and “flexing muscles within boundary” (e.g. Zhao, 2004), such 
horizontal flow of news stories on the national level was a remarkable breakthrough in the 
centralized and top-down model of China’s public communication since Mao and should not be 
easily discredited on the the ground of theories.  
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4.3 Bad News, Good Tellers 
By the end of the twentieth century, weekend journalism based on light-hearted 
entertainment and popular culture was virtually marginalized. Though investigative reporting 
was not dominant, in its place was no longer cultural activities but broader social news reporting 
and the rising metro newspapers which focused on the everyday life and politics of the urban 
population. For Southern Weekend, news reporting grew in number and length as its pages 
increased. The structure of the front-page, for instance, stabilized around 1998 with only three 
major items: the cover story, a commentary, and a reading guide highlighting a few news stories 
inside. In August 2000, a senior reader wrote to Southern Weekend and complained that “your 
newspaper should avoid long stories” (17 Aug 2000: 20). Later, another reader sent in an letter 
and argued that “in-depth reports not only give the information but also answer the question 
‘why’” (21 Sept 2000: 27). In response, the editor commented on the second reader approvingly 
that “in-depth reports should be the major goal of weekly newspapers.”  
Varied in length, target, and degree of investigation, not all long and in-depth stories were 
watchdog journalism in “documenting the activities of government, business, and other public 
institutions in ways that expose little-publicized or hidden activities to public scrutiny” (Bennett 
and Serrin, 2005). But the trend was clear. The development of this newspaper has indeed been 
against the popular assumption that the commercialization of the press brought in shorter and 
more fragmented stories. While metro newspapers, the other form of popular journalism in the 
late 1990s, developed its news as a companion of urban life for the booming population, 
Southern Weekend relied on the growing journalistic techniques as well as the popular moral 
concerns of the rising social conflicts of market reform.  
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The journalistic truth 
Journalism in twentieth century China has yet been an autonomous profession. Lin Yutang 
(1895-1976) lamented in the 1930s that only a small circle of writers tended to flaunt their 
knowledge yet without “using their legs” hindered the advent of more democratic flow of 
information (1937: 161). Financial constraints further aggravated this matter, according to Lin, 
so “current magazines are generally from poor writers living in garrets in the terribly inhuman 
residences of Shanghai alleyways called ‘terrace houses’ who can spin out long yarns of 
grandiloquent discussions on abstract theories or collect their material by quotations from 
quotations from books ancient and modern” (Ibid). This, Lin Yutang commented, “has a 
dangerous tendency of cutting off periodicals from the real life of an evolving society” (Ibid).  
Mao’s press solved the problem of the struggling writers in Republican China by integrating 
the printing press within a centralized Party-state bureaucracy. Journalism became essentially a 
model of centralized political communication serving first and foremost Party politics in 
mobilizing consent and mass participation for national integration (Liu, 1971). It maintained a 
national political community and the role of Party-state as the dominant public voice on all 
issues of national importance. Journalists of the Party press derived their authority to address 
social reality from its institutional affiliation with the Party. As we have seen in its long shadow 
cast on Hong Kong culture in the 1980s, Party journalism during Mao’s time resided within the 
political language of the CCP. 
Early post-Mao efforts tried to legitimize journalism as a conveyer of information outside of 
the Party mandate of class struggle. The reformist Marxists or Old Left inside the Communist 
Party such as Liu Binyan and Hu Jiwei, for instance, became open critics against Mao’s remnants 
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in propaganda apparatuses and tried to justify journalism on the basis of people’s interests (Lee, 
2000). In addition to inner-Party struggles, they also found a popular channel in reportage 
literature [baogao wenxue] or literary journalism to expose Party corruptions, a tradition that can 
be traced back to the left-wing culture the CCP aligned with in the wake of the May Fourth 
movement in 1919 (Laughlin, 2002).  
The first decade and a half in post-Mao China decentralized newspaper production within the 
Party press structure (chapter 1). For newspapers, still, it was not until the mid-1990s when 
reporters gained their institutional status to cover social lives that were potentially outside the 
Party agenda. On an increasingly regular basis, journalists began to spend days and weeks or 
even longer for a story which may or may not alert local Party committees and governmental 
officials. Their growing presence and labor began to relocate journalism within a social life 
which used to be ignored or dominated by political discourses, impressionistic accounts, and 
literary narratives. Contrary to their previous forms during the twentieth century, newspaper 
journalism became rooted in the work of the reporter rather than the writer’s literacy or the 
Party’s public speech.   
In light of this rough historical account, it should be clear that professional codes of Chinese 
journalism were only a recent construct. In just a few years, reporters began to take up news 
production within the post-Mao press and actively honed their skills in the expanding social 
spaces. In 1996, six pages out of sixteen on Southern Weekend—including the front page, 
“Economy and People,” “Consumer Square,” “People and Law,” “Weekend News,” and “Social 
Observatory”—were consistently devoted to news stories produced by its own reporters. Two 
years later, again, “Journalist Observatory” was launched to replace “Social Observatory,” which 
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signaled a more conscious exploration on the role of reporters in journalism. Soon became a 
major outlet for news stories on Southern Weekend, the bi-weekly page printed a short note next 
to its heading that read “Tell the public by your own action: I am a journalist” (8 January 1998: 
7). 
“Journalist Observatory” was edited by Shen Hao, a front-page editor since 1992. And it was 
open to journalists from other newspapers. The inaugural page published two external 
submissions, one from Economic Daily in Beijing and the other from Yunnan Daily, the Party 
daily of Yunnan province. The two stories shared the page in half under two vertically 
symmetrical sections of “Journalist’s Witness” [jizhe muji] and “One Type of Reality” [xianshi 
yizhong]. The first story, “Inertia in the Fog,” reported the chaotic service of the Beijing airport 
in foggy weather; the other one, “The Last 16 Hours of Death Row Inmates,” was a feature story 
on eight death row inmates in Yunnan before their execution. A news event and a human interest 
story respectively, both stories highlighted the reporter's presence as a third person. As Jiang 
Yiping, the editor-in-chief, wrote in the short introduction for “Journalist Observatory”: 
This is an experiment, a page reserved exclusively for journalists. As the definition of journalist by the 
society and their self-identifications are complicated enough, we don’t plan to define the duties of the 
profession. We only hope to see how journalists see the reality in their unique perspective… As long as 
you are a journalist, wherever you are, we hope to see your work. Raise your professional spirit and 
submit to Journalist Observatory. 
(Southern Weekend, 9 Jan 1998: 1) 
The exploration of journalistic practices made the page an establishing ground for news 
reporting. Professionalism [zhi ye jing shen] or what Jiang Yiping called professional spirit began 
to develop. In July 1998, “Journalist Observatory” printed the following four stories written by 
Southern Weekend reporters: 
!164
“Bacteria in Shenzhen Women & Children Hospital: an Unprecedented Epidemic involved at least 130 
women and babies” (3 July 1998: 16); 
 “Running toward ‘Minimum Affluence’: Poverty in Sifang Jing Village” (24 July 1998:7); 
“The Fight” (Two drunk drivers in Guizhou tricked their entry into a college and killed a student on 
campus; one of them was beaten to death by the angry students) (31 July 1998: 6); 
“Get on the Public Payroll” [chi huang liang] (Nepotism in a small town of Hainan province led to a 
semi-open sale of high school teacher positions to get public paycheck] (31 July 1998: 6). 
The four stories differed in length, target, and scope of investigation. What seemed coherent, 
however, were the practices of on-site inquires by the reporter as an outsider, who investigated 
primary sources involved in presenting a social problem. Similar to the inaugural page, the last 
two stories were printed on the same day and were relatively short. Two of the stories, poverty in 
the Sichuan village and a bloated public payroll in Hainan, targeted government corruption. In 
the case of hospital infection, the most thoroughly investigated one, two Southern Weekend 
journalists gathered information from multiple victims, the Municipal Bureau of Public Health in 
Shenzhen, local media, the supplier of concentrated disinfectant, recent purchase records of the 
hospital, and their own investigation of lab practices in the hospital. The final revelation that the 
concentrated disinfectant was diluted to a ridiculously low density due to malpractice pointed to 
the dysfunctional management of the hospital rather than, as the hospital earlier claimed, a wrong 
delivery by the supplier. The evidence based on independent inquiries by the journalists strongly 
defied the explanations given by the hospital and supported an alternative judgment to be taken 
up by the readers.   
Previous research has provided rich accounts of such “deviance” from Party journalism, 
highlighting the genre of investigating reports as stretching the role of yulun jiandu or 
“supervision by public opinion” within the circuit of Party-state power. To emphasize its 
historical origins in Party journalism, Sun Wushan defined the critical reports as essentially a 
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governing technique of the Party-state in exposing regional problems and tackling local 
protectionism (2005). CCTV’s Focus Interview, again, was openly visited and endorsed by three 
Party leaders for its efforts to bring social concerns to critical spotlights. The practice of 
investigative reporting, one may suggest, is internal supervision turned public without real public 
participation.  
In practice, this particular form of “Chinese muckraking” shared similarities with its Western 
counterparts especially from the perspective of reporters when they were working out-of-town 
against bureaucratic and business interests (often both) to uncover information. But the 
differences were also apparent. Within the general trend of decentralization of governance during 
the post-Mao economic reform, regional governments had their own interests in patronizing 
affiliated media whereas the central government also had an interest in exposing regional 
problems to channel public opinion (Tong, 2010). A convergent area of central and regional 
interests, then, was cross-provincial reporting. This was, as discussed earlier, facilitated by the 
absence of direct administrative connection between a regional government and an out-of-town 
press. However, the highly imbalanced economic and media development in mainland China 
also created a new sense of inequality as most provinces did not have a Southern Weekend. At 
times of bureaucratic backlash in various forms, as will be seen later, it is not uncommon for 
newsroom leaders to turn to their governmental sponsors in order to defend the newspaper 
against punishment from higher political pressure. This relationship based on shared interests in 
facing potential political risk from above, however, also came with a price. When institutional 
and even personal bonds between press leaders and local government strengthened, it made the 
intervention in news production easier—and an imperative—for local propaganda officials yet 
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demoralized newsroom staff and cultivated self-censorship. Without newsroom autonomy or 
press law to define the boundaries, therefore, journalistic endeavors of the popular press 
navigated precariously within the political network in their pursuit of market share and public 
accountability.  
Investigative practices gradually penetrated other news pages in Southern Weekend. Later in 
1998, the news page of “Southern Weekend Investigation” [ben bao diao cha] was added, 
printing predominantly full-page investigative reports written by Southern Weekend journalists. 
The next year, Southern Weekend morphed into three sections, covering “news,” “culture,” and 
“life”; and regularly devoting 7 to 10 out of 24 pages to news reporting across the country. 
Cross-provincial reporting became the major approach to news for the weekend newspaper. The 
basis of its journalism has come to gravitate around the “truth” produced by journalists rather 
than that from Party mandates. 
The editorial voice 
In line with the consistent output of investigative reports, Southern Weekend began to bring 
in a social picture which otherwise could only be read between the lines in central policies and 
isolated critical reports in Party dailies if not from one’s own experiences. The popularity of 
these stories, on the other hand, was deeply rooted in the prevailing “righteous indignation” upon 
the “Dickensian inequality and injustice” (Sun, 2001: 14) of post-Tiananmen Chinese society. 
Even though the growth of reporters and development in reporting techniques enhanced popular 
journalism in accuracy and accountability, it did not suppress the moral impetus of intellectuals 
or install impartiality as the norm of journalism. The editorial voice was, on the contrary, 
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reinvented. Perhaps similar to the late Qing tabloids that relied on social criticism for popularity, 
the invested interests of the commentator continued to evolve and offered the news reports an 
interpretive framework—a popular truth—that the newspaper shared with its readers. 
The double development of public accountability and moral leadership in the newsroom 
could be read from the editorial written by Jiang Yiping, the editor-in-chief, in 1999: 
Looking back to the past 365 days and nights, all our efforts have been building on the commitment that 
“I am a journalist”…The duty of the journalists is no more than paying the debt to the public…Just as the 
life of plants are represented by their green leaves, the life of news is justified by its truthfulness…The 
eyes of the journalists not only open up to seek the truth, but also quite often close gently while touched 
by true emotions.  
(Southern Weekend, 1 Jan 1999: 9) 
In this much-acclaimed New Year editorial, Jiang Yiping emphasized “truthfulness” [zhen 
shi] as the principal of journalism in reference to public interests. But she also pointed out how 
“truth emotion” [zhen qing] and justice played perhaps no less important a role for working 
journalists. In fact, the voice of editors like Jiang Yiping who emerged out of the development of 
the newsroom was a significant aspect in shaping the newsroom culture and a collective identity 
of the newspaper.  
Within the anti-corruption discourses of the Party-state and rising grievances about the rent-
seeking bureaucrats and institutions, the stance of the newsroom was so articulate that it quickly 
built up its reputation in the newspaper market. To one end, some of its pages were close to the 
radical role of advocacy journalism in offering a space for the otherwise voiceless in their 
separate struggles with state departments and private companies. “Consumer Square” [xiao fei 
guang chang], a new page added in 1996, had been edited with a coherent agenda in support of 
consumer rights as opposed to market malpractice (Hong, 1998). By following cases of 
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consumer activists fighting against bootlegs, Southern Weekend became a participatory force in 
organizing a larger community of consumers in an undisciplined and authoritarian marketplace. 
By following the brands and commodities endorsed by trade associations and promoted by 
CCTV, Hong Bing argued, Southern Weekend raised critical questions against the misleading 
rating system that relied on the authority of governmental departments and the central media.  
The intervention of Southern Weekend in consumer campaigns did not stop short at the 
popular accusation of “swatting flies but not tigers,” reporting on lower ranking power holders 
rather than their supervisors. Even though the risk of questioning higher ranking governmental 
institutions increased, targeting the wedded network of state departments which turned into 
natural monopolies in the process of marketization was at times unavoidable. As will be seen in 
the following case, the editor worked as the de facto leader in representing activists and 
deploying reporters in an organized struggle for consumer rights.  
On March 20, 1998, “Consumer Square” featured the case of Shen Hongjia, a retired 
professor and member of the Political Consultative Committee of Ji’nan, Shandong province, 
who questioned the legitimacy of telecommunication service fees. This was the third case 
“Consumer Square” published on the same topic in three months (see also 30 Jan 1998; 27 Feb 
1998). Before writing to Southern Weekend in January, Shen Hongjia had filed his inquiry to the 
Ministry of Post and Telecommunication (MPT, later Ministry of Information Industry or MII) 
and other governmental departments but did not get any answers. Cao Xihong, the editor of 
“Consumer Square” wrote an editorial titled “Questioning the Telecom Industry” where he drew 
attention to another two activists and additional complaints about telephone charges to 
interrogate the monopoly of the state department in the telecommunication industry. In addition 
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to a short piece from Shen Hongjia on his own findings and opinion, the page also printed a 
piece by Du Weidong, a reporter of Southern Weekend, who reported on another three complaints 
the newsroom received from Xinjiang and Hunan provinces.  
In the following issue, “Consumer Square” carried on the topic and presented an exemplar of 
public discussion on behalf of public interests (3 Apr 1998: 12). Readers’ responses in support of 
Shen Hongjia were edited into a short piece, including Shen’s contact information upon his 
consent. The side column added seven other complaints from readers of six provinces—two in 
Guangdong, about telecommunication service fees. The heart of the page featured the voices 
from Shen Hongjia and an anonymous government official calling for revoking the telephone 
installation fee; a master student from Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications 
arguing against both; and the editor Cao Xihong’s short telephone interview with the MPT. 
Headed “Listen to the Voice of the MPT,” the short piece informed the readers that the editor’s 
inquiry was met with answers like “we don’t read your newspaper,” “we are too busy with 
restructuring the department,” and “sue us if they want.” Also included in the “Background” 
column was a short piece titled “Incoming Minister of the MII,” where readers were told that the 
incoming minister of the MII was the head of the MPT. The piece further pointed out that the 
new establishment should be expected to function as the regulator other than direct participant in 
the telecommunication industry. In this multi-vocal discussion, in sum, the editor orchestrated a 
bottom-up challenge against the monopolistic power of the MPT without hiding his own opinion. 
Instead of a light-hearted street show of weekend journalism, the newspaper page was a presided 
chorus with an agenda. 
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In addition to the role of producer, the editorial voice also emerged in “foreword” [bian qian 
yu], “editor’s words” [bian zhe de hua], and “afterwords” [bian hou yu] (e.g. 9 Feb 96: 1; 2 May 
1997: 16; 7 Apr 2000: 9). But it perhaps took its strongest form in New Year editorials printed on 
the front page of the last or first issue of the year. In the first year-end issue of 1997, Jiang Yiping 
wrote a signed editorial on the cover page (26 Dec 1996). Jiang addressed readers as “thousands 
of strange ‘you’” and exhorted the strength of “the powerless.” The practice presented its formal 
debut in 1999, where the New Year editorial was printed on top of the cover page and signed 
with the collective byline “Our Newsroom,” a ritual that has lasted until today.   
Titled “The Strength that Never Fails to Bring Us into Tears,” the piece later became the 
widely quoted statement of Southern Weekend on its journalism of the time. Written in an 
essayist style and sentimental in tone, the short piece raised “truth” [zhenshi], “justice” [zhengyi], 
and “love” [ai] in three consecutive paragraphs opened by the identical sentence that “nothing 
can truly touch people except.” The word remen, plainly the plural form of “human,” was used 
instead of renmin, the one used almost exclusively in referring to the national political identity 
(e.g. Chinese people). More importantly, the notion of social justice was invoked in addressing  
the powerless and a moral community in the post-1989 Chinese society: 
We are rooting for you because your hope is our hope and your hardship our hardship. We saw you 
raising your hue, we saw you laboring with your scythe; we saw you sweating all day, we saw you filling 
up your own barn; we saw you drifting from place to place, we saw you grieving in tears; we saw you 
fighting against all odds, we saw you rebuilding your own home; we saw you being laid-off, we saw you 
crunching your teeth; we saw you going through the storms, and we saw you showing a smile…we were 
watching you and rooting for you because we are part of you.  
(Southern Weekend, 1 Jan 1999: 1) 
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The well-claimed editorial indeed gave a snapshot of the “realities” Southern Weekend 
produced and popularized during this time. The powerless in the row of six scenarios, including 
peasants, migrant workers, the involuntarily re-located, and laid-off workers, represented the 
disenfranchised social groups in the rapid social stratification within China’s rising state 
capitalism.  
As the editorial voice gained increasing weight in the newspaper, ironically, the legacy of 
literary intellectuals speaking for the disenfranchised yet using a different language was revived. 
The noticeable dichotomy between “you” and “we” in this editorial also hinted at elitism. This 
was, indeed, the other end of its popular journalism in addressing the ordeals of ordinary people 
when the historical consciousness of intellectual-officials was invoked. A reader who wrote to 
Southern Weekend  in the year of 2000 seemed to be expressing such an irony: 
Since last year or this one, I have felt that the news section is less friendly and vivid as it used to be. Your 
news is going to the right direction, but your tone is arrogant. On the Aug 24th issue, for example, the 
captions of the headline photo made me uncomfortable where it printed “anger and eulogy,” “confession 
and boundaries,” “president and soldiers,” “loyalty and betrayal,” “war and peace”… The seemingly 
noble language is indeed sensational. 
(Southern Weekend, 26 Oct 2000: 30).  
The development of the newsroom in Southern Weekend in the late 1990s, in sum, relocated 
the newspaper from the cultural realm toward the center of national life and grounded it by the 
investigative work of reporters. Compared to the Party dailies, its “politics of compassion” (Sun, 
2001) addressed the changing society in much more substantiated and humane details. In just a 
few years, it won its popularity among post-Mao intellectuals, government officials, university 
students, the politically informed, and also marginal social groups in “worrying about 
China” (Davies, 2007) at the national level; compared to the rising metro newspapers that 
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situated journalism within everyday urban life from weather forecasts to water supply, Southern 
Weekend maintained a national purview and the moral energy of traditional intellectuals, making 
it closer to a “China’s weekend” (9 Feb 1996: 15) than other regional newspapers.  
Returning to “news” 
Investigative reports faced all kinds of resistance. Pre-publication resistance mostly came 
from the investigative process since official sources and statistics, if available, were notoriously 
unreliable in China. Zeng Huaguo, an investigative journalist from Xinhua News Agency, 
recalled that the most reliable informants were local taxi drivers while information obtained from 
governmental departments was scarce if not misleading (Zeng, 2006: 35). In most challenging 
situations, journalists could face a hidden alliance between profiteering local bureaucrats and 
private interests as well as a silenced local media. Investigative techniques, in a sense, were 
essential to uncover stories and information when “most governmental officials are not yet used 
to being supervised; most media are not yet used to if not afraid of doing the work” (Zhang, 
2002: 67). Though some investigative work rode on governmental initiatives in top-down 
campaigns—so-called killing the “dead tiger”—and seemed opportunistic in winning public 
accountability and market appeal at the same time, regular production of investigative reports 
was indeed a precarious and expensive enterprise.  
Post-publication resistance, on the other hand, came from both private interests and the 
Party-state. The most visible yet probably the least harmful one was retail buyout as a means to 
control or disrupt the distribution of the newspaper. In July 1999, Southern Weekend published 
an in-depth cover story on the booming network of private STD clinics in Taiyuan, Shanxi 
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province (9 Jul 1999: 1). The story was written by its reporter Guo Guosong as a follow-up to a 
local newspaper Urban Life [dushi shenghuo] in Taiyuan, which first broke the story and 
received a death threat. Guo’s report unveiled the connections among the overwhelming STD 
clinic ads in local media, the tacit endorsement of the local government, and the rent-seeking 
public hospitals and research institutions. As soon as the newspaper was published, the 
newsroom received telephone calls from Taiyuan readers to complain that either they could not 
find the newspaper on newsstands or it was sold at a raised retail price. The distribution 
department, too, began to receive similar complaints from subscribers in Taiyuan area about the 
abnormal delay of delivery. In response, editor-in-chief Jiang Yiping wrote an editorial in the 
following issue. Titled “Whose feathers were ruffled by yulun jiandu,” her column also revealed 
a similar case in 1997, when Southern Weekend investigated a heavily advertised thermo 
massager and was later bought in wholesale in multiple cities as soon as the copies got on 
newsstands (16 May 1997: 1).  
Compared to retail control, backdoor censorship from the Party-state and post-publication 
punishment were much less known in comparable details. After all, it is possible to justify 
investigative reports against private interests, like Jiang’s editorial suggested, by the rationale of 
yulun jiandu in Party journalism. These occasions could also serve as marketing strategies for the 
newspaper. But it was out of the question to publish any complaints on state censorship. 
However, news reports with verifiable information may have arguably contributed to backdoor 
censorship since they could not be as easily falsified on the ground of accuracy as the case of 
Police Raid in 1994. The battle with the MII at the point of its establishment, for instance, came 
with a top-down request to replace Cao Xihong and other two editors (Yan, 2007). Both Cao 
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Xihong and Yan Lieshan  began to use pseudonyms with the acquiescence of the newsroom since 
late 1998. For the general public, such backdoor struggles and negotiation with central 
governmental departments were usually signaled by the relocation of senior editors. In 2000, 
Jiang Yiping was removed from her leadership in Southern Weekend by the Provincial 
Propaganda Department of Guangdong. The purge, soon involving the interim editor-in-chief 
Qian Gang and deputy chief editor Chen Mingyang, was widely considered as “the end of an 
era” for investigative journalism of the weekly newspaper. Later, Jiang Yiping was appointed to 
take charge other subsidiaries within the news group, including 21st Century World Herald [21 
shiji huanqiu baodao] and Southern Metro News, and was removed from her posts in 2003 and 
2008, respectively, under top-down pressure.  
On the other hand, bureaucratic resistance from regional levels was easier to discern than 
from the central one. Backed by institutional support and a protective leadership, the national 
distribution and political influence of Southern Weekend in the late 1990s invoked frequent 
backlash from the targeted departments. As seen in the case of Taiyuan STD clinics, the external 
investigation was a potential threat to local officials and their bureaucratic careers. Local 
protectionism, as many have pointed out (Cho, 2007: 210-215; Zhao, 2004), was a formidable 
barrier to cross-provincial reporting despite the market appeal of such stories and strategic 
endorsement from the central government. In such new reporting space, the absence of 
institutional contact or norm between the press and cross-provincial governments also brought 
the power struggle to different channels. When it stayed within the political system, like the case 
of Police Raid, complaints from targeted departments would most likely be sent to central 
departments which exerted direct political power to punish the press; if the conflict entered 
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judicial procedures, similar to the case of Chen Maya, chances were dubious for the “intruding” 
journalists and press when the local court, neither an autonomous institution from the Party state 
yet, was sandwiched between an out-of-province newspaper and local political and economic 
interests; in extreme cases involving criminal or other social groups with even less legal, 
economic, or bureaucratic connections, investigative journalists could find themselves under 
violent threats against their personal safety. Some such stories later went into crime fictions 
written by former investigative journalists (e.g. Guo, 2014; Shi, 2011). 
Compared to external predicaments, much less discussed were the struggles from within the 
press on investigative reporting. Yan Lieshan, the editor of “Current Affairs,” had expressed 
similar feelings with a paranoid reader: 
Two years ago when I started the column of news commentary, I thought that I was raising new and 
unique questions in writing pieces like “Power Capital,” “The Red and the Black,” “Professional Killer” 
and felt anxious about being accused. By now, however, the exposure on governmental corruption and 
judicial failure had fed our appetite to an unprecedented degree; bureaucratic transactions, assassinations, 
collaboration between police and criminals…seem to have become the normal social scenario…What 
should intellectuals like us do? I have no answer. 
(Yan Lieshan, 2002) 
It is possible to suggest that the “normal social scenario” of corruption in popular journalism 
was losing ground partly due to its own market success and political influence. In a few years, its 
moral voice seemed to have exhausted its explanatory power if not market appeal. Despite its 
narrative strength and increasing accountability, it was reminiscent of the perennial story 
between the corrupted official [guan] and the powerless people [min] in voluminous literature 
produced in Imperial China. The ability of speaking for the powerless as traditional intellectuals 
in promoting social change, in the end, was powerless without either the imagination or channels 
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of civil engagement. Yuezhi Zhao (2004) might have gone too far in arguing that in the absence 
of alliances from independent citizen groups and oppositional parties, investigative journalism 
could only lapse into a lapdog if not underdog in the final analysis. After all, critical exposure 
had offered a distinctly different social picture—an alternative basis of public discussion—for an 
extended readership. But it is still revealing when a reader wrote to Southern Weekend in 2001 
and expressed similar sentiment with the editor Yan Lieshan: “You are my favorite newspaper. 
However, I have not been reading it for a long time because I have no ability to help any of the 
ill-fated people you have reported except for praying for them…You have all done what you 
could do by reporting on it” (21 Jun 2001).  
Finally, the growing emphasis on professionalism also began to question the “truth” as 
filtered by the moral voice of Southern Weekend. In 2002, Zhao Jing (also known as Michael 
Anti), a journalist and later independent blogger, criticized narrative journalism represented by 
Southern Weekend for its subjective voice and intellectual politics. Unlike Jiang Yiping’s 
editorial published only three years ago which juxtaposed “truthfulness” and “true emotion” in 
journalism, Anti’s subscription to Western standards instead called for a radical departure from 
the moral tone: 
[They] remind me of the reportage literature of the 1980s…That’s why the technical standards in Western 
journalism on verifiability and balance are important; in such a quickly changing society, facts are noble 
and sexy par excellence without any literary touches…The era of Confucius journalists [xinwen rujia] 
has past. We are in a complicated world with all kinds of interests groups and struggles. Journalists have 
no more power and are only a group of lonely practitioners looking for truth in the jungle. 
(Anti, 2002: 69) 
Such criticism against the investigative reporting of Southern Weekend, however, was 
controversial. The moral obligation of journalists does not have to advance at the expense of the 
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technical standards in Western journalism on verifiability and balance. Journalists’ value 
judgments can reflect the community consensus on values; it can also represent active moral 
agency in individual news stories as empirically grounded observation—what Glasser and 
Ettema had called “objecification of moral standards” (1989). If journalists of Southern Weekend 
drew on the historical moral order of Confucius intellectuals, what Jiang Yiping later called “an 
unconscious defect” (Zhang, 2008), which community Michael Anti’s criticism was speaking to 
should be further examined. 
Southern Weekend embarked on a few radical adjustments in 2002. The most visible one was 
the establishment of the new section of “City” [cheng shi], which was only distributed in Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Guangzhou, the three megacities. The urban shift in journalism and distribution 
signaled the final stage of its paradigmatic transformation toward a new genre of national and 
political journalism in a much more controlled style of writing. As Xiang Xi, the successor of 
Jiang Yiping commented, “Excessive moral judgment made us a ‘media bible’; we are aiming at 
a return to news” (Shi, 2002). 
Conclusion 
Compared to the 1980s, it seems ironic that editors found its critical voice on Southern 
Weekend when the newsroom was quickly dominated by reporters, whose work turned yulun 
jiandu in Party journalism and reportage literature into institutional practices without changing 
much of its moral impetus. Yulun jiandu or the “supervision by public opinion” in Party 
journalism justified the exposure of social problems; political role of traditional intellectuals 
renewed its critical lens in observing and interpreting the changing Chinese society; and the 
!178
national market of the newspaper also made cross-provincial reporting a possible strategy. In 
essence, investigative reporting is a form of non-fictional storytelling that displayed a close 
moral distance with the powerless in social conflicts; it extended the social world well beyond 
average Chinese’s daily experiences in consistent accounts. Collectively, investigative journalism 
became a panorama of “bad news” in verifiable details and was made accessible to a national 
readership.  
The compassion and sense of social justice that spelt out in the collective efforts to cover the 
various powerless groups in an insufficiently regulated market economy also indicated a critical 
moment of cultural change. Despite their diminishing voices, the readers served by Southern 
Weekend in its cross provincial investigative stories were better informed about the price of the 
post-Tiananmen market reform; they knew it from the hard-won and well-told stories, and they 
also felt it from the voices filled with “true emotions.” These were, no doubt, the “right” stories 
for readers who shared similar moral indignation with the newsroom. The construction of a 
moral community caring for the powerless, on the other hand, renewed the role of the intellectual 
in public life as the legitimate speaker. In spite of its instant market success, reader disaffection 
and professional development over time as well as—and perhaps most importantly—its 
vulnerability at times of political and market censorship prompted reconsiderations of editorial 
strategies for future development of the press.  
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PART III 
The urban press by the early 2000s had become powerful media institutions. Supported by 
state policies, the Southern Press Media Group (formerly Southern Daily News Group) and the 
other two Party press groups in Guangzhou invested heavily to maintain their structural 
dominance in the regional and national market. Institutionalization of the Party press, on the 
other hand, coincided with the divergence of metro news and more serious political reporting. 
Ironically, Southern Weekend shifted away from “speaking for the powerless” while turning to 
the last uncharted realm of post-Mao popular journalism: politics.   
Chapter 5 deals with the contemporary Guangzhou press again within its social conditions; it 
analyzes political reporting in relation to the intensifying regulatory power, market 
concentration, and corporate control over news production. In the end, it leads up to the final 
discussion on “Party-popular” that, within three decades of marketization, whose voice(s) and 
experiences the press has been organizing around and what determined that.    
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CHAPTER 5  
MAKING THE NEW MAINSTREAM PRESS 
Compared to the first decade and a half of the post-Mao reform, the turn of the twentieth 
century for the Chinese press has been marked conspicuously by state regulation in consolidating 
the newspaper sector. Beginning in 1996 when Guangzhou Daily, a most profitable media 
institutions since 1992, was hand-picked by the SPPA to establish the first news group in 
mainland China, newspaper commercialization entered the stage of conglomeration centered 
around the profitable Party press (Zhao, 2000; Lee et al., 2006). Both of the other two 
Guangzhou Party newspapers, Southern Daily and Yangcheng Evening News, followed suit in 
1998. By the end of 2004, 39 newspaper groups were founded in China, accounting for 17 
percent of total newspaper titles nationwide yet printing 56 percent of  Chinese newspapers 
(Min, 2006).  
In 1999, follow-up campaigns on press regulation continued, requiring structural shutdown 
or hand-over [hua zhuan] of smaller newspapers to local Party papers and press groups (SPPA, 
2001). For the “newspaper trio,” the new century began with a blessing. 
5.1 Regulations and Deregulations 
 In 2003, the central government began a national campaign to regulate the newspaper 
market further toward centralization that, in a few years, legitimized the Party press groups as the 
major players in the newspaper market (GAPP, 2006: 465-472). The directive issued in June by 
the General Administration of Press and Publication or GAPP (formerly SPPA) problematized 
subscription by public institutions that, in practice, has been imposed as taxing categories on 
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subordinate departments and deteriorated the financial health of lower level Party-state units 
especially in rural areas. The new policy stipulated that, as a form of state subsidy, public 
subscription would be made available only to two central titles, two provincial titles for each 
province, and one municipal newspaper for each municipality. Newspapers sponsored by various 
governmental units and departments below the municipal level—rarely financially afloat—were 
either to be shut down or handed over to Party press groups. The campaign involved 1,452 
newspapers and journals; 677 of them, including 282 newspapers, were shutdown (Southern 
Weekend, 21 Aug 2003; Ten Headlines, 2004).  
The policy package toward a re-centralized model of newspaper production intensified in 
2003, on the other hand, included further relaxation for these media groups to deepen market 
practices. Thirty-five media institutions, including four newspapers (groups), were selected to 
experiment with cross-provincial mergers and cross-media production. Beijing Youth Daily, for 
instance, had set up a joint firm with Beida Jade Bird Group, a state-owned high-tech company 
affiliated with Beijing (Peking) University, to take charge of its distribution, advertising, and 
branding; and later became the the first Chinese press listed on the Hong Kong stock market 
(Zhang, 2014).  
The trend of capital investment, acquisition, merger, and diversifying financing schemes, 
however, went beyond the selected few. The Beijing News [xin jing bao], for example, was co-
founded in 2003 by Southern Daily News Group and Guangming Daily Press Group in Beijing 
as the first cross-provincial newspaper venture in mainland China. The First Financial Daily 
[diyi caijing ribao], similarly, was a joint venture launched by three news groups including 
Guangzhou Daily, Shanghai Wenhui-Xinmin United Press Group, and Beijing Youth Daily in 
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2004, targeting urban areas of Beijing, Tianjin, Yangtze River Delta (Shanghai area), and the 
Pearl River Delta (Wu & Zhu, 2006).  Media marketization, if still largely initiated in a bottom-
up fashion in the first two decades of reform, the unleashed interests of its forerunners seemed to 
have increasingly converged with top-down mandates in having “bigger and stronger” media 
institutions within Party control. As Yuezhi Zhao argued forcefully in her early observation, the 
press conglomerate was viewed as “the ideal organizational form for optimal integration between 
propaganda and business” (Zhao, 2000: 16).  
By 2005, top-down regulation of the newspaper market and institutional reform had been 
extended to the cultural sector as a whole. For the press nationwide, state policies further 
categorized newspapers and journals into two major groups: (1) the Party press and other 
political publications would stay as social enterprises [shi ye] and continued to receive state 
support; (2) newspapers and journals with non-political content such as culture, art, lifestyle, and 
science will move toward market enterprises [qi ye] (Hu, 2006: 15). Press regulations, while 
replete with temporary directives for over two decades under Deng Xiaoping’s template of 
“groping the stones while crossing the river” in advancing economic reform, was again quick to 
catch up with media development on the ground (SPPA 1991, 1997).  
At the end of 2005, “Regulations for the Administration of Newspaper Publication” [baozhi 
chuban guanli guiding] was issued to replace the temporary regulations of 1990. In general, the 
new regulation adopted a much more technical approach (and language) in rationalizing 
licensing, publishing, management, and legal responsibilities of the press. In order to reinforce 
the state (sponsor)-press (publisher) relationship regarding especially the increasing cross-
provincial initiatives, the 2005 regulations added that in case of multiple publishers [zhuban 
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danwei], there should be a major publisher [zhuyao zhuban danwei]; and it must be a subordinate 
department of its governmental sponsor therefore within the same administrative jurisdiction. 
This policy, simply put, worked on the institutional level to strengthen bureaucratic affiliation 
with market expansion of the press. On the editorial level, similarly, the central government 
reinstated in multiple documents and proceedings to ban cross-provincial reporting especially on 
breaking news, and to make sure that media institutions comply with administrative boundaries 
in news production (Cui, 2006). It should be noted, however, that these regulatory efforts were 
largely supported by, if not came from, regional governments. Earlier in 2005, seventeen 
provincial and municipal governments, including Guangdong, signed a joint petition to ban 
cross-provincial reporting (Wang, 2009: 150-153).  
Among other things, it was clear that the potential alignment of interests between major news 
groups and the central and regional governments increased. In particular, as small and 
unprofitable publications were being weeded out, their licenses were handed over to local news 
groups at no cost. In the case of Guangzhou, Guangdong Price [guangdong jiage bao] and 
Modern Sports [xiandai tiyu bao] were given to Southern Daily News Group; Guangzhou-Hong 
Kong Information Daily [yuegang xinxi ribao], Guangdong Commerce [guangdong gongshang 
bao], and Guangdong Manufacturing [guangdong jianshe bao] went into the hands of 
Yangcheng Evening News Group; Information Times [xinxi shibao] and the well-known 
magazine Southern Window [nanfeng chuang] were absorbed by Guangzhou Daily. By August 
2010, 49 press groups have been founded in mainland China with Guangzhou Daily Press Group 
and Southern Press Media Group ranked the first and fourth, respectively, most profitable press 
groups in China (CJY, 2011: 489-491). The Southern Press Media Group, in particular, was 
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ranked the third among the 500 Top Chinese Brands in 2010 following only CCTV and Phoenix 
TV, and was followed by People’s Daily in the estimated value of its brand name. Approaching 
the fourth decade of the post-Mao reform, the market had installed its legitimacy not only in 
national policies but also material and symbolic orders. 
The news monitoring network 
Top-down consolidation and deregulation of the media sector, in addition, have been 
accompanied by a parallel development of control in news production. In contrast to the well 
known fact that Chinese newspapers are under censorship, how censorship works and has 
changed has eluded serious attention until recently (e.g. Brady 2008). The common negligence 
has supported a seemingly ironic “two sides of the same coin” story regarding governmental 
actions in unleashing market liberalization on one hand and restricting content diversification on 
the other; but it has failed to explain that, in fact, the growing network of censorship has been an 
evolving institutional environment of the press—and just like the press—within the similar logic 
of post-Mao modernization since the 1990s. 
There are two regulatory bodies of the press, the propaganda system and the administrative 
departments of press and publication, which embodied the joint power structure of the Party-
state. On the central level, the two systems were represented by the Central Propaganda 
Department (CPD) and the GAPP even though the latter, in fact, was headed by the former 
(Brady, 2008: 11).  
In the post-Mao era, the propaganda departments have transformed enormously toward a 
“modern, systematic, standardized system of control in the propaganda sphere” especially during 
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the post-Tiananmen period (Brady, 2008: 49) as a response to the rapid expansion of media 
outlets. In the 1980s, as discussed in chapter 1 on the tabloid “scandal” in Guangzhou and, in 
chapter 2, the private publishing market and Hong Kong TV,  regulatory efforts were constant 
but often approached in a case-by-case or campaign manner. The crisis of Police Raid 
experienced by Southern Weekend in 1994, for example, caught the eyes of the Ministry of 
Public Security, not any regulatory units, who followed up with the press and later urged the 
CPD to issue the shutdown. You Yanling, then the editor-in-chief of Southern Weekend, recalled 
that the heavy-handed punishment was partly because “we have not introduced our newspaper to 
the officials in the CPD” and so quickly set himself on such a mission to Beijing (You, 2013: 
164- 173). The whole struggle around the crisis in 1994 involved press leaders, Guangdong 
officials in the provincial government, the provincial propaganda department, the provincial 
press and publication administration [xinwen chuban ju], and the CPD. None of them, however, 
played the exclusive role as an institutional censor.  
Looking at its post-1989 development, Brady (2008) made a strong case on the “rebirth” of 
the propaganda system in China. In addition to the growing personnel and internal units, the 
CPD began the “news monitoring groups” [xinwen yueping xiaozu] in 1994, where retired party 
members who formerly held positions in propaganda, media, cultural or publishing institutions 
were re-employed to monitor news content in media. The news monitoring group selectively 
surveyed newspapers on central and regional levels, published the News Review [xinwen 
yueping], and sent it to Party officials on central and provincial levels (Liu, 2012). Since 1997, 
news monitoring groups have also been set up in regional propaganda departments to follow 
similar practices in post-publication monitoring. In 1998, the CPD officially changed its English-
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language translation to Central Publicity Department and began to use more and more terms like 
“political communication” or “information” instead of propaganda [xuan chuan] (Brady, 2008: 
71-2). 
The CPD also oversees several administrative offices, including the Ministry of Culture, the 
General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP), and the State Administration of Radio, 
Film, and Television (SARFT). The press, as mentioned above, was supervised by both the 
regional propaganda department and regional offices of the GAPP, which have developed a close 
relationship with the local press in day-to-day production under the guidelines of the CPD and 
the GAPP. As early as 1988, the SPPA required its regional branches to set up “readers” [shendu 
yuan] to monitor newspapers, periodicals, and books under their own jurisdiction (GAPP, 2006). 
The regional press and publication bureaus were asked to submit a reading report [shendu 
baogao] every six months to their corresponding units of the SPPA. Later, the discourses and 
practices of censorship gradually became more and more elaborate. On March 20, 1995, the 
SPPA issued the “Regulatory Criteria on Newspaper Quality” [baozhi zhiliang guanli biaozhun], 
and adopted a grading rubric on a one-hundred point scale to evaluate newspapers. Newspapers 
without a passing grade (60 points) in annual evaluation would face immediate probation or 
shutdown. The rubric contained five general categories: 
(1) Editorial policies and guidance of public opinion (30 points); 
(2) Publishing qualifications (20 points); 
(3) Overall evaluation on newspaper content (30 points); 
(4) Quality of advertising (10 points); 
(5) Social reputations (10 points).  
(GAPP, 2003: 151-3) 
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While most of the categories above remained largely vague (i.e. what defines “social 
reputations”?) and resembled the 1988 regulation, the only category broken down into grading 
criteria was in content (No.3), which contained qualifications in accuracy, readability, proportion 
of news, language, column/page setting, proofreading, and printing quality. For the proportion of 
news, broadsheet newspapers were required to reach a minimum of seven news items (including 
news, photos, and features) per page and at least ten for the front page; tabloid-size papers should 
have an average of five news stories with no less than seven on the front page. What required 
some more attention in the 1995 mandate, nonetheless, is that newspaper circulation was 
incorporated into the evaluation as a prerequisite or “life or death” qualification. After an initial 
two years of publication, circulation was required to reach 100,000 for provincial newspapers, 
30,000 for municipal papers, and 10,000 for county papers. “As a mass medium,” the rationale 
went that, “newspaper circulation should reach a proportional level of readership regarding its 
professionalization and target audience.”  
 The institutionalization of regulations, personnel, and finance of news censorship was 
organized through several other pushes in the early 2000s. The reviewers informally hired in the 
1990s became formal positions on the regional level in 2001 and 2002 (Ruo, 2006). In the 2005 
regulation of newspaper publication, the current document in use, news monitoring was officially 
installed in the annual evaluation process of newspapers in legislation. Reading reports became 
the legal responsibility of the GAPP (entry No. 48); and reader-censors [shendu yuan] were 
required not only in the regional branch of the GAPP but also inside the press, which in fact 
imposed pre-publication censorship on news production. The new regulation of 2005, in sum, 
instituted systematic censorship, which was previously guided by sporadic directives, into day-
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to-day news production. For the bigger and richer Chinese newspapers, increased market 
concentration has been constitutive of—not external to—state control in its institutional 
evolvement. 
5.2 Corporate Initiatives 
Not surprisingly, the top-down mandate of press consolidation was welcomed and pushed 
aggressively by the Party press groups and their growing subsidiaries. Newly-added titles of 
newspapers and magazines were largely dominated by investment within press groups. Founded 
in May 1998, the Southern Daily News Group had taken advantage of the granted dominance 
and began to expand its media outlets at a dazzling speed. While Southern Weekend and Southern 
Metropolis News were its only post-Mao establishments during the pre-corporate stage, it 
founded 6 newspapers and 10 magazines between 1998 and 2011 (Figure 5.1). In 2003, Southern 
Daily News Group aligned with Guangming Daily Press Group in Beijing to establish the first 
cross-provincial newspaper enterprise, The Beijing News [xin jing bao] (Zhang & Liang, 2004, 
Han, 2004). In July 2005, Southern Daily News Group further integrated the multiple 
subsidiaries now across media sectors and changed its name to Southern Press Media Group 
[nanfang baoye chuanmei jituan] (Fan, 2006), which by now owns 11 newspapers, 10 
magazines, 6 websites, one publisher, and a dozen new media apps. 
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Table 5.1  Major Publications of Southern Daily News Group  
(Southern Press Media Group since 2005) 
Publication Year of Est. Content/Type
Newspapers Southern Daily 1949 Provincial Party daily
Southern Rural News 1963 Rural newspaper
Southern Weekend 1984 Weekly subsidiary
Southern Metropolis News 1997 Metro newspaper
21st Century Business Herald 2001 Business newspaper 
New Beijing News [xin jing bao] 2003 Daily newspaper, joint-venture with 
Guangming Daily in Beijing
Magazines Southern Metropolis Weekly [nan du zhou kan]
2006 News and entertainment 
Trend Weekly  
[feng shang zhou bao]
2006 Fashion, urban culture (ceased 
publication in 2014)
Money Weekly  
[li cai zhou bao]
2007 Financial news
City Pictorial [chengshi huabao] 1999 Youth culture
Agriculture Fortune 
[nong cai baodian]
2001 Agricultural market news
Mangazine [ming pai] 2003 High-end men’s magazine
Southern People’s Weekly 
[nanfang renwu zhoukan]
2004 News & interviews of political, 
economic, and other social elites 
21st Century Business Review 2004 Business news magazine
South [nan fang] 2006 A monthly journal of the provincial 
Party Committee
Business Travel  
[shangwu lüxing]
2007 Consumption magazine
The First Consumption 
[di yi xiao fei]
2009 Consumption magazine, free 
distribution
China Fortune  
[zhongguo caifu]
2011 News on non-profit organizations in 
China
Across [chuan yue] 2011 Monthly magazine on tourism
!190
In stark contrast to the rapid expansion of media groups, the total number of newspaper 
outlets in mainland China stagnated. On both national and provincial levels, that is, the growth of 
newspapers stabilized around the early 2000s. Newspaper production was characterized by 
internal expansion within the press groups by merging, collaboration, or establishing 
subsidiaries. For Southern Daily News Group, the first three post-Mao subsidiaries—Southern 
Weekend, Southern Metropolis News, and 21st Century Business Herald, all developed their 
second-tiered subsidiaries and brands. A degree of internal diversification of news content within 
news groups, indeed, has been prompted by the market considerations of the corporate press. 
Voice of the publisher 
The establishment of news groups led by the Party press in Chinese urban areas has 
tremendous implications. In Shenzhen and Shanghai, the printing press acted quickly to 
eliminate local competition. No longer merely a mediator between its popular subsidiaries and 
governmental sponsor, news groups became active decision makers that coordinated the 
newsroom with its growing business departments and initiatives. Corporate branding, for the 
most obvious, was introduced to negotiate an integrated identity for the multiplying subsidiaries 
and stratifying readership.  
Now a member of the news group, similar trends have been noticeable in Southern Weekend 
since the early 2000s. The public image of the newspaper, for instance, became increasingly 
manipulated outside its newsroom based on market considerations. The weekly newspaper set up 
a branding office in 2002, which later expanded into a marketing department, to initiate 
marketing campaigns since, according to its director, the newspaper “is not modern 
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enough” (Liu, 2003; 2004). The branding campaign began in 2002 invested nearly 10 million 
Yuan (approximately $1.5 million) to “upgrade the brand” [tisheng pinpai]. A set of advertising 
strategies were developed to manipulate the publicity of Southern Weekend as well as to cross-
promote other subsidiaries of the news group. In September 2002, for instance, a quarter-page 
advertisement addressing to “6,000,000 intellectual readers” was released, portraying its readers 
for the first time in unprecedented detail. The upper market appeal was spelled out in four 
sentences: “our readers think; our readers take responsibilities; our readers have resources; our 
readers shape the development of China.” (Southern Weekend, 26 Sept 2002: D28).  The news 
group, rather than editors or journalists, gained a louder and louder voice in the newspaper and in 
connecting to its readers. 
Other marketing measures went beyond the advertising spaces to promote the newspaper as a 
commodity in urban life. The long-term middle columns printed between two pages, including 
the one for readers’ letters [du bian wang lai], were eliminated, leaving the newspaper with more 
blank spaces as part of its visual style. In crimson color and a double frame, its masthead and 
section titles were all printed as stamped by traditional seals to signify “perseverance, passion, 
depth, and rationality” (28 Mar 2002: 24). To become a “modern” newspaper, Southern Weekend 
also followed Southern Daily, the parent paper, and narrowed the width of the newspaper in 2002 
to 680mm. It was explained in the front page column that “the current ratio of length and 
width…is the closest to the ‘golden ratio’ among domestic newspapers. This ‘golden newspaper 
size’ [huangjin baoxing] has been adopted by many well-known foreign newspapers.” (24 Oct 
2002: A1). The benefit, as it explained, was that “now you do not need to fold it like reading the 
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previous broadsheet newspapers; it is more comfortable to read in limited spaces such as on the 
plane, in subway or on a bus. Meanwhile, the newspaper stays straight in your hands.”  
The considerations of changing social spaces for newspaper reading (no longer in the study 
room of Party officials or other domestic spaces) spoke to a desirable attachment with an 
urbanizing society and lifestyles. The marketing metaphor of “staying straight,” on the other 
hand, also alluded to journalistic integrity. In the following issue, Southern Weekend printed 
excerpts from readers’ letters that praised the new paper for “standing up straight…as it always 
has been as a newspaper with social responsibilities that tells the truth without ‘bowing’ to any 
distortions” (31 Oct 2002: C24).  
For the newsroom, corporate considerations brought in new initiatives most evidently in 
establishing second-tiered subsidiaries. Southern Weekend, Southern Metropolis News, and 21st 
Century Business Herald, the three major subsidiaries of Southern Daily, turned to be the 
incubator of a third generation newspapers and magazines and began to develop their own line of 
branding strategies. Southern Weekend launched Mangazine [ming pai], a high-end lifestyle 
magazine for men in 2003, and Southern People’s Weekly [nanfang renwu zhoukan] in 2004 that 
became known for its in-depth interviews. The development of the newspaper, in short, was 
incorporated into the considerations of the marketing department and corporate strategies.  
The urban turn 
A side effect of press conglomeration beginning in the late 1990s was in its socio-spatial 
reconfigurations of news production. Normally established in capital cities during Mao’s time, 
Party press groups and the increasingly elaborate system of regulation have contributed to the 
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urban bias in newspaper production and distribution. In fact, the urban turn in the post-Mao 
economy since the mid-1990s was so significant that some described it as taking a separate path 
from the reform beginning in the late 1970s (Huang, 2008). In 1998, 36 newspapers (groups) 
accounted for more than 70 percent of national advertising sales; among them, the press in 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong province alone accounted for more than 48 percent of the 
national share in 2002 (Xu, 2002; Jia, 2003). After the regulatory campaign in 2003, in 
particular, county-level newspapers dropped to unprecedented insignificance. By 2005, the 
majority of Chinese newspapers were provincial (41.8%) and municipal (44%) rather than of the 
central (11.3%) or county level (2.8%). Guangdong, especially, printed one hundred titles or the 
most newspapers among all provinces (Wang, 2005). The rising urban-based economy of China 
has become a defining factor of newspaper development and expansion.  
The urban turn, on the other hand, is further aggravated by Party-state bureaucracy in which 
the press has been kept. In cities where a single governmental body resided, in particular, the 
trend of re-centralization has encountered even less difficulties (Lee, ..). In both Shenzhen and 
Shanghai, mergers of major newspapers under top-down mandate resulted in a glaring degree of 
concentration—if not monopoly. In Shanghai, after the merger of Wen-hui and Xin-min 
newspaper groups in 1998, the “newspaper duo”—Wen-Xin and Jiefang Press Group—
accounted for 90 percent of local advertising sales (Xu: 2002, Wu & Zhu, 2006). In Beijing and 
Guangzhou, where official sponsorship of newspapers was split between central-municipal and 
provincial-municipal levels, competitions intensified among the few oligarchies. The Guangzhou 
Party “trio” had all become multimedia conglomerates in publishing newspapers, magazines, 
books, and also news websites.   
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The increasing urban and rural divide in press development was seen most conspicuously 
with the rise of metro newspapers as a response to the growing urban populations and a market 
society. Income disparities in China’s post-Mao industrialization drove not only the surplus rural 
labor but also university graduates of rural origins to look for a place in urban spaces. As the 
migrant population increased, how to navigate the sprawling city became an immediate agenda 
for both local residents and migrants. In Guangzhou, the Southern Metropolis News launched in 
1995 and the New Express [xin kuai bao] founded by Yangcheng Evening News in 1998 were 
both such attempts to situate journalism within a changing urban population of both locals and 
migrants. Unlike Party dailies or evening and weekly newspapers, metro newspapers provided 
their readers with an unfolding landscape of urban living as a “department store of 
information” (China Newspaper Industry, 2005). Southern Metropolis News, especially, had 
expanded quickly from 16 to 88 pages on timely reports of city news and lively entertainment. A 
sharing identity of “urbanites” [shi min], including local and migrant residents or “ultimate 
individuals with self-interests” and their everyday life, began to be articulated by the metro 
newspapers (Sun, 2001; Sun, 2008). 
Reporting the immediacy of urban life had led to the expansion of reporting areas that 
targeted predominantly the urban regions. As a pioneer, Guangzhou Daily set up a page on the 
Pearl River Delta in 1996 to extend its news reporting from Guangzhou to central Guangdong 
areas. For Southern Metro News, regional news and life-style sections targeting Shenzhen and 
other cities in the Pearl River Delta were added rapidly since the early 2000s (Zhang, 2006: 31). 
In 2002 Yangcheng Evening News began to publish separate bi-weekly sections for Foshan and 
Dongguan, two satellite cities near Guangzhou. The provincial Party paper Southern Daily 
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established its Pearl River Delta News Center as a separate department in 2003 to expand on 
regional reporting. Even the central newspaper People’s Daily responded by publishing Eastern 
China [hua dong] and Southern China [hua nan] versions in the mid- and late 1990s. Headed by 
the metro newspapers and supported by the corporate press, the urban turn of newspapers 
manifested in newspaper journalism a rapidly stratifying society and imbalanced economic 
development of China in the post-Tiananmen era.  
5.3 Newsroom in Control 
As the most recent genre of popular journalism since the mid-1990s, metro newspapers 
displayed distinctive market appeal and geographical distribution. Beginning with Western-
China Metro News [huaxi dushi bao] launched in Chengdu, Sichuan province in 1995, metro 
newspapers grew exponentially with the growing population in urban areas (Huang, 2001). 
Southern Metropolis News [nanfang dushi bao], launched in 1995, was the second subsidiary of 
Southern Daily that won immense market success after Southern Weekend. By 2005, there were 
132 metro newspapers nationwide; and 62.6 percent of Chinese newspaper publishers located in 
36 major cities across the country (Zhou, 2006: 419).  
Compared to Party dailies, evening newspapers, and weekend papers, a prominent aspect of 
metro newspapers was their aggressive page expansions in competing for urban advertisers and 
eye-catching news stories. The war on numbers quickly involved other newspapers in the city. In 
February 2004, for instance, the average published pages for major Guangzhou newspapers 
were: Yangcheng Evening News (35p); New Express (20p); Guangzhou Daily (56p); Information 
Times (64p); Southern Daily (23p); and Southern Metropolis News (88) (Deng, 2005: 11). 
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Among them, Southern Metropolis News was the most aggressive in page expansion, integrating 
almost every aspect of urban life and advertisement into its pages. On March 31, 2004, it set a 
record of 304 pages with 92 full-page of advertising and was still sold at 1 Yuan for retail (Lin & 
Zhu, 2004). A friend of mine, a loyal reader of Southern Metropolis News, once confessed that 
she had stayed with this newspaper partly because it was the only title thick enough to keep her 
doghouse thoroughly dry everyday. The urban printing press, indeed, has entered the era of 
industrial production and mass consumption (Li, Y. 2004).  
The style of metro journalism also differed considerably from that of others. Its fast-growing 
pages required a different way of organization so that readers could easily find what was 
appealing to them. Metro newspapers no longer expected readers to read everything but instead, 
select from the salad bowl what fits their appetite. In its supermarket mode of editing, a new 
organizing device, “section” or “stack” [die], was introduced as the primary indexing tool. Each 
section of the newspaper was folded individually with its own cover page and all folded within 
the major news section. Most of the sections were printed weekly, showing up only on a fixed 
day of the week—like a mini-magazine—to cover less timely topics on leisure, entertainment, 
IT, stock market, telecommunication, lottery, automobile, real estate, education, tourism, interior 
design, and job market, etc. Southern Metropolis News printed five sections in 2002, numbered 
from A to E, to organize local news, international/sports/entertainment news, economics, 
lifestyle, and regional news. 
The birth of weekly sections in metro newspapers largely resolved the limits of license for 
the press groups in multiplying content and expanding readership and advertising market (Cao, 
2004). It also, on the other hand, divided its readers as well as journalists into smaller groups 
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while the newspaper grew thicker. Professional journalists began to develop along the lines of 
trade journals and specialized. Junior journalists sometimes complained that the narrow agenda 
they were assigned—writing obituaries for a local district, for example—could harm their 
professional development. It is not uncommon, in other cases, that they could become so well-
connected in a lucrative “line” and were offered to work for their former sources in the industry 
or simply built up their professional fame in the professional community of journalists (Lu & 
Pan, 2002). The metro newspapers, in general, stretched their muscles deep into the urban market 
economy, enriched from it, and harbored mixed politics in relation to the urban public (Lee, 
2010). As the leading form of journalism, metro dailies provoked further questions for other 
newspapers on how to adjust themselves in the regional or national newspaper market. 
The urban-national  
The editorial transformations of Southern Weekend initiated in the new millennium 
manifested several aspects of the newspaper culture evolving toward urban economy and 
population at the time. It began to print, for example, an additional eight-page section called 
“City” [cheng shi] in 2002 which circulated exclusively in three urban centers of Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Guangzhou. For readers outside the three urban clusters, the national edition 
shared the other 24 pages with a 12-page news section followed by “Economy” (4p) and 
“Culture” (8p).   
The new “City” section of Southern Weekend, however, was nothing ostensibly consumerist. 
Half of it was a four-page special report, publishing in-depth stories of various social and cultural 
issues in Chinese cities. In 2002, for example, it covered “New Urban Poverty,” “The Crusade 
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from Peasantry to Urbanite,” “Korean Wave in Beijing,” “The Life of Working Units” [danwei 
rensheng], “A Personal History of Sanlitun” (a pub area in Beijing), “Office Politics,” and “The 
Era of New Neighborhood,” presenting a sociological lens grounded by interviews and 
investigation that stayed largely consistent with the national edition. The other four pages, 
“Walking” (introducing global places), “Talking” (a column page by mostly foreign urban 
writers), “Online” (Internet writers and topics), and “Gaming” (a miscellany of light-hearted 
stories), in general, were charged with transnational cosmopolitanism. 
The geographical divide between three mega-cities and the rest of the country—the urban 
versus the national readership—turned out to be transitional. But it did, as expected by the press, 
boosted its circulation and shifted the focus to major cities (Zhang & Liu, 2004). At the 
beginning of 2004, a 32-page edition was reinvented to cover the national market, abolishing the 
“City” section and the distributive divide. Meanwhile, the retail price was doubled from ¥1 Yuan 
to ¥2. The new national edition had three sections: News (16p), Economy (8p), and Culture (8p). 
Gone with the “City” section was only half of its content. The in-depth coverage remained and 
was relocated as “Special Report” [tebie baodao] in the news section. In-depth reporting on 
domestic affairs subsequently became the dominant form of the newspaper. 
News as planned 
As noticed by many, the tone of Southern Weekend had changed from “fighter” to 
“sage” (Jiang & Xu, 2008) in presenting a world that is increasingly rational, calm, and orderly. 
How that style of seriousness was acquired, in part, had to do with the changes in news 
production that emphasized pre-publication planning. Indeed, it goes against common sense that 
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news can be planned ahead of its actual happening. Even though experienced journalists and 
editors can often predict what might happen especially in a chain of events closely related to 
each other and deployed reporters accordingly, it is hardly conceivable that anything printed in a 
newspaper comes out of the initiative of the newsroom before it happens.  
News planning [xinwen cehua], the various practices of initiating reporting activities by the 
newsroom outside of routine reporting, became an emergent approach in newspaper journalism 
when competition intensified among the news groups. As a term, news planning in China had its 
origin in the burgeoning field of public relations in the early 1990s (Dong, 2002). Its introduction 
into journalism and following academic debates on its definition began in the mid-1990s 
regarding, especially, the legitimacy of planning in journalism. While it remains a controversial 
notion, the press, generally speaking, was no longer satisfied with digging into even exclusive 
news sources and happenings; it began to participate what happened as “news.”  
The increasing control over news production, partly, had to do with the growing reporting 
team as well as the improved abilities of the newsroom in organizing reporting activities across 
time and space. Follow-up reporting on selected news stories previously published, for the most 
obvious, represents one of such efforts. The new year edition of Southern Weekend in 1999, for 
example, followed up on twenty-six investigative stories reported in 1998 (1 Jan 1999: 9-11). In 
a few brief paragraphs, the original reporters updated with readers the recent development of the 
stories. Many cases had justice restored while some others continued to mire. The infection in a 
Shenzhen hospital I discussed in chapter 4 for example, had 120 of the victims filing a collective 
lawsuit against the hospital. But as presented in the new year edition, the twenty-six follow-up 
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stories spoke loudly to, as the title suggested, “Power of the News” [xinwen de liliang] or what 
the newspaper wanted its readers to remember. 
The new year edition, in particular, became a special issue where the newsroom produces its 
content ahead of time for the holiday seasons when only a smaller number of staff would be at 
work. With advertising becoming the major financing source for the press, it is unwise to reduce 
newspaper pages when urban readers are on their leisure time. Yet as Southern Weekend has been 
expanding its news sections since the late 1990s and eventually shredded its “weekend” and 
subsidiary identity, leisure and entertainment could hardly fit in its hard-won reputation through 
investigative journalism. The new year edition, inaugurated in 1999, was invented as a distinct 
space where the newspaper showcased the best journalistic practices of the year most 
conspicuously by setting up various journalism awards and ratings. Since 2001, the “Annual 
Awards for Media Breakthrough” [niandu chuanmei tupo jiang] and various “Journalism 
Excellence in Chinese Media” [zhongguo chuanmei jiechu biaoxian] have been elected by a 
group of media researchers and veteran journalists once a year. The award evaluated journalism 
of newspapers, TV, radio, and news websites to acknowledge outstanding performances by both 
individuals and institutions. These practices on one hand contributed to the formation of 
professional identities of journalists taking shape; it also, on the other hand, regularly served the 
marketing interests of the news institutions. 
The planning over space in news production, on the other hand, could be exemplified by the 
“50 Miles West” [xiang xi wushi li] reporting initiative in the new year edition of 2003. Starting 
from five major cities in eastern China, Southern Weekend dispatched its reporters to travel 50 
miles west from Shanghai, Yixing, Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shenyang to cover stories they 
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found within assigned topics (1 Jan 2003: 5-24). The twenty-page series reports published 15 
stories with themes on “Fortune,” “Rights,” “Education,” “Employment,” and “Welfare” in the 
five locations respectively. Each of the themes was organized around a number of individual 
stories that highlighted acute social inequalities in income levels, civil rights, educational 
opportunities, job market, and the social welfare system.  
The reporting initiative was well acclaimed (Zhou, 2003). The five themes cut straight into 
popular concerns with carefully chosen cases. Traveling west—instead of other directions—from 
major cities, similarly, pointed incisively to the glaring urban bias in economic reform as well as 
in media representation favoring southeastern and coastal China. Together, these stories 
presented a sociological map of the disturbing process of China’s economic reform without 
equality. The Beijing stories on education, for instance, started with the heavily invested Beijing 
No.4 Middle School in downtown, and then covered a high school for migrant students in 
suburban Beijing, a middle school of rural Beijing, a struggling private high school, and finally 
the prominent People’s University. In reporting the job market of Guangzhou, the starting point 
was set in a small food stall initiated by a few laid-off workers in town, and followed by the 
frustrating story of a middle-aged unemployed (“77 Job Interviews”), the grave job perspectives 
for university graduates (“Graduates in the Bazaar”), and migrant laborers in suburban 
Guangzhou (“Living on the Peripheries”). Perhaps not as critical as investigative reports 
Southern Weekend published in the late 1990s, the editorial planning of the newsroom and its 
politics in reporting deployment should not be underrated. The role of the reporter, once 
prominent as the heroes (rarely heroines) advancing to unveil the covert truth, seemed to have 
been replaced by the newsroom, a group of editors, who were aiming at revealing a greater order. 
!202
The exclusive stories, in other words, did not rely as much on the skills of journalists as the 
knowledge of editors. 
The increased organizational control by the newsroom of Southern Weekend across both time 
and space, finally, can be illustrated by an ambitious project that, at approximately the same time 
of each year between 1998 and 2007, reporters were sent out to visit three chosen places: a town 
in western China, a village in central China, and a street on the eastern coast. The annual reports, 
titled “Here and There” [zhe’er yu na’er], generally resembled anthropological research on 
individual stories as well as social changes happening around the local environment. With a few 
individual focuses, the stories of the only postal staff in Bailu town of Sichuan province, an 
underpaid young woman who later embezzled subscription money of newspapers for her own 
business, were traced throughout the decade; Xiaochang Zhuang, a village in Henan province, 
witnessed a railway constructed over the decade and the introduction of market mechanisms into 
agricultural production;  Chenggong Road, the coastal street in Fujian province, had its first 
Internet cafe in 1999 and a soaring number of netizens of more than 2,000 the next year. The 
longitudinal report ended in January 2008, where the initial group of reporters were invited to 
revisit the three locations and wrote about their observations (3 Jan 2008: 21-28).  
In explaining the innovative approach, the inaugural editorial made it clear that “we chose 
these places randomly…they are not the ideal or pioneers but the most ordinary places—social 
structures in mainland China. Therefore, we are aiming at a meaningful history of a decade, the 
most truthful stories of the Chinese people” (1 Jan 1999: 24). The “medium shot”, to borrow a 
cinematographic term, focused on some long-term yet uneventful changes of a Chinese society 
that were underrepresented or at times different from official accounts. In Xiaochang Zhuang 
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village, for instance, the abolition of agricultural taxes in 2005 did not seem to have helped local 
peasants much since the market price of productive materials soared and public services such as 
medical and educational resources continued to suffer; it did, ironically, ameliorate the 
relationship between local Party bureaucrats and the peasantry. In Chenggong Road, the 
introduction of international stores in town had significantly raised the rent of commercial spaces 
and deprived local business. What these chronological reports unfolded, in sum, was a first-hand 
socio-spatial scenario of the post-Mao society pointing to the ordinary—instead of the under-
covered—“truth.” 
For Southern Weekend, coverage like “50 Miles West” and “Here and There” represented a 
set of recent journalistic shifts in its corporate era. The sources of news, once pursued 
aggressively with an open newsroom and investigation, were again relocated from outside the 
newsroom back to the inside. In doing so, the newsroom not only demonstrated greater abilities 
to control news production in both temporal and spatial dimensions, but it also guaranteed 
exclusive stories without subjecting news production to the unpredictable flow and competition 
of routine reporting. In other words, none of these places or stories would have received any 
attention from a national weekly otherwise. If investigative stories in the late 1990s had offered 
first-hand documents for case by case litigations, the in-depth reporting like “Here and There” 
and “50 Miles West” presented a broader social context within which those previous cases were 
set. Compared to the informational and urban-based metro newspapers, this form of journalism 
on Southern Weekend has been characterized by its exclusiveness, a broader national purview, 
and greater editorial control.  
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Professionalism on the rise 
Greater editorial control by the newsroom also means, at the same time, the rise of a 
professional culture within the press. Xiang Xi, the successor of Jiang Yiping and editor-in-chief 
since 2001, explained that the evolving slogans of Southern Weekend represented “a deepening 
process of understanding journalistic professionalism” (Xiang, 2010). He also laid bare the 
market orientation behind such a shift that “media is information provider; to create value is the 
essential market mission and the less available the value is, the more valuable the media is. What 
is the least available value in contemporary Chinese society? China needs to complete its 
modernization in 40 years which took hundreds of years in western countries. The changes of 
society and humanity have been so huge that people in or outside the country cannot be sure of 
the changing status quo and logic. ‘Understanding China’ is the scarcest value available hence 
the goal of Southern Weekend” (Ibid). 
Even for the most careless readers, it is not difficult to tell that the critical tone of the weekly 
newspaper gradually faded in the new millennium. It has become controlled, cold, or to cite the 
editors, “awaken from the responsibilities of the ideal literati to professional 
consciousness” (Deng, 2008). In order to cultivate its sources in the political world, journalists 
and editors had to negotiate with political leaders whom, in the late 1990s, they did not even care 
to contact. Instead of “speaking for the powerless,” the discussion on professionalism increased 
significantly both among journalists and also within academia. In the year-end editorial of 2002, 
titled “We Don’t Talk, They Do,” the newsroom was seen wrestling with the rising sense of 
professionalism in emphasizing neutrality and balance, and a lasting intellectual ideal of moral 
and political obligations: 
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We insist the basic principles of journalism: rational and level-headed reasoning, objective and balanced 
reporting. But we do not hide our emotion, our anger, our sighs, our passion or enjoyment. We won’t hide 
our stand point or attitude. We displayed our anger to the morally deprived, respect to the rich and 
benevolent, and our passion to the intellectual minds that also are grounded in practice…  
We no longer care how much we should talk or how we should talk. We already know that, regardless, 
people are talking. They talk by mouth, expressions, bodies, and one’s own life trajectories. They ‘talk’ in 
all kinds of ways. 
We realized that we do not need to do the talking. We only need to fulfill the basic responsibility of the 
media: record. 
(Southern Weekend, 26 Dec 2002: 1) 
In addition, Southern Weekend published multiple internal guidelines to discipline 
professional performances (Lang & Chu, 2007: 326-329) and established the Press Occupational 
Standard Commission [xinwen zhiye guifan weiyuanhui] in March 2006 to institutionalize 
evaluation and independent investigation on journalistic performances (Zhou et al., 2009: 45). It 
is reasonable to suggest that, while the moral sentiment stayed, a more balanced mode of 
journalism emerged in which the newsroom refrained from making explicit moral judgments in 
order to pursue a more sophisticated account on the presumably complicated Chinese reality. 
Righteous indignation can no longer be invoked whether in its “high-end” interviews or 
macroscopic analyses on national policies and institutional changes. “The time and social context 
for aggressive reporting have passed,” a journalist commented, “the fundamentalist [yuan jiao 
zhu yi] news value can only be contained in our hearts; and ‘balance’ summarizes the surviving 
wisdom for us to keep reporting the truth within confined boundaries” (Fu, 2006: 127). In 2004, 
the annual media awards for feature writing went to a story of a controversial Party leader in a 
small city (5 Feb 2004). The three-page in-depth report was acclaimed for “setting up a suspense 
that pushes the readers to inquire and presenting ongoing conflicts from both sides; even though 
it offered no conclusion, it provokes multiple relevant themes in the transitional Chinese society 
!206
such as means versus ends, personal authority versus citizenship, the rule of people versus the 
rule of law, etc.” (20 Dec 2004) 
This rise of a professional culture with an emphasis on balanced reporting, however, has yet 
to be the dominant ideology of working journalists. Recent evidence shown that the shift is far 
from being clean. In surveying journalists of the major newspapers in Guangzhou, Fen Lin 
suggests that the literati value still coexists with both the modern professional and Party 
journalism value during the current journalistic professionalization (Lin, 2010). Most of the the 
journalists, now “younger, better-educated, and more likely to be female and contracted 
journalists,” are dissatisfied with the current lack of autonomy of the newsroom, welcome 
commercialization, and yet are “inactively liberal.”  Lin argued that neither professional nor 
commercial concerns were strong enough to oppose political concerns when journalists faced 
severe political issues. Among the investigative journalists, similarly, Bai Hongyi (2011) found 
that the increasing emphasis on professional values of objectivity and impartiality cannot be 
simplified as a voluntary identification but rather, a helpless move that echoed what Tuchman 
called “strategic ritual” (100).  
5.4 (Re)turning to Politics 
The orderly Southern Weekend in the new millennium has received mixed and at times 
controversial acclaim. For readers who have been following the newspaper especially since the 
late 1990s, the sense of disappointment was more than palpable when the newspaper changed its 
journalistic paradigm toward national politics. “Understanding China Here,” as its 2007 slogan 
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claimed, the newspaper had been trying to reach a more sophisticated account about the status 
quo where simple moral judgment cannot be easily made.  
Within the editorial framework which aims at understanding rather than questioning the 
changing Chinese society, in other words, the question is raised again about who the newspaper
—and the news group in general—are targeting in public communication. How should one 
evaluate what Zhao and Guo (2012) called the “upscaling movement” of the provincial 
newspaper working for national influence? 
The last cake 
Political news, sometimes called “hard news” or, in Chinese, shi-zheng baodao—the 
combination of “current” [shi] (affairs) and “political” [zheng] reporting [baodao]—has been 
rooted in the origins of Chinese journalism and continued to be the canonical form since the rule 
of the CCP. It is ironic that, regarding it being the most recent area of reform in the post-Mao era, 
the academic attention to the role of Chinese media in political communication has shown its 
signs of displacement (Sparks, 2012). The obsession to diagnose political freedom even in 
entertainment TV shows such as Super Girls (Hunan TV, 2004-2011), for instance, was in 
embarrassing contrast to the belated development of political reporting that only began to occupy 
a small fraction of Chinese media in the twenty-first century. 
Chinese politics in the post-Tiananmen era, indeed, has been an area with belated journalistic 
endeavors. Traditional ways of reporting continued in Party dailies and many other media 
outlets, where meetings and other activities of governmental departments and political leaders 
were publicized, national policies announced and explained, and the regional and individual 
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experiences exemplified. National news institutions such as the Xinhua News Agency largely 
reserved its monopolistic status in national and especially international news production while 
regional newspapers, on the other hand, were much restricted.  The lasting approach to politics 4
without much variation in representational patterns and degrees of independence in coverage or 
public discussions, therefore, reproduced the dominant official sources, styles, and also the 
authority of national news outlets. The so-called “Xinhua style” [xinhua ti], in particular, 
maintained its currency in political reporting (Lin, 2008: 140-144). “If we erase the dates of 
today’s political news, “ Li Liangrong wrote in the early 2000s, “and compared them to those in 
the 1950s, there are not any differences” (Li, 2004: 240). 
Such persisting continuities in political reporting point to where the political and economic 
interests of the post-Mao press radically diverged. For at least some commercial newspapers, 
political reporting was considered the “last cake in the market” (Feng, 2012: 1). However, since 
newspapers were affiliated with governmental units, the bureaucratic identity of media, be it 
central, provincial, or municipal, also defined the levels of political activities they are given 
access to in news production. Central media institutions such as CCTV and People’s Daily have 
been enjoying their administrative vicinity to political activities on the national level mostly 
located in Beijing; provincial and municipal media outlets, on the other hand, were very much 
contained within their administrative boundaries and relied on central sources and governmental 
releases for news above their levels of affiliation. When it comes to political news, in brief, the 
 Regional newspapers do, however, worked around the convention to compete in the market. In fact, it has become 4
common practice for popular newspapers to translate, rewrite, and edit news sources from both domestic-official and 
foreign sources without giving itemized credits. I worked for the Department of International News at Information 
Times, a popular subsidiary of Guangzhou Daily, for seven months in 2007. The working experiences attested to the 
claim above.
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natural affiliation with the Party-state sustained the bureaucratic hierarchy in news production. 
National politics has remained as the last untouched area for popular newspapers after their 
earlier endeavors in cultural and social news. 
This bureaucratic grip of Chinese newspapers has, in fact, been broken first in distribution 
and later in journalism. In political reporting, there were some special magazines devoted to it 
but they remained rare. Pioneers of the press in political reporting set off in the early 1990s. 
During the CCP’s Fourteenth National Congress in 1992, Guangdong-Hong Kong Information 
Daily [yuegang xinxi ribao], an economic newspaper affiliated with the Economic and Trade 
Commission of Guangdong Province [Guangdong sheng jingji maoyi weiyuanhui], became one 
of the two regional media outlets reporting in Beijing (Liu, 2000: 65).  
In the case of Southern Weekend, the turn to social news, especially through investigative 
journalism in the late 1990s, indicated the growing attention to socio-political transformations in 
Chinese society in the popular press. Here, politics can be understood broadly as the conflicts of 
stratifying interests often involving power abuse in social life. In cases of investigative reports 
involving legislative and other governmental departments, the stories normally shed critical light 
onto specific Party-state units and, as discussed in chapter 4, invoked explicit or implicit forms 
of bureaucratic and market retaliation. An investigative report on the “Zhang Jun” case in 2001, 
in particular, directly led to a top-down replacement of more than ten editors and journalists—
including the editor-in-chief—in Southern Weekend (Fa, 2008). In July 2001, the new leadership 
led by Xiang Xi proposed a different goal for the newspaper toward “a comprehensive and 
serious weekly with a good taste,” responsible for “recording the progress of the era,” and 
pursuing journalism with “more rational and scientific qualities” (Zhu, 2004: 38). For stories 
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with individual officials involved, in other words, a different and more defensible approach in 
reporting was needed. 
Reporting the center 
In its narrow sense, politics can also mean, the words and actions of the professed politicians 
or having something to do with the nation-state whose power can shape the law of the land (Pye, 
1963: 3).  Like the cultural and social turn in journalism in the 1980s and 1990s, the turn to 
political reporting had not been an isolated practice among Guangzhou newspapers. Though not 
yet a prominent genre, more than a dozen weekly newspapers and magazines specializing in 
current affairs have emerged especially since the 2000s (Chen, 2009: 48). Various pages and 
columns on politics were set up in other newspapers as well. Even the national network of CCTV 
launched a “high-end” talk show since 1998, later renamed “The Decision Makers 
Said” [jüecezhe shuo] in 2005, interviewing government officials at and above the ministry level. 
For Southern Weekend and other commercial publications, the assumption seemed similar: 
Chinese readers are, indeed, interested in politics. Though the definition remained largely vague, 
an emerging market for “serious newspapers” [yansu dabao] or “mainstream 
newspapers” [zhuliu baozhi] was actively in discussion and practice in the early 2000s. 
For the Southern Press Media Group, what seemed interesting was that the turn to political 
reporting took off almost at the same time for both its Party daily and popular subsidiaries. 
Falling behind in journalistic innovations for almost two decades, the parent paper Southern 
Daily had realized that Party-state politics might have a place in the newspaper market and began 
its editorial reform in August 2002, devoting one out of its three sections to “Politics.”  “Height 
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Defines Influence,” the new slogan claimed (Peng, 2003, Gu and Chen, 2003). “Our political 
advantage comes from mainstream reports, authoritative sources, and in-depth analyses; our 
authoritative advantage comes from propagating policies, guiding public opinion, and yulun 
jiandu” (Southern Daily, 6 Aug 2002). “High-end readers” [gaoduan duzhe], in particular, 
became its targeted readership. “If you are a leader or decision maker, a manager or researcher, 
an investor or business person—in other words, if you are a governmental staff, a businessman, 
or a professional, do choose Southern Daily that specially tailored for your needs” (Ibid). 
Politics, simply speaking, was posited as the common interests of social elites as a whole. 
It can be argued that political reporting, by taking on the national and structural changes, was 
partly a response to the vigorous expansion of metro journalism in its “downward” movement 
emphasizing the urban everyday life. But it was not a defining factor between the Party and non-
Party newspapers. The vibrant Southern Metropolis News, for example, also began to tackle 
political reporting as early as 2000. But as a five-year old metro newspaper, its political page 
[zheng yao] had a hard time approaching political officials and was eventually withdrawn (Wei, 
2012). For metro newspapers, the identity of “tabloid”—judging either by its institutional 
affiliation or its spicy entertainment news and visual styles—continued to be marginalized 
despite its commercial success in the urban market. Milder attempts were made later, as 
reporting on current affairs grew within the section of “Domestic News.” Nine years later, the 
page “Politics” [shi ju] finally became an independent section at the beginning of 2009.  
Like Southern Metropolis News, the evolving process of political reporting on Southern 
Weekend does not seem to be any easier. In 2001, the “The Second Page” [di er ban] changed to 
“Trend” [dong xiang] where the distinction between “politics” and “society” was still vague. 
!212
Two years later the page “Politics” [shi zheng] was launched, normally occupying page three and 
four, where Southern Weekend started to explore themes and reporting styles on politics and to 
cultivate its sources in the political world. In March 2003, Southern Weekend published a special 
edition reporting on premier Zhu Rongji at the time he was leaving his five-year term (6 Mar 
2003). The special 24-page report, however, was done without interviewing him in person. “A 
Letter to Premier Zhu,” instead, was printed at the bottom of the cover page and laid bare the 
political distance of the newspaper from the political center: 
Dear Premier Zhu Rongji: 
Hello! 
We are far away in the south. Within the current institutional settings, we are not qualified to join your 
press conference or conduct interviews while you are working. We are out of your radar indeed. Because 
of this, however, we can watch you from the angle of the ordinary people… 
(Southern Weekend, 6 Mar 2003: 1) 
Without access to direct political sources, the early reporting style or “Southern Weekend 
formula” [nan zhou ti] was compromised and known as “Xinhua New Agency /follow-ups on 
major websites + interviews with lower ranking officials or experts + research” (Fa, 2008: 50). 
But it changed quickly as new sources expanded. In 2006, Southern Weekend landed its first 
interview with Party leaders on the provincial level (19 Jan 2006: 5-8). By 2008, it had published 
more than 30 interviews with provincial or central leaders (Lin & Guo: 2008). Government 
officials and their voices began to gain more and more attention on the popular newspaper. 
In most cases, the interview set out to clarify a hot topic or social issue related to Party-state 
policies. Bo Xilai, at the time the director of the Ministry of Commerce, was interviewed to talk 
about the rising accusation of China’s neocolonialism in Africa (15 Mar 2007: A8); Yu Youjun, 
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the Party secretary of Shanxi province, discussed the problems of labor conditions in the coal 
mining industry (20 Jul 2006: A1-3; 5 Jul 2007: A1-3); Liu Zhongde, former deputy director of 
the Ministry of Culture, was interviewed to discuss ideological management (3 Aug 2006: A3); 
Ye Xiaowen, director of State Administration for Religious Affairs, talked about the tension 
between religion and the political context  of socialism (13 Mar 2008: A7-8). In 2007, both major 
national political conferences, the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the National 
Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) granted access to 
Southern Weekend. By the end of the year, the brand new four-page section “Politics” [shi ju] 
was eventually launched.  
In addition to interviews, Southern Weekend had also inherited the in-depth reporting styles 
from the previous era and combined it with increasing editorial planning in covering politics. 
Macroscopic reporting and analyses had emerged and offered bigger pictures of political 
changes. Some of these stories included, for instance, “Four Years of Transformation in China’s 
Public Security” (4 Jan 2007); “Alumni of Peking University in the Political World” (14 June 
2007); “A Survey of Official Think Tanks in China” (11 Oct 2007: A1); “Institutional 
Transformations of the Chinese Communist Party in a Historical Perspective” (11 Oct 2007: A4). 
In 2008, in particular, Southern Weekend had published four special editions on the Beijing 
Olympics and two issues on the thirtieth anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s open reform (Chen, 
2009: 22-26). By shifting to political reporting and analyses, Southern Weekend and other similar 
publications significantly expanded the scope of political communication in news media, 
bringing greater transparency to Chinese politics that has long been crowded by official accounts 
on one hand and tabloid stories on the other. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed the major transformations in state policies, market conditions 
of the press, and newspaper journalism in relation to changes of Southern Weekend since the new 
century. A few questions can be raised here regarding, again, the politics of the popular press and 
its sources of changes. 
Under the convergent interests of state regulations and the press, the newspaper industry has 
moved toward rapid concentration after a decade and a half of decentralizing movements. There 
have been no major conflicts in the double development of news monitoring network or state 
censorship on one hand, and the that of press conglomerates on the other. The Party-engineered 
market consolidation, as Yuezhi Zhao argued, indicated that “the age of a privately owned, 
independently operated, and market-supported competitive press has bypassed China” (2000: 
22). Despite the high drama at times of outright intervention and resistance, which I will discuss 
in conclusion, state intervention and concentration of the media market went hand in hand to 
shape the dominant structure of Chinese press on both regional and national levels. 
Regarding newspaper journalism, the new corporate press invested heavily in establishing 
new publications most successfully in daily metro newspapers, which located along China’s 
urban areas. Paying close attention to urban life and everyday news, the metro newspapers have 
easily aligned with advertisers; but they also challenged state power at times when their 
investigative reports on “small” social problems contradicted with Party-state interests most 
conspicuous in environmental, infrastructural, and other aspects of urban living (Huang, 2001). 
Such “downward” movement has filled up the long-term absence of journalism, as Sun Wei 
argues, in addressing everyday life of individuals who now rely on their own knowledge, rather 
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than articulations of elites or Party-state propaganda, as living in the urban space (Sun, 2008: 
81). 
Led by the metro papers, the urban turn of the press also signified a general pattern of news 
production that has been increasingly directed by corporate maneuvers. In Shanghai, the impact 
of recentralization and press conglomeration has been driving off newspaper vendors, important 
as they were in the 1980s and early 1990s, by corporate chain booths (Zhao, 2000: 19). Southern 
Weekend, similarly and also ironically, became the cradle of several third-tier publications that 
included a high-end male magazine for commercial elites. If “speaking for the powerless” was at 
least partly a bottom-up reputation for the weekly newspaper in the late 1990s, public perception 
of the newspaper in the 2000s has been heavily marked by the initiatives of its own branding 
office and advertising campaigns.  
The rise of metro journalism, on the other hand, coincided with another bifurcation in 
popular journalism toward more serious newspapers. Political reporting, regarded the last 
unreformed area of Chinese journalism, became the more recent adventure of a few. For 
Southern Weekend, the “upward” movement was evident, expanding political sources from 
central media institutions to individual Party officials. Such efforts had brought politics and 
political leaders down with a human face and on a more equal relationship with the general 
readers. 
So, what are some of the benefits and cost of such a journalistic shift? Lin Chufang, one of 
the editors of Southern Weekend, suggested that political reporting helped expand readership 
within the bureaucratic ranks; it also, by getting political leaders as sources, reduced the risk of 
political retaliation; and finally, political reporting has been a response to market competitions 
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where metro papers turned more and more to in-depth stories and Internet information has 
overwhelmed the media environment (Lin & Guo: 2008). Political reporting, that is, had its own 
basis of popularity and can be both profitable and politically defensible.  
However, the upward movement toward political life in news production also raised critical 
questions against the newsroom. For the most obvious, how does the newsroom defend against 
the accusation that, by casting increasing attention to governmental affairs, it has betrayed its 
own credo in the previous era as speaking for the powerless and “standing up straight” to the 
powerful? This has been a shift that palpable even from the marketing slogan of the newspaper: 
“Empowering the Powerless, Backing the Pessimists” (1999), “Go Inside the Depth of 
Achievements” (2001-2002), “Record the Epochal Progress” (2003-2006), and “Understanding 
China Here” (2007 to present). With greater control over news production, though, the newsroom 
also deployed its reporting activities more efficiently across temporal and spatial boundaries. 
Despite the individual(ized) interviews, developing expertise still serves a vital role in bringing 
contexts to Chinese politics that, despite its continuities of authoritarian rule, had been 
undergoing transformations that need to be known.  “Some ‘thinking weapon’ has taken shape 
such as placing a news event within the ‘longer period and bigger space’ in analyses against 
which the context of reform is considered” (Deng, 2008). Becoming a wise observer instead of a 
fighter could promote expertise in the newsroom, emphasizing technical standards instead of 
moral responsibilities of journalism. The newspaper became more informed and defensible at the 
expense of leaning toward those who had no immediate struggles in life.  
The Guangzhou press, in brief, has been under stronger intervention from the Party-state 
(de)regulations, corporate initiatives, and rising professionalism since the new millennium. The 
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increased editorial control and expertise over news production, the shift to political reporting, 
and institutionalization of self-discipline suggested a much more complicated power map of 
journalism than normally assumed and evaluated. 
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CONCLUSION 
Home to one hundred newspapers in 2010, Guangdong province remained the biggest 
printing center in mainland China. The three newspaper corporations, Southern Press Media 
Group, Yangcheng Evening Newspaper Group, and Guangzhou Daily Group, printed a total of 32 
newspapers and 20 magazines and continued to dominate the regional market in Guangzhou and 
major cities of the Pearl River Delta. For the daily newspaper market between 2005 and 2009, 
the municipal Guangzhou Daily took over 50 percent of the share while Southern Metropolis 
News and Yangcheng Evening News accounted for around 20 percent each (Cui, 2009: 78; Tian, 
2009). This matches the general pattern of the print market in major Chinese cities, where the 
competition was mostly fought between the two popular subsidiaries of the provincial and 
municipal Party papers. The market distribution was similar too. The municipal subsidiary 
normally shows a local advantage in the capital city while the provincial one takes a better share 
among cities nearby. The southern press, again, was not an exception. 
As regional markets take shape, national weeklies have become a relatively small but no less 
concentrated niche market. A few initiatives to establish news weeklies in Wuhan, Chongqing, 
and Chengdu were launched but eventually failed (Liao et al., 2007). The average circulation of 
Southern Weekend in six cities—Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Xi’an, and Chengdu
—alone reached above half a million during the third quarter of 2004 and continues to be a major 
news weekly on the national-urban market (Ibid: 5). 
Gaining its foothold in urban readership cross-provincially, on the other hand, has coexisted 
with continuous upward market movement of Southern Weekend since the new millennium. 
During the economic crisis in 2008 when advertising sales plummeted and pulp prices soared, 
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Southern Weekend raised its retail price from ¥2 to ¥3 along with many other Chinese 
newspapers (Guo, 2008). In October 2014, its retail price was again raised from ¥3 to ¥5, which 
significantly closed the price gap with magazines, and became the most expensive newspaper in 
mainland China at a time while Internet users, mostly mobile, reached 632 million in the country 
(CNNIC, 2014: 4). Newspaper reading, it seems, has retreated from the social space Southern 
Weekend had tried hard to blend in in the early 2000s, and become an upscale—if not again 
private—activity. In 2009, a newspaper of special interests, the China Press Journal [zhonghua 
xinwen bao], was shut down due to dwindling resources from either market return or its official 
sponsor, the All-China Journalists Association. The closure, as the first case among newspapers 
of the central level, invoked tremendous discussion within the professional community on the 
death of Chinese newspapers (Fan, 2009; Tong, 2009). To use this as the end point of my story, 
what has the trajectory of this weekly newspaper informed us on post-Mao press development in 
the past thirty years? Regarding, in particular, the ongoing discussions on press theories in non-
Western countries (e.g. Lee, 2000; Zhao, 2012), how does the case of Southern Weekend add to 
the conversation? Following a chronological order, I’ll review the structural transformations of 
the press in Guangzhou, its forms of journalism and politics, and extend the discussion to recent 
development and challenges to provide some answers.  
From Tabloid to Corporate Press: the 30-year “U” Turn  
Press reform in post-Mao China has certainly produced its own dynamics in the past three 
decades. For many who celebrated the possibilities introduced by the market mechanism, 
optimism has been dwindling since the late 1990s. Perhaps this is not surprising. After all, China 
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has been gradually incorporated into the world economy and become a prominent member 
among the global turn to neoliberal policies since the 1980s (Harvey, 2005). Deregulation of 
governmental control has prioritized market competition in Western countries and brought the 
media sector to increasing concentration by a smaller number of multinational media groups. In 
China, as seen from the case of the Guangzhou press, the end point seems highly similar: three 
news groups dominate the local market and, though not yet multinational ones, have decidedly 
moved across media and economic sectors domestically. But the historical process, as will be 
outlined below, should oppose such generalization. 
Decentralization of the right to print and sell newspapers in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
was the defining factor for a reviving print market at the time (chapter 1). Fiscal crisis in public 
institutions at the end of the Cultural Revolution, the pioneering role of Guangdong in market 
reform, and the re-connections with Hong Kong and overseas Chinese communities all 
contributed to the liberalization of cultural production and consumption in the southern province 
and beyond. The opportunity to print and seek profit in the urban market for governmental 
departments and units also came at the time when many intellectuals were reinstated and secular 
culture, as opposed to radical politics, came to the center of social life. Within such contexts, the 
establishment of Southern Weekend as the provincial subsidiary was loaded with convergent 
interests of the national, regional as well as that of the general public to restore social order and 
to experiment with the post-Mao project of market modernity.  
Therefore, decentralization of the press in China should be distinguished from the general 
deregulation of media sector in western countries. Unlike the United States, for instance, the 
number of post-Mao newspapers grew most rapidly during the 1980s. It was the democratization 
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of press structure from within the bureaucratic ranks; and it recruited a large number of 
individual writers-journalists as the major source of newspaper labor. In short, they popularized 
the secular turn to private life and identities, introduced external cultural resources to the public 
domain, and they expanded, instead of shrinking, the cultural spectrum as far as invoking 
ideological controversies with cultural authorities at the time. 
As marketization was officially endorsed by Deng Xiaoping and his reformist colleagues in 
1992, commercialization of the press was pursued more aggressively nationwide. Heavy 
infrastructural investment and institutional expansion favored Party subsidiaries over non-Party 
newspapers in various aspects. Southern Weekend, for instance, installed its translocal printing 
centers by taking advantage of the Party press facilities across the country. In other words, 
former bureaucratic resources were turned into stratifying means of development in media 
market competition. This attests to what Colin Sparks called “institutional continuity” in post-
communist countries (Sparks, 2010).  
To be sure, the internal competition between Party and non-Party establishments had 
disrupted the formerly power structure based strictly on bureaucratic ranks. Municipal 
departments and units, for example, at times were more responsive and no less resourceful than 
their provincial counterparts materially. But it was very unlikely that non-Party alliance could 
compete with the Party press. Among other things, they had to face more crippling bureaucratic 
complications in organizing resources for the new establishment (chapter 3). For these 
establishments, bureaucratic connections often became organizational barriers rather than 
advantages. More research, indeed, should work on the details how, especially during the 1990s, 
the press turned institutional resources into the means of market development. 
!222
Starting from 1996, the state-engineered consolidation of the press market took off and 
expedited its concentration around the Party press (chapter 5). The Guangzhou press witnessed 
another around of rapid establishment of popular subsidiaries yet mostly within press groups. 
More comprehensive policies announced in 2003 further shut down 677 non-Party newspapers 
nationwide mostly on the county level, and drove the survivors to join the newly-established 
news groups (Ge, 2004; Chen, 2005). Since 2008, the GAAP began to push unprofitable 
newspapers to exit the market and redistributed their licenses to those markedly savvy (Southern 
Weekend, 10 June 2010: 9, 11). The continuous top-down efforts toward “bigger and stronger” 
press groups [zuo da zuo qiang], which enabled the proliferation of tabloids in the 1980s, became 
the power to consolidate the current concentration of press groups. 
From commercialization to conglomeration, then, market reform of the post-Mao press has 
been contained within legitimate institutional and ideological boundaries (Zhao, 2000). The top-
down approach, again distinct from the U.S. experiences, renewed the authoritarian dominance 
of the Party press in market competition while maintaining its bureaucratic connections with the 
Party-state. The process of media reform in post-Mao China, in short, has not been a one-way 
journey.  
Deconstructing the “Party-popular” 
 The project sets out not only to understand the trajectory of press transformations, but also 
the types of journalism evolving in the weekly newspaper in relation to cultural changes that, as 
Stuart Hall put it, are “a polite euphemism for the process by which some cultural forms and 
practices are driven out of the center of popular life, actively marginalized” (Hall, 2006). 
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Newspaper journalism is, according to Stuart Adam, “the primary method of framing experience 
and forming the public consciousness of the here and now” (Adam, 1993: 45). For Southern 
Weekend, the meaning of popularity for its journalism had certainly evolved in the three decades 
the study covered. From a cultural tabloid to a national news weekly, what has the history of 
Southern Weekend discussed informed us about the culture of the post-Mao popular press? 
The popular press in post-Mao China started with the secular turn of the post-revolutionary 
society. Hong Kong popular culture, characterized by its urban and localizing traits (chapter 2), 
offered a great deal of the cultural forms and resources for popular tabloids of the 1980s to 
articulate the return of a secular life. The rapidly growing tabloids at the time, as mentioned 
above, were produced in a decentralized model of the newsroom, relying on an extensive 
network of external readers, writers, and the reinstated intellectuals in various cultural 
institutions. The early Southern Weekend, as one example, represented the cultural turn by 
opening the four-page paper to a variety of cultural forms from Hong Kong as well as informal 
labor across regions. It was, essentially, a populist enterprise that revived the reader orientation. 
While the content of journalism did not originate from the Party-state anymore, however, the 
newspaper and most of its contemporaries stayed within the general consensus between state and 
intellectuals on restoring order and reaffirming the value of personal lives. The only difficulty, it 
seems, was the degree of censorship against the cultural input.  
The relative openness of the newsroom in the 1980s had also arguably homogenized the 
popular newspapers as a whole and blurred the line between Party and non-Party newspapers in 
production. The expansive print market invited the press to a national audience beyond its 
original administrative boundaries. The lively reading public now choosing and buying 
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publications from urban newsstands anonymously and reading them at home allowed some room 
for voices of dissent. Calling for deeper political changes and reform against bureaucracy and 
corruption, some bottom-up journals such as People’s Road and Life printed by young workers in 
Guangzhou were among the radical current of the post-Cultural Revolution social formation that 
went beyond a secular turn. These voices, though quenched quickly, were among those—such as 
the famous non-Party World Economic Herald in Shanghai—that contributed to the democratic 
movement culminating in the 1989 Tiananmen protest. Eschewing politics on reform and 
marketization, then, cultural tabloids like Southern Weekend stood squarely outside these radical 
strands. The Chinese press, therefore, generally diverged along the political lines within the 
Party-state on further reform initiatives.  
Political divisions subsided in the following decade in government and also the press. The 
post-Tiananmen Chinese society canonized “socialist market economy” as the project for 
modernization once it silenced the dissidents and possibility of political reform. The increasing 
social conflicts in the inexorable process of marketization without formal channels of political 
expression had to find its way in a new form of popular journalism. The rise of investigative 
reporting in the mid-1990s in television and newspaper journalism cannot be simplified within 
the classical liberal framework. It has its historical constituents from within Party journalism as 
well as authoritarian governmentality. In its earlier form, negative reporting in Party journalism 
combined with market orientations on readability, as seen in the case of Police Raid and Chen 
Maya (chapter 3), suggests a potential shared ground between the often suppressed line of Party 
journalism and reportage literature. As the newsroom grew with reporters and news sources, 
cross-provincial investigative reporting became the establishing form of popular journalism in 
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the late 1990s (chapter 4). Reporting on corruption and power abuse in unaffiliated and mostly 
lower-ranking governmental departments and officials reduced the chance of bureaucratic 
retaliation from the top; and it also, at least to some extent, articulated the prevalent social 
grievances in market reform. The circulation of investigative journalism, in other words, forged a 
moral community nationwide, winning its popular support from the overlapping interests of the 
central government to channel public opinion, political participation of the intellectuals, the 
living experiences of the “powerless and the pessimistic” and, more arguably, the compassionate 
gaze from urban middle class readers. In its best practices, the newspaper facilitated public 
participation and struggles as we have seen in consumer campaigns (chapter 4). But it eventually 
exhausted bureaucratic tolerance if not market appeal—not to mention the constant resistance 
from regional government and targeted enterprises.  
Retrospectively speaking, the critical space of investigative journalism was decisively 
facilitated by the strategic compromise of the Party-state as well as more flexible labor relations 
between the first generation migrant reporters and the press. It expanded the reporting spectrum 
of the Party press from cultural to social issues. But cross-provincial stories have also, perhaps 
ironically, on one hand deepened Party-market clientelism on the regional level (Lee et al., 2007; 
Liu, 2013) and further distanced itself from local life on the other. The rise of metro newspapers 
in the mid-1990s could be seen as the renewal of the secular culture in the press since the 1980s 
but bringing to everyday life an urban and commercial twist.  
Finally, the conglomeration of press groups beginning in the mid- and late 1990s further 
emphasized the income level rather than the size of readership for the Chinese press. The 
renewed interests in political reporting, for Southern Weekend, no doubt contained the profit 
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orientation in repackaging its readership toward the class of social elites. Selling at a top price 
among Chinese newspapers since 2014, Southern Weekend today clearly speaks to the translocal, 
if not yet transnational, domestic elites. “Party-popular” at the moment, one may say, finds its 
sources in the language and consciousness of the well-educated, whose lives and benefits have 
genuine interests in state policies.  One may also argue that, ironically, its journalism has become 
politically removed once it moved to political reporting.  
From negotiating a cultural forefront, channeling a strategic stance for social grievance, to 
offering analyses of state policies and current issues, the 30-year trajectory of the weekly 
newspaper has unfolded a tortuous story of the “Party popular” in contemporary China. The 
articulated consciousness by these journalistic paradigms, in my opinion, has all been serious 
attempts to live within the dominant Party-state hegemony. Returning to the question of the 
“popular,” while the market or commercial definition of the term runs true in all three decades 
for the press, the newspaper has never been oppositional to Party-state polity even at its height of 
liberal oriented professionalism. Unlike the political journals published throughout KMT’s 
authoritarian dominance in Taiwan (Lee, 2004: 135-163), Southern Weekend and the like have 
not been the outlet for articulating political alternatives despite its genuine efforts in pushing the 
envelope of Party censorship. As Party subsidiary, it resembles the mainstream commercial 
newspapers during KMT’s authoritarian regime in Taiwan: “sharing the same dream but sleeping 
on different beds” with the political journals [yi chuang tong meng] (ibid: 161).  
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Old Battles and New 
In early 2013, Southern Weekend stirred national and global attention with its latest episode 
of  struggle with the Provincial Propaganda Department of Guangdong. Its New Year editorial, 
originally titled “Chinese dream, the Dream of Constitution” [zhongguo meng, xianzheng meng], 
had been partly revised by its editor-in-chief who reportedly did it under the dictation of a 
propagandist official. As the new year edition had already been through multiple pre-publication 
negotiation and finally submitted by the front-page editors, the additional round of revision 
behind their back provoked a newsroom outcry the next morning and later developed into a high-
profile strike demanding the removal of the chief editor and of pre-publication censorship in the 
press. The antagonistic moment of the rebellious newsroom against a “lame duck” chief editor 
and the suppressing propagandist official again exemplified a classic liberal situation of state-
press relationship.  
There has been, indeed, sufficient room for the liberal critique throughout the past three 
decade of press reform. State control of the press during the 1980s remained lax but regulatory 
campaigns were not uncommon especially against bottom-up market initiatives from outside the 
bureaucracy. The development of the news monitoring network since the mid-1990s that 
institutionalized censorship in and outside the press, and the establishment of Party committee 
inside Southern Weekend and all of its second-tiered subsidiaries in March 2005, similarly, both 
maintained the critical relevance of the liberal discourses in mobilizing for newsroom autonomy. 
Continuous struggles of the newsroom against its supervising power can reasonably be expected 
in the future. For investigative journalists or the most political strand among the newsroom,  
professional network such as the “Blue Shirt” [lan yi] (formerly xiao dao or “small knife”) 
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founded by Deng Fei, a Southern Weekend journalist, in 2004 has shown more organized 
energies in initiating charitable projects like “Free Lunch for Children” in rural areas. “Righteous 
indignation,” it seems, bears more potential fruits outside the newsroom.  
No less explicit than its political intervention has been state power in instrumentalizing the 
market as means for social control. Among others, press regulations which subjected newspapers 
to reach a minimum circulation in annual evaluations, foreclosure of unprofitable newspapers, 
recentralization of press structure and redistribution of licenses favoring Party press groups have 
all demonstrated what the historian Zhu Xueqin has called the “visible foot” of the state rather 
than the “invisible hand” of the market (2000: 489). For Chinese journalism, the continuous 
presence and penetration of Party-state power in market reform, Chin-chuan Lee rightly argued, 
is both “enabling and disabling” relative to the market and the “‘socialist market economy with 
Chinese characteristics’ is undoubtedly state capitalism with authoritarian characteristics” (Lee, 
2000: 563). Such dynamics continued to be seen in recent attempts of press groups in capital 
investment and stock market initiatives.  
Even so, however, this project also shows that one should not ignore the continuous 
expansion of Chinese journalism since the early 1980s covering from cultural to social and 
political lives of the post-Mao society. This has been real growth of journalism as experienced in 
social life which, from my cultural materialist perspective, could not be readily reduced to 
narrowly-defined politics at any given period or society. For instance, even though the post-Mao 
media space remained “improvising performances” [jixing biaoyan] within institutional 
boundaries (Pan & Wu, 2008: 39), its best practice in investigative journalism over the course of 
the late 1990s and early 2000s manifested the re-appropriation of Party journalism in channelling 
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social grievances. For another often neglected example, Southern Weekend also received positive 
feedbacks from the Central Propaganda Department for its coverage on various issues (e.g. 10 
Dec 2014; 3 Oct 2006; 20 Apr 2007). Such seemingly contradictory features indeed remind us of 
the starting point of studying popular culture, according to Stuart Hall, as “double movement of 
containment and resistance” (Hall, 2006).  
Technologies and the newsroom  
More fundamental changes happened within the major social relations of the press now under 
new conditions. For the rising attention to new media and Internet technologies, I would like to 
draw the attention to the developments again in modes of news production and the media 
ecology of the press: the big newsroom, and the struggling formation of a national public sphere.  
The printing press in China has been actively incorporating computer technologies much 
earlier than the Internet became popular. The printing and then editing systems of the press have 
been computerized in the 1980s and mid-1990s respectively. Meanwhile, electronic devices such 
as personal computers, sound recorders, and cameras had gradually been used as technologies of 
reporting; satellite technologies had synchronized the transmission between the newsroom and 
all its printing branches; and finance and advertising management of the press also computerized 
to improve efficiencies (Liao et al., 2007). As the Internet developed since the mid-1990s, 
however, computer technologies have extended from means of production to other areas of the 
press. It was considered as a new distribution outlet beyond geographical boundaries, as the press 
started to establish its own websites and moved the print version in HTML format online. Later, 
the form of the newspaper has also been digitized in PDF format, now a dominant practice for 
!230
major newspapers in Guangzhou, and released the news portals to other functions in advertising, 
branding, and reader survey, etc. Southern Weekend launched its new media department in 2006, 
the news website infzm.com at the end of 2007, and the first mobile reading app among Chinese 
media in 2009. In addition to printed content, infzm.com also included opinion polls on a variety 
of topics and published real-time results.  
More recent explorations to integrate information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
with newspapers brought in extensive transformations in reporting and newsroom collaboration 
toward the big newsroom or so-called “the central kitchen,” where the original boundary 
between the print version and new media content in news production began to be taken down. 
Guangzhou Daily, which established its news portal dayoo.com in 1999, built up its all-in-one 
[quan mei ti] newsroom in 2014 as a cross-medium editing center to consolidate reporting, 
editing, digitization, and multi-media production and distribution. Real-time reporting on 
breaking news, as a result, has been broken down into different formats. Journalists are required 
to send in a 140-word blurb within 10 minutes, 500-word with photos and other audio-visual 
materials within 2 hours, a complete news format—length depending on its nature of the event—
after all the interviews are done, and finally an in-depth report by the end of the day for the print 
version. It should be further evaluated, again, how such mode of news production has reshaped 
the form of journalism in relation to the readership, and how journalism culture shifts 
accordingly. 
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Formation of a national public? 
Internet technology not only reconfigures the temporal order of newspaper production and its 
format, it also, unlike the regional printing press, breaks down geographical boundaries radically 
in news consumption to facilitate the making of a national and even transnational public. As 
news institutions publish increasing content online, news reading becomes no longer a daily or 
weekly consumption but endures longer periods of time while multiple voices from media 
institutions, individual journalists, and netizens are involved across regional boundaries. News 
commentaries and public discussion, most prominently, have been greatly empowered on social 
media when news institutions—including various newspapers—can be easily accessed, archived, 
searched and compared across time and place.  
The archival nature of the Internet has assisted the circulation of information for public 
discussion on a national scale. Major Internet platforms such as Sina Weibo and Wechat, though 
still not free from political or market regulations, have become the public arena for unofficial and 
potentially disruptive voices against the Party mainstream. During Southern Weekend’s struggle 
on the New Year editorial in 2013, individual accounts from a number of journalists and editors 
on the social media Sina Weibo became the major sources of real-time report of the struggle and 
mobilized public participation both online and offline. Global Times [huanqiu shibao], the 
popular subsidiary of People’s Daily, soon published a highly controversial editorial on the event 
(7 Jan 2013) which questioned the credibility of Southern Weekend journalists, and claimed that 
Chen Guangcheng, the dissident civil rights lawyer who escaped his house arrest and exiled to 
the United States in 2012, was one of the group’s supporters. The Central Propaganda 
Department later mandated newspapers and websites to reprint this editorial yet encountered 
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delay and resistance from a few newspapers, which further escalated and externalized the 
political struggle nationwide.  
Assisted by capital investment and cross-media integration, the corporate press in Guangzhou 
and other major cities are quickly experimenting another round of expansion in the digital world. 
But how much of their endeavors are related to the production of quality journalism is yet 
another question. Their expansions, for one thing, are mostly national oriented and consumer 
based now.  It remains to be seen how the revived public discussions on politics (in its broadest 
sense) can be integrated with the changing economics of news production, political continuity, 
and cultural reconstruction in contemporary China.
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APPENDIX A:  NEW PUBLICATIONS IN GUANGZHOU, 1980-1981 
(Source: Guangzhou Municipal Gazette-the Press) 
Name Affiliation Inauguration Topics/format
Pharmaceutical Economy 
[yiyao jingji bao]
State Bureau of Pharmaceutical 
Administration, Information Center 
for Pharmaceutical Economy
Jan. 1980 weekly
Football 
[zu qiu]
Guangzhou Daily press, 
Guangzhou Football Association
Jan. 1980 Bi-weekly, changed to 
weekly in 1984
Stage and Screen 
[wutai yu yinmu]
Guangzhou Institute of  Literature 
and Art  Research
Feb. 1980 Film and television, bi-
weekly
White Cloud Collection 
[baiyun jijin]
Center for People’s Art 
[Guangzhou qunzhong yishu guan]
Mar. 1980 Cultural news, literature, 
folktales, bi-weekly
Chinese Weekly 
[yuwen yuebao]
Municipal Bureau of Education, 
Guangzhou
Aug. 1980 Language and learning, 
monthly
Stamp Collector 
[jiyou jia]
Guangzhou Post Office Sept. 1980 Monthly magazine on 
stamp collecting
Intro to Film & TV 
[yingshi jieshao]
Guangzhou Performance Company 
[Guangzhou yanchu gongsi] 
1980 Film and TV news
Flower Land 
[Baihua yuan]
Guangdong Playwright 
Association, Guangzhou Branch
1980 Star news, weekly
Weekend Pictorial 
[zhoumo huabao]
Guangdong Lingnan Art Publishing 
House
1980 Weekly pictorial
South Wind 
[Nan feng]
Guangzhou Literature Association 
[Guangzhou wenlian]
1981 Bi-weekly
High School Students 
[zhongxuesheng bao]
Guangdong Normal College 
[Guangdong jiaoyu xueyuan]
Jan. 1981 Weekly 
Youth Art 
[shaonian wenyi bao]
Guangdong Writers’ Association Jun. 1981 Cultural weekly for high 
school students
Legal Pictorial 
[fazhi huabao]
Guangdong Legal Press 
[Guangdong fazhi baokan she]
Jun. 1981 Weekly
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APPENDIX B:   SELECTED TABLOIDS IN GUANGZHOU, 1979-1988 
Name Sponsor Inauguration
Guangdong Pictorial 
[Guangdong Huabao]
Guangdong Pictorial Press 
[Guangdong huabao she]
1979
Weekend Pictorial 
[Zhoumo Huabao]
Guangdong People's Publishing House 
[Guangdong Remin Chubanshe]
1980
Stage and Screen 
[Wutai yu Yinmu]
Guangzhou Cultural Bureau  
[Guangzhoushi wenhua ju]
Feb. 1980
White Cloud Collection 
[Baiyun Jijin]
Guangzhou Popular Art Center 
[Guangzhou qunzhong yishu guan]
1980
Golden Times 
[Huangjin Shidai]
Provincial committee of the Communist Youth League 
[Gongqingtuan Guangdong shengwei]
1981
Guangdong Police Pictorial 
[Guangdong fazhi huabao]
Department of Justice, Guangdong  
[Guangdong sifating]
1981
Guangdong TV Weekly  
[Guangdong dianshi zhoubao]
Guangdong TV station 
[Guangdong dianshitai]
May. 1982
Modern People’s News 
[Fengliu Renwu Bao]
Guangdong Writers' Association 
[Guangdongsheng zuojia xiehui]
1983
Guangzhou Youth News  
[Guangzhou qingnian bao]
Guangzhou committee of Communist Youth League 
[Gongqingtuan Guangzhou shiwei]
1984
HK & Macao Economy Clippings 
[Gang’ao jingji jianbao]
Guangdong Research Center for Social & Economic 
Development  
[Guangdong shehui jingji fazhan yanjiu zhongxin]
1984
Overseas Market 
[Haiwai shichang bao]
Southern Daily & Foreign Economic and Trade 
Commission of Guangdong  
[Guangdong duiwai jingji weiyuanhui]
Feb. 1984 -  
1 Jan. 1990
Canton Information 
[Yangcheng xinxi bao]
Canton Information Press, Guangzhou Youth Information 
Center 
[Yangcheng xinxi baoshe, Guangzhoushi qingnian xinxi 
kaifa zhongxin]
Dec. 1984
Story Weekly 
[Gushi zhoubao]
Guangdong Popular Culture & Art Center 
[Guangdong qunzhong wenhua yishu guan]
1985
Micro-economy News 
[Xiao jingji daobao]
Guangdong Micro-economy Research Association  
[Guangdong xiaojingji yanjiu hui]
1985
Modern Mankind 
[Xiandairen bao]
Foreign Trade Association & 
China Southern Book Company (SCBC)
1985
Cultural Reference 
[Wenhua cankao bao]
Guangzhou Cultural Journalist Society 
[Guangzhou wenhua jizhe lianyihui]
1985
Chinese Poetry 
[Huaxia shi bao]
Guangzhou Literature & Art Association 
[Guangzhoushi wenlian]
Jan. 1985
China Modern Pictorial 
[Zhongguo xiandai huabao]
Apr. 1985
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(Sun Yat-sen Library of Guangdong, Special Collection, May 2013) 
Consumer News 
[Xiaofeizhe bao]
Guangzhou Consumers’ Committee 
[Guangzhou xiaofeizhe weiyuanhui]
1986
Canton Culture & History 
[Yangcheng wenshi]
Guangzhou Institute for Cultural History 
[Guangzhoushi wenshi yanjiu guan]
1987
Coastal Culture 
[Yanhai dawenhua bao]
Coastal Culture Press 
[yanhai dawenhua baoshe]
1988
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APPENDIX C:  PAGE EXPANSIONS OF SOUTHERN WEEKEND, 1984-2004 
1984 1992 1996 1998 1999 2001 2004 
Pages 4 8 16 20 24 28 32
1 Weekend 
Interview
Weekend 
Interview
In-depth Front Page Front Page Front page Headline, 
Opinion
2 Family & 
Society
Reader 
Digest/
Economy 
& People
Current 
Affairs
Weekend 
Topic
Page Two Event In-depth
3 Colorful 
Square
Medicine 
& Health
China 
Economy
Sports The World The World Politics
4 Art Art Art Sports The Week Focus Politics
5 People & 
Law
People & 
Law
Portray People & 
Law
Investigation Investiga-
tion
6 The Globe Faces Current 
Affairs
SW 
Investigation
Law & Order Law & 
Order
7 Serial 
Literature
Social Lens Advertising Special 
Report
Observation The World
8 Grass 
Land
Portray Consumption Advertising Faces The World
9 Fashion Advertising Consumption Economy B News
10 The Globe People & 
Law
Declassified Finance Special 
Report
11 Serial 
Literature
Family Life Declassified Industry Special 
Report
12 Grass Land Grass Land Advertising IT Science
13 Sports Reading Current 
Affairs
People Civil Life
14 Information 
Times
Journalists 
Observatory
Civil 
Teahouse
Recommenda-
tion
Lens
15 Information 
Times
Information 
Times
Grass Land Current Affairs/ 
In-depth
Public  
Opinion
16 Family Life The Globe Computer Consumer 
Square
Portray
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17 Advertising New Life Science C 
Economy
18 Cartoon Left-Column Declassified/ 
Health
Conversa-
tion
19 Economy & 
People
Right-
Column
Civic Teahouse/ 
Civic Notes
IT
20 Economy & 
People
Back-Family Creativity Economics
21 SW Finance Culture Industry
22 Financial 
News
Reading Finance
23 Opinion Writing Opinion
24 Focus Entertainment Auto
25 New Life D Culture
26 Column Film
27 Column Criticism
28 Travel Television
29 Civil 
Notebook
30 Reading
31 Writing
32 Geography
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